The elective franchise was also placed upon a new basis. In the boroughs a Li° household suffrage was substituted for the narrow and unequal franchises which had sprung up—the rights of freemen, in corporate towns, being alone respected. In the counties, copyholders and leaseholders for terms of years, and tenants at will paying a rent of £50 a year, were added to the 4os. freeholders. Reform Acts, similar in character, were passed to deal with the franchise and constituencies in Ireland and Scotland respectively. The most decisive feature of these Reform Acts was not so much the extension of the franchise, as five-sixths of the male adult population were still left without a vote, the work ing-classes being practically without a vote. But what the Acts did do, once and for all, was to take the control of the con stituencies, particularly by the disfranchisement of the "rotten boroughs," out of the hands of the peers who had hitherto bought or sold the right of nomination of candidates. From henceforth the political balance of power was shifted from the Lords to the Commons.
The legislature was now brought into closer relations with the people, and became more sensitive to the pressure of popular forces. The immediate effects of this new spirit were perceptible in the increased legislative activity of the reformed parliament, its vigorous grappling with old abuses, and its preference of the public welfare to the narrower interests of classes. But, signal as was the regeneration of parliament, several electoral evils still needed correction. Strenuous efforts were made, with indifferent success, to overcome bribery and corruption, and proposals were often ineffectually made to restrain the undue influence of land lords and employers of labour by the ballot ; improvements were made in the registration and polling of electors, and the property qualification of members was abolished. Complaints were also urged that the middle classes had been admitted to power, while the working classes were excluded from the late scheme of en franchisement. It was only with the enactment of the second Reform Act of 1867 that the working-classes were admitted to the franchise in the borough, by the introduction of what was known as "household franchise," i.e., inhabitant occupation with out any minimum restriction of annual value. . In 1884 this franchise qualification was extended to the counties, thereby enabling the agricultural labourer to exercise a vote. Other im portant stages in reform were the Acts removing a property qualification for election to the House (1858) and securing free dom of election by the secrecy of the ballot (1872).
Prior to the reign of Charles I. the condition of society had been such as naturally to subordinate the Commons to the Crown and the Lords. After the Revolution of 1688 society had so far advanced that, under a free representation, the Commons might have striven with both upon equal terms. But, as by far the greater part of the representation was in the hands of the king and the territorial nobles, the large constitutional powers of the Commons were held safely in check. After 1832, when the repre sentation became a reality, a corresponding authority was asserted by the Commons. For several years, indeed, by reason of the weakness of the Liberal party, the Lords were able successfully to resist the Commons upon many important occasions; but it was soon acknowledged that they must yield whenever a decisive majority of the Commons, supported by public opinion, insisted upon the passing of any measure, however repugnant to the senti ments of the upper house. And it became a political axiom that the Commons alone determined the fate of ministries.
Before 1832 the functions of ministers were mainly adminis trative, and parliament was able to deal much as it pleased with their rare legislative proposals without thereby depriving them of office. Moreover, since before that date ministers were, generally speaking, in fact as well as in theory appointed by the king, while the general confidence of the majority in the House of Commons followed the confidence not so much of the electorate as of the Crown, that house was able on occasions to exercise an effective control over foreign policy. Pitt, after 1784, was de feated several times on foreign and domestic issues, yet his resignation was neither expected nor desired. In 1788, when the regency of the prince of Wales appeared probable, and again in 1812, it was generally assumed that it would be in his power to dismiss his father's ministers and to maintain the Whigs in office without dissolving parliament. This system, while it gave to ministers security of tenure, left much effective freedom of action to the House of Commons. But the Reform Act of 1832 intro duced a new order of things. In 1835 the result of a general elec tion was for the first time the direct cause of a change of ministry, and in 1841 a House of Commons was elected for the express pur pose of bringing a particular statesman into power. The electorate voted for Sir Robert Peel, and it would have been as impossible for the house then elected to deny him their support as it would be for the college of electors in the United States to exercise their private judgment in the selection of a president. As time went on, and the party system became more closely organized in the enlarged electorate, the voting power throughout the country came to exercise an increasing influence. The premier was now a party leader who derived his power in reality neither from the Crown nor from parliament, but from the electorate, and to the electorate he could appeal if deserted by his parliamentary majority. Unless it was prepared to drive him from the office in which it was elected to support him, that majority would not venture to defeat, or even seriously to modify, his legislative proposals, or to pass any censure on his foreign policy for all such action would now be held to be equivalent to a vote of no con fidence. From the passing of the Reform Act of 1867 down to 19oo (with a single exception due to the lowering of the franchise and the redistribution of seats) the electorate voted alternately for the rival party leaders, and it was the function of the houses elected for that purpose to pass the measures and to endorse the general policy with which those leaders were respectively identi fied. The cabinet (q.v.), composed of colleagues selected by the prime minister, had practically, though indirectly, become an executive committee acting on behalf of the electorate, that is to say, the majority which returned their party to office; and the House of Commons practically ceased to exercise control over ministers except in so far as a revolt in the party forming the majority could influence the prime minister, or force him to resign or dissolve. Meanwhile, the virtual identificaton of the electorate with the nation by the successive extensions of the franchise added immensely to its power, the chief limitation being supplied by the Septennial Act. The House of Lords, whatever its nominal rights, came henceforth in practice to exercise restriction rather on the House of Commons than on the will of the electorate, for the acquiescence of the upper house in the decision of the electors, when appealed to on a specific point of issue between the two houses, was gradually accepted by its leaders as a constitutional convention.