I the Problem of the Suez Canal

I. THE PROBLEM OF THE SUEZ CANAL When Turkey entered the World War on the side of the Central Powers at the beginning of Nov. 1914, it was obvious that an advance from southern Palestine against the Suez canal and Egypt was likely to form part of the Turkish strategical programme, largely inspired from Berlin. Seizure of the canal would paralyse the most vital line of communication with the British Empire and seriously hamper the gathering of its armies. Even the threat must immobilize considerable numbers for passive defence. The dream of reasserting dominion over their former province of Egypt was an additional lure to the Turks.

The Turkish Advance.

Between the southern frontier of Palestine and the Suez canal lay over loom. of almost waterless desert. It was crossed by three routes, of which the northern, near the coast, through Rafah, El `Arish and Qatiya to El Qantara, was the easiest and best. The Turks made their main effort on the centre route, from El `Auja by the Wadi Muksheib, which reaches the canal about Tussum, south of Ismailia but they also sent smaller forces by the coast road and by the southern route through Nekhl to Suez, the most difficult of the three. The Turkish commander in Syria, Jemal Pasha, directed the enterprise, but its real brain was his Bavarian chief of staff, Col. Kress von Kressenstein. In spite of the difficulties, a force of some 12,000 to 15,00o Turks was brought within striking distance of the canal by the first days of Feb. 1915.

The British were not unaware of the danger—though they un derestimated the Turkish effort—and were ready. The line of defence, which was held mainly by Indian troops, lay on the western bank of the canal, leaving the canal itself as an obstacle between the defenders and the enemy. A territorial division (the 42nd) and some Australian and New Zealand troops, who were completing their training near Cairo, formed the reserve. War ships in the canal provided gun support and compensated for the scarcity of land artillery. On the night of Feb. 2-3 the Turks made their effort, reached the canal, and actually succeeded in pushing three pontoons full of troops across it. These were all

killed or captured. An attack next day had no better success, and the Turks withdrew, unmolested by any serious pursuit.

This first Turkish raid, though it failed, proved the desert pass able to large bodies of troops and thus compelled the retention of considerable forces in Egypt for the protection of the canal. It also showed the unsuitability of the defence on the west bank, since this line could not prevent the attackers from reaching the canal and interfering with the passage of shipping. No change was made in the system of defence, however, till after Lord Kitch ener's visit in Nov. 1915. For during the summer and autumn of 1915 the Gallipoli campaign was in full swing and absorbed the principal efforts of both Turk and Briton. The Senussi rising in the western desert, too, occupied the attention of the G.O.C. in Egypt, Gen. Sir John Maxwell. After the evacuation of Gallipoli at the end of 1915 and beginning of 1916 Egypt contained close on 400,000 British troops, reor ganizing and recuperating after that gallant but ill-starred adven ture. For a short time there ex isted within Egypt three separate, independent commands, but in March 1916 all three were united under Sir Archibald Murray.

Meanwhile, early in 1916, a line was taken up in the desert, some 8 to 1 om. to the east of the canal. Many miles of entrench ments were dug and reveted in the shifting sand, metalled roads constructed and pipe lines laid. For the Turk, freed from concern for the safety of his capital, was obviously contemplating a fresh advance on Egypt and the canal. He had in fact been busy with preparations ever since the repulse of his first effort.

This system of entrenchments, extending for some 8om. along practically the whole length of the canal, was expensive in men as well as in material. This fact originated the first advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and led to the crossing of the Sinai desert, an achievement made possible by sound and thor ough organization, and by the fine quality of the mounted troops, mainly Australians and New Zealanders.