Iv Syria

Meanwhile, the Turkish 4th Army had remained inactive, ignorant of the fate of the other armies. On the 22nd it began a hurried retreat on Amman, hoping thence to escape up the Hejaz railway to Damascus. It paused at Amman till Sept. 25, await ing the arrival of the Maan garrison from the south. But the 4th Army was now not only too late to rescue this force, but too late to secure its own safety. Feisal's Northern Arab Army was al ready between it and Damascus, and the whole countryside was rising against the Turks. The Arabs under Lawrence had already contributed largely to the discomfiture of the Turks by their raids on the lines of communication near Deraa, which they cut effec tively from Sept. 17 onwards. They were thus in a position to delay and harass the 4th Army in its march north.

The Final Victory.

The Turkish 7th and 8th Armies having been disposed of, Allenby ordered a part of his mounted troops to occupy Haifa, which was captured on Sept. 23 by a most gallant charge of the Indian Imperial Service Brigade. The remainder were despatched east and north-east to cut off the 4th Army and to capture Damascus. The 4th Cavalry Division was to cross the Jordan near Beisan and move on Deraa, while the Australian Mounted Division was to make direct for Damascus by the road which runs from Nazareth to the west of Lake Tiberias, crossing the Jordan at Jisr Benat Yakub. On Sept. 25 there was a fierce fight at Tell es Semakh at the southern end of Lake Tiberias. The 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade charged in the dark over un known ground and captured the village after hand-to-hand fighting with a force composed largely of Germans.

The Turkish 4th Army passed Deraa before the 4th Cavalry Division could head it off, but under pressure from this division and from the Arabs it gradually disintegrated. The end came on Sept. 3o, when the Australian Mounted Division, which on Sept. 28 had overcome some determined opposition to its crossing of the Jordan, succeeded in getting astride the Damascus-Beirut road just outside the city, cutting off the remains of the 4th Army. Damascus was occupied next day, Oct. r. Immediately after the capture of Damascus, malaria and influenza broke out and placed a great proportion of the British mounted forces out of action. It also seriously affected the very numerous Turkish prisoners.

There was now no formidable Turkish force in southern Syria. To complete its occupation, two columns advanced. The 7th Division left Haifa on Oct. r and moved up the coast to Beirut, which it reached on the 8th, and then on to Tripoli, which was occupied on the 18th ; the 5th Cavalry Division, which though less affected by malaria and influenza than other formations, was con siderably below establishment, advanced from Damascus by Homs (Oct. 16), Hama (Oct. 20) to Aleppo, which was occupied on Oct.

26. The last fighting took place north of the town on the 28th. On the 31st an armistice was concluded. Between Sept. 19 and Oct. 26 the British army had moved its front forward a distance of 36o miles. During this period the 5th Cavalry Division had actually covered over 500 miles. The captures included 72,000 Turks and nearly 4,000 Germans and Austrians, 35o guns, Boo machine guns, and large quantities of transport and other material. History records few victories, if any, more striking and complete.

Conclusions.

These campaigns of the Egyptian Expedition ary Force are of great strategical interest. For the military stu dent they will always remain classic examples of the use of mounted troops and of the value of mobility. Conditions of war change, and it may be that some mechanical form of transport will entirely replace the horse as the means by which mobility can be secured. But the power of mobility as a strategical weapon in the hands of a commander who has the knowledge and the de termination to use it as did Gen. Allenby will only be enhanced.

A second strategical lesson is the advantage gained by a com mander who can conceal his intentions from his opponent. In both his great battles against the Turk, Allenby completely de ceived his adversary as to his plans, and had thus secured a deci sive superiority before the battle was joined. Only constant f ore sight and careful preparation can effect this. Air superiority is a factor of increasing importance in this question of concealment of plans and movements.

Finally, the dependence of all strategy on the communications may be stressed. The Turks added to the initial handicap which their long and difficult lines of communication imposed on them by their neglect to improve these and by the inefficiency of their working. Falkenhayn, during his command, entirely failed to adapt his strategy to the limitations necessitated by his means of transport. On the British side, the greatest care was devoted to de veloping the communications in accordance with the strategical plan, and the supply services were thus able to cope even with such problems as were presented by the rapidity of the advance to Damascus and Aleppo.

von Kressenstein, Die Kriegsfiihrung in der Wiiste (Oldenburg, 1922) ; Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, U.S. Naval Institute, Trans. by C. Reichmann (Annapolis, 1927) ; A. P. Wall, The Palestine Campaign (1928) ; G. MacMunn and C. Falls, Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine (British official history) . See also WORLD WAR ; BIBLIOGRAPHY. (A. P. W.)