Parthia 5

These tendencies taken together explain the radical weakness of the Parthian empire. It was easy enough to collect a great army and achieve a great victory; it was absolutely impossible to hold the army together for any longer period, or to conduct a regular campaign. The Parthians proved incapable of creating a firm, united organization, such as the Achaemenids before them, and the Sassanids after them gave to their empire. The kings themselves were toys in the hands of the magnates and the army who, tenaciously as they clung to the anointed dynasty of the Arsacids, were utterly indifferent to the person of the individual Arsacid. Every moment they were ready to overthrow the reign ing monarch and to seat another on his throne. The kings, for their part, sought protection in craft, treachery and cruelty, and only succeeded in aggravating the situation. More especially they saw an enemy in every prince, and the worst of enemies in their own sons. Sanguinary crimes were thus of everyday occurrence in the royal household ; and frequently it was merely a matter of chance whether the father anticipated the son, or the son the father. The conditions were the same as obtained subsequently under the Mohammedan caliphate (q.v.) and the empire of the Ottomans. The internal history of the Parthian dominion is an unbroken sequence of civil war and dynastic strife.

For the literature dealing with the Parthian empire

see PARTHIA.

The Wars with Rome.

These conditions elucidate the fact that the Parthian empire, though founded on annexation and perpetually menaced by hostile arms in both the east and the west, yet never took a strong offensive after the days of Mithra dates II. It was bound to protect itself against Scythian aggression in the east and Roman aggression in the west. To maintain, or regain, the suzerainty over Mesopotamia and the vassal states of that region, as also over Atropatene and Armenia, was its most imperative task. Yet it always remained on the defensive and even so was lacking in energy. Whenever it made an effort to enforce its claims, it retreated so soon as it was confronted by a resolute foe.

Thus the wars between Parthia and Rome proceeded, not from the Parthians—deeply injured though they were by the en croachments of Pompey—but from Rome herself. Rome had been obliged, reluctantly enough, to enter upon the inheritance of Alexander the Great; and, since the time of Pompey, had definitely subjected to her dominion the Hellenistic countries as far as the Euphrates. Thus the task now faced them of annexing the remainder of the Macedonian empire, the whole east from the Euphrates to the Indus, and of thereby saving Greek civiliza tion (cf. Plut. Comp. Nic. et Crass. 4). The aristocratic republic quailed before such an enterprise, though Lucullus, at the height of his successes, entertained the thought (Plut. Luc. 3o). But the

ambitious men, whose goal was to erect their own sovereignty on the ruins of the republic, took up the project. With this ob jective M. Licinius Crassus, the triumvir, in 54 B.C., took the aggressive against Parthia, the occasion being favourable owing to the dynastic troubles between Orodes I., the son of Phraates III., and his brother Mithradates III. Crassus fell on the field of Carrhae (June 9, 53 B.c.). With this Mesopotamia was re gained by the Parthians, and King Artavasdes of Armenia now entered their alliance. But, apart from the ravaging of Syria (51 B.c.) by Pacorus the son of Orodes, the threatened attack on the Roman empire was carried into effect neither then nor during the civil war of Caesar and Pompey. At the time of his assassina tion Caesar was intent on resuming the expedition of Crassus. The Parthians formed a league with Brutus and Cassius, as previously with Pompey, but gave them no support, until in 4o B.C. a Parthian army, led by Pacorus and the republican general Labienus, harried Syria and Asia Minor. But it was easily re pulsed by Ventidius Bassus, the lieutenant of Mark Antony. Pacorus himself fell on June 9, 38 B.C. at Gindarus in northern Syria. Antony then attacked the Parthians in 36 B.c., and pene trated through Armenia into Atropatene, but was defeated by Phraates IV.—who in 37 B.C. had murdered his father Orodes I. —and compelled to retreat with heavy losses. The continuation of the war was frustrated by the conflict with Octavian. Armenia alone was again subdued in 34 B.C. by Antony, who treacherously captured and executed King Artavasdes.

Roman opinion universally expected that Augustus would take up the work of his predecessors, annihilate- the Parthian dominion, and subdue the east as far as the Indians, Scythians and Seres (cf. Horace and the other Augustan poets). But Augustus dis appointed these expectations. His whole policy and the needs of the newly organized Roman empire demanded peace. His efforts were devoted to reaching a modus vivendi, by which the authority of Rome and her most vital claims might be peacefully vindi cated. This the weakness of Parthia enabled him to effect with out much difficulty. His endeavours were seconded by the revolt of Tiridates II., before whom Phraates IV. was compelled to flee (32 B.c.), till restored by the Scythians. Augustus lent no sup port to Tiridates in his second march on Ctesiphon (26 B.c.), but Phraates was all the more inclined on that account to stand on good terms with him. Consequently in 20 B.C., he restored the standards captured in the victories over Crassus and Antony, and recognized the Roman suzerainty over Osroene and Armenia. In return, the Parthian dominion in Babylonia and the other vassal states were left undisputed.