Philosophy and Philosophical Studies

Logic, Aesthetics and Ethics.

If the theory of knowledge thus passes insensibly into ontology it becomes somewhat diffi cult to assign a distinct sphere to logic (q.v.). Ueberweg's defini tion of it as "the science of the regulative laws of thought" (or "the normative science of thought") comes near enough to the traditional sense to enable us to compare profitably the usual subject-matter of the science with the definition and end of phi losophy. The introduction of the term "regulative" or "normative" is intended to differentiate the science from psychology as the science of mental processes or events. In this reference logic does not tell us how our intellections connect themselves as mental phenomena, but how we ought to connect our thoughts if they are to realize truth (either as consistency with what we thought before or as agreement with observed facts). Logic, therefore, agrees with epistemology (and differs from psychology) in treat ing thought not as mental fact but as knowledge, as idea, as having meaning in relation to an objective world. To this extent it must lead on to the theory of knowledge. But, if we desire to keep by older landmarks and maintain a distinction between the two disciplines, a ground for doing so may be found in the fact that all the main definitions of logic point to the investigation of the laws of thought in a subjective reference—with a view, that is, by an analysis of the operation, to ensure its more correct per formance.

Aesthetics (q.v.) may be treated as a department of psychology or physiology, and in England this is the mode of treatment that has been most general. To what peculiar excitation of our bodily or mental organism, it is asked, are the emotions due which make us declare an object beautiful or sublime? And, the question be ing put in this form, the attempt has been made in some cases to explain any peculiarity in the emotions by analysing them into simpler elements, such as primitive organic pleasures and pro longed associations of usefulness or fitness. But, just as psychology in general cannot do duty for a theory of knowledge, so it holds true of this particular application of psychology that a mere refer ence of these emotions to the mechanism and interactive play of our faculties cannot be regarded as an account of the nature of the beautiful. Perhaps by talking of "emotions" we tend to give an unduly subjective colour to the investigation ; it would be better to speak of the perception of the beautiful. Pleasure in itself is unqualified, and affords no differentia. In the case of a beautiful object the resultant pleasure borrows its specific qual ity from the presence of determinations essentially objective in their nature, though not reducible to the categories of science. Unless, indeed, we conceive our faculties to be constructed on some arbitrary plan which puts them out of relation to the facts with which they have to deal, we have a prima facie right to treat beauty as an objective determination of things. The question of aesthetics would then be formulated—What is it in things that makes them beautiful, and what is the relation of this aspect of the universe to its ultimate nature, as that is expounded in meta physics? The answer constitutes the substance of aesthetics, con sidered as a branch of philosophy. But it is not given simply in

abstract terms : the philosophical treatment of aesthetics includes also an exposition of the concrete phases of art, as these have appeared in the history of the world, relating themselves to differ ent phases of human culture.

Of ethics (q.v.) it may also be said that many of the topics commonly embraced under that title are not strictly philosophical in their nature. They are subjects for a scientific psychology employing the evolutionary method with the conceptions of hered ity and development, and calling to its aid, as such a psychology will do, the investigations of all the sociological sciences. To such a psychology must be relegated all questions as to the origin and development of moral ideas. Similarly, the question debated at such length by English moralists as to the nature of the moral faculty (moral sense, conscience, etc.) and the controversy con cerning the freedom of the will belong mainly to psychology. If we exclude such questions in the interest of systematic correctness, and seek to determine for ethics a definite subject-matter, the science may be said to fall into two departments. The first of these deals with the notion of duty, and endeavours to define the good or the ultimate end of action ; the second lays out the scheme of concrete duties which are deducible from, or which, at least, are covered by, this abstractly stated principle. The second of these departments is really the proper subject-matter of ethics con sidered as a separate science ; but it is often conspicuous by its absence from ethical treatises. However moralists may differ on first principles, there seems to be remarkably little practical diver gence when they come to lay down the particular laws of moral ity. It may be added that, where a systematic account of duties is actually given, the connection of the particular duties with the universal formula is in general more formal than real. It is only under the head of casuistry (q.v.) that ethics has been much culti vated as a separate science. The first department of ethics, on the other hand, is the branch of the subject in virtue of which ethics forms part of philosophy. As described above, it ought rather to be called, in Kant's phrase, the metaphysic of ethics. A theory of obligation is ultimately found to be inseparable from a metaphysic of personality. The connection of ethics with meta physics will be patent as a matter of fact, if it be remembered how Plato's philosophy is summed up in the idea of the good, and how Aristotle also employs the essentially ethical notion of end as the ultimate category by which the universe may be explained or reduced to unity. But the necessity of the connection is also apparent, unless we are to suppose that, as regards the course of universal nature, man is altogether an imperium in imperio, or rather (to adopt the forcible phrase of Marcus Aurelius) an abscess or excrescence on the nature of things. If, on the con trary, we must hold that man is essentially related to what the same writer calls "a common nature," then it is a legitimate corollary that in man as intelligence we ought to find the key of the whole fabric.