On Feb. 16, 1920, the London Conference of the Allies an nounced that Constantinople would remain the capital of Turkey; but a month later the Allies informed Turkey that this conces sion depended upon its good behaviour. Constantinople had been occupied by Allied troops under the command of Sir G. F. Milne before the end of 1918. On April 25, at the Conference of San Remo, mandates were given to France for Syria, Cilicia and the Lebanon; to Great Britain for Palestine and Mesopotamia, but the mandate over Armenia was declined both by the League of Nations and by the United States. Finally, on May 11, 1920, the draft of a treaty similar in many respects to the Treaty of Ver sailles was handed to the Turkish representatives at Sevres. It was signed on Aug. io, 192o (see SEVRES, TREATY OF). Thus the task of constructing terms of peace was brought to an end. Real peace, however, had not yet come to the world.
The Peace Conference should have sat immediately after the conclusion of the Armistice, and should have made a preliminary peace to be followed later by a permanent peace. The belligerent nations had been so shattered by the war that the need for bring ing about a resumption of normal conditions as soon as possible was imperative. Much of the distress which has overtaken Europe since 1918 might have been avoided by an early preliminary peace. When the conference first got down to work there was much con fusion as to method and also as to the precedence to be given the subjects to be discussed. There should have been a well-de fined programme laid out in advance so as to form a basis for discussion, as was done when the Covenant was formed. The lack of this caused the conference to waste time, and it resulted in the setting up of the ineffective Council of Ten which was, indeed, a council of 3o or 4o when the secretaries, experts and representa tives of states interested were included in the meetings. After wasting many weeks in a futile endeavour to get at the facts, the Council of Four was substituted for the Council of Ten. Decisions then came rapidly.
President Wilson finally agreed to a compromise which amounted to Germany's signing a blank cheque to be filled in later. He con sented to this because it was thought that the Reparations Corn mission which the treaty provided, would, of necessity, name a sum which could be met. No one then considered the possibility of the United States Senate refusing to ratify the treaty.
The question of French security ran through the discussions at Paris and finally was met by compromise. President Wilson and Lloyd George agreed on behalf of the United States and Great Britain respectively to come to the assistance of France in the event of an unwarranted invasion by Germany. The terms of the treaty were somewhat indefinite, but they were the best that Clemenceau, after long negotiation, was able to secure. Wilson and Lloyd George were adamant in refusing all proposals regard ing the left bank of the Rhine as a permanent line.
If the Versailles Treaty had been accepted by the United States, the Franco-American Security Treaty would, in all probabil ity, have gone through ; and the Versailles Treaty would have been ratified by the Senate provided President Wilson had been willing to accept the Lodge reservations. The Versailles Treaty failed by six votes of getting the necessary two-thirds ; twenty odd Democrats who were ardently for the treaty voted against it, because of the reservations. As with the League of Nations, the importance of the French Security Treaty was not realized at Paris in the making of the peace. It has been the crux of nearly all the troubles which have beset Europe since the Armistice was signed on Nov. II, 1918. If the French had been assured of pro tection, their attitude toward Germany, toward reparations and toward disarmament undoubtedly would have been more in keep ing with the public opinion of the world. (See SECURITY.) It is only in retrospect that historic events are seen at their just value. Those who are making history oftentimes exaggerate the importance of some things and underestimate the importance of others. At Paris undue stress was laid on questions of enemy disarmament and reparations—both matters of temporary inter est and susceptible of quick solution. Within a few decades they pass from view; but questions like the League of Nations and the security of France reach to the heart of peace and war, and are vital if Western civilization is to live. If it had been seen at Paris, untold hardships might have been averted.