It is to subjective modes of experience that the traditional threefold scheme of Cognition, Feeling and Conation most directly refers, and to them it is most conveniently restricted. We shall first consider how the experiences distinguished under these heads are connected with each other. We shall then, for purposes of exposition, treat each of them separately, so far as it is legiti mate and convenient to do so.
Interrelations Between Cognition, Feeling and Cona tion.—The three subjective components of experience certainly are irreducibly distinct. They are not, however, events which may occur independently. The terms refer, rather, to "aspects" of a concrete unitary whole. Even so, they are not simply con comitant and independent attributes, as colour and sound would seem to be. A better analogy is afforded by the relations of colour and extension. As the former implies the latter so the so-called elements of experience would seem to occur in a simi lar intimate connection.
Conation clearly implies cognition. A striving which is wholly blind is an unintelligible conception. The experient always has at least a vague awareness of the sort of thing he wants, either to "have" or to avoid. But cognition, it may reasonably be argued, equally implies conation. The relations, however, are not recipro cal, for in any given case the immediate objects are not exactly the same. It is on account of this difference that there is pro gressive development of experience. We apprehend an object because of some interest in the whole of which it forms a part. We become aware of it because we want to know what is there, though having found out what, we may in consequence lose inter est. That is to say conation is presupposed only in relation to an object presented as admitting of further determination, not as already fully determined. In this lies the significance of atten tion. Conative activity, whatever its remoter end, presupposes cognition of the situation to be changed, a fuller awareness is required of that which is, and to some extent of that which is to be. So far as conation is so directed simply to fuller cognition, the process is one of attention.
The place of feeling in the cycle of cognition, feeling and conation presents a peculiar problem. Is it the immediate conse
quence of cognition or does it depend upon conation? Here, as is so often the case, each of the rival theories is strong in what it affirms, and falls into error only in what it denies. It is indis putable that the apprehension of various things and their qualities (such as the taste of a dose of quinine) immediately gives rise to affective experience. But it is also plausibly contended that all pleasures are ultimately "pleasures of pursuit." In so far as conative activity is successful, pleasure is experienced, in so far as it is thwarted, pain is the consequence. Difficulties of detail arise in regard to some of the sensory pleasures and pains, and even granting that these can be shown to conform to the rule, a place will still remain to be assigned to cognition. No conative tendency can, from the standpoint of the experient, be regarded as progressive unless it is recognised as such. Travelling in the dark we may be on the right road, but if there is any serious doubt about it, we gain little satisfaction from our progress. It is the sight of familiar landmarks which conditions our satis faction. In general it is presentational cues, i.e., percepts and ideas, which mark the progress of conation. This is as true of purely instinctive action as of intelligent self-direction. The mutual implication of cognition and conation would thus seem to resolve the apparent contradiction between these rival views.
In the genetic treatment here adopted we may dispense with any attempt to classify the "cognitive faculties." There is only one cognitive function, which, according to the nature of its object or of the presentations which condition its exercise, is described as visual, auditory or tactile perception, and according to temporal marks, as memory, expectation or imagination. Ac cording as the object is determined as actual or possible, so the difference of mental attitude is expressed by such terms as "belief," "assumption" or "supposal." These, however, with their many subtle variations can hardly be regarded as distinct and separate f unctions.