Scientific Conception of History.—With regard to the func tion of the historian, Polybius is one of those who consider history to be—in the phrase of Dionysius—"philosophy teaching by ex amples." Thus he says in i. 35: "Whereas there are for all men two ways of improvement, to wit by one's own disasters or those of others, the former is the more vivid, the latter is the less harm ful. Therefore, one should never willingly choose the former, since the improvement which it brings is fraught with great danger and pain, but one should always pursue the latter, since in it one can discern the better way without hurt. And it is therefore to be considered that the best education for real life is the knowledge of affairs which accrues from practical history (7-pay,uarto) laropta) which alone, without personal hurt, makes men on every occasion and in all circumstances, true judges of the better way." From this conception of history, which differs little, if at all, from that of Thucydides or the modern historian of the scien tific school, it follows that the chief interest lies, not in the question of origins, in the legendary or semi-legendary traditions, by which states or nations, like individuals, when they have achieved greatness, are fain to decorate their origins, but in the actual transactions of historical times, the plain matters of fact which appeal to the plain man. This seems to be undoubtedly what Polybius means by the term "pragmatic" by which he sev eral times characterizes his History. Thus in criticizing Phy larchus he writes (ii. 56. 7. seq.) : "Endeavouring to excite his readers to pity and to make them sympathetic with his narrative, he introduces embracing of wives, disordered hair, baring of breasts, tears and lamentations of men and women haled away with their children and aged parents. This he does throughout his whole history, seeking always to give a vivid picture of hor rors. The ignoble femininity of this design may be left out of the question ; but we must consider what is proper and profitable in history. It is the function of the historian not to astonish his readers by prodigies nor to hunt up all possible tales and recount all the concomitants of his subjects, as tragedians do, but to narrate in their verity the things actually done and said, how modest soever they may be. For the end of history is not identical with that of tragedy, but quite the contrary. In tragedy the end is by the most plausible language to astonish and move the audience temporarily. In history the end is by real facts and real speeches to instruct and persuade for all time the lovers of knowledge : since in the former the leading motive is the plausible, even if the plausible be false, for the deception of the spectators; in the latter the leading motive is truth for the benefit of the stu dent." What Polybius himself means by "Pragmatic history" (i. 2. rnXi.Ka avA(36,XXEcOat rert•wc€ Tat rpay,uarcKijs laropLas rpinros) is illustrated by his remarks (iii. 47) on those who have written of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps : "Wishing to astonish their readers by their marvellous account of the localities, they fall into two faults which are most foreign to all history; for they are compelled to tell falsehoods (tkeyboXoy ay) and to contradict themselves. On the one hand they introduce Hannibal as a general of inimitable daring and prudence, while they show him admittedly the most imprudent ; and on the other hand, unable to reach a denouement or an issue from their own mendacity, they introduce into pragmatic history gods and the children of gods. . . . Ignorant of these things they say that a hero (i.e., a demigod) appeared and showed the Carthaginians the roads. Hence, naturally, they find themselves in the same position as the writers of tragedies. For the denoue ments of their dramas need a god and a machine, because their first premises are false and contrary to reason; and historians must be in like case and must represent gods and heroes appearing when their premises are improbable and false." Polybius (iii. 6) insists on the distinction between the remoter causes (atria() of events and their immediate origins (apxcti) and in the same spirit he emphasizes the necessity of taking a com prehensive or synoptic view of history, regarding history as a unity in so far as the interests of different nations mutually interact : "In previous times the actions of the world were sporadic . . . now history is, as it were, an organic whole; the affairs of Italy and Africa are intertwined with those of Asia and Greece and all have reference to one end" (i. 3). It is this con ception of history which leads Polybius to prefix to his more immediate subject the preparatory narrative of his first two books : "The peculiarity of our study and the marvel of our times is this. Just as Fortune (rbxn) has bent almost all the affairs of the world to one end and has inclined them to one and the same goal, so by means of history we must bring under one conspectus for our readers the agency which Fortune has em ployed to accomplish the whole. For this consideration it is chiefly which incited and stimulated me to undertake my history, coupled with the fact that no one in our time has attempted a general history : otherwise I had been much less eager in this direction. But when I see that many writers occupy themselves with particular wars and some of the actions connected with them, while no one, so far as I know, has even attempted to examine the general and comprehensive economy of events—when and whence they originated and how they attained fulfillment—I con sidered it absolutely essential not to omit or allow to pass un noticed the most beautiful and at the same time the most bene ficial exhibition of the power of Fortune. For many as are her
innovations and unceasingly as she engages in the affairs of men, absolutely never has she wrought such a work or engaged in such a struggle as in our time. This cannot be seen from sectional histories—unless it be that one who visits the most eminent indi vidual cities or sees them represented in a picture, imagines straightway that he understands the form of the whole world, and its general position and arrangement" (i. 4).
i. 2 ; ill. 4; xix. ro). He had an extensive first-hand acquaintance with geography (cf. the inscription on his statue at Megalopolis as quoted above) ; he accompanied Scipio in many campaigns (Arrian, Tact. l.c.) and, as he tells us himself, "it was mainly for this reason that I undertook the dangers and discomforts incident to travel in Africa and Spain and also Gaul and the Outer Sea (Atlantic) adjacent to those lands, in order that I might correct the ignorance of my predecessors in those matters and make known those parts of the world to the Greeks" (iii. 59). He also tells us (iii. 48) in discussing Hannibal's passage of the Alps, that he had himself seen the region and had travelled over the Alps for the sake of information and observation. His inti mate study of constitutional matters is shown by his account of the Roman constitution in Book VI. Finally he made diligent use of the documentary and monumental evidence accessible to him. Thus in iii. 33, after giving the numbers of Hannibal's forces with a detail "suggesting the plausible mendacity of a hikorian" he explains that he took the numbers from a record in bronze left at Lacinium (in Bruttium) by Hannibal himself. In xvi. 15 he appeals to the evidence of a despatch preserved in the prytaneum of Rhodes ; and the manner in which he quotes the terms of the treaty which ended the first Punic War (i. 62) and of that between Hannibal and Philip (vii. 9) implies that he is either translating or quoting a translation of an original document which he possibly obtained from official sources.
His enlightened conception of the function of history, his careful preparation for his task, entitle Polybius to an honourable place among historians. The completely impartial historian is an ideal, certainly unattainable and perhaps undesirable. No very serious charge on this ground is made against Polybius, nor can such charges in any case be either confuted or confirmed authori tatively. He has himself at all events forestalled criticism : "That historians may incline the balance in favour of their own country I would allow—not that they should make statements which contradict the facts. There are enough errors of ignorance to which historians are liable and which a man may hardly avoid. But if we write falsely from intention—be it for country or for friends or for favour—what better are we than those who make their living by such means? . . . On this tendency readers should keep a watchful eye, and historians themselves should guard against it" (xvi. The main criticism directed against Polybius from Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1st century, B.c.) to the present day is made on the ground of style. Dionysius, from the standpoint of a strict Atticist, writes of the later Greek historians who have so far neglected style that they "have left behind them compositions which no one endures to read to the end—Phylarchus, Duris, Polybius" (Dionys. De comp. verb. iv.). The modern reader, from a more general standpoint, would be inclined to think that his defects of style have been exaggerated. But his unfamiliar vocabulary, his intentional rejection of the picturesque concom itants of historical events, his anxiety to point a moral, combine to render him less popular than his merits deserve: one more proof that something more than knowledge, more than accuracy, more than serious purpose and moral earnestness, is required in the historian to whom the world will gladly listen.