The defences of Port Arthur, as designed by the Russians in 190o, and owing to the meagre allotment of funds only partially carried out before the war, had some tincture, but no more, of modern continental ideas. The main line of defence followed the outer edge of the amphitheatre of hills surrounding the harbour. These hills had their greatest development on the north-east side, their outer crests being some 4,000yd. from the Old Town. Running south-west and south back to the coast, the line gradu ally drew in quite close to the south-west end of the harbour. The total length from sea to sea was some 12 miles. Its most obvious weakness was that 5,000yd. N.W. of the harbour and New Town, the now famous "203-Metre Hill" overlooked both. Here it had been intended to construct permanent works, but consideration of expenditure had caused this to be deferred.
The permanent works along the main line were supplemented before the siege began by a prodigious development of semi-per manent works and trenches. Every knoll had its redoubt or bat tery, and the trenches were arranged line behind line, to give sup porting, cross and enfilade fire in every direction. On the north west front, 203-Metre Hill, in advance of the main line, was occupied by strong, semi-permanent works, with trenches and re doubts on either flank. Wire entanglements were disposed in re peated lines in front of the defences, but they were not of a strong type. The Russians, with the resources of the fleet at their dis posal (just as at Sevastopol, in the Crimean War), used great numbers of machine guns and electric lights, and the available garrison at first was probably, including sailors, 47,000 men.
Such were the defences that the Japanese attacked, with a force at the outset (July 30) barely superior in numbers to the defenders, and an entirely inadequate siege train (18 6-in. howitz ers, 6o 4.7-in. guns and howitzers, and about 200 field and moun tain guns). They were imperfectly informed of the strength of the garrison and the nature of the defences. Recollections of their easy triumph in 1894 and perhaps thoughts of Sevastopol, Ger man theories of the "brusque attack," the fiery ardour of the army, and above all the need of rapidly crushing or expelling the squadron in harbour, combined to suggest a bombardment and general assault. The bombardment began on Aug. 19 and con tinued for three days, while the infantry was spreading along the front and gaining ground where it could. The real assault was made on the night of the 21st on the two Pan-Lung forts (semi permanent) on the centre of the north-eastern front. Although the stormers captured the two forts they were unable to make any further progress under the fire of the permanent forts Erh-Lung and Chi-Kuan on either side of, and the Wan-tai fort behind, Pan Lung. attempt to bring up support to the captured posi tions failed. On the night of the 23rd-24th, just as the assault was being renewed, Stossel delivered a fierce counter-attack against the lost positions, and the result of an all-night battle was that though the forts were not recaptured, the assault was re pulsed with over 5,000 casualties, and the Japanese in Pan-Lung were isolated. This sortie raised the spirits of the Russians to the
highest pitch. They seemed, indeed, to have broken the spell of defeat. On the Japanese side 15,000 men had been killed and wounded in three weeks, and their army had now to resign itself to a methodical siege. Small sorties, partial attacks' and duels 'A feature of these constant night-fights was the effective use of the defenders' searchlight, both to show up the enemy and to blind him.
between the Japanese guns and the generally more powerful ordnance of the fortress continued. The siege approaches were first directed against the Temple-Waterworks group, which was stormed on Sept. 19 and 20. Pan-Lung was connected with the Japanese lines by covered ways, approaches were begun towards several of the eastern forts, and on Sept. 20, 'So-Metre Hill was stormed, though the crest was untenable under the fire from 203 Metre Hill. Further progress on the western side of the fortress was foiled after hard fighting, and the eastern forts remained the principal objective. Heavier howitzers had been sent for from Japan and on Oct. z the first batteries of 28-centimetre (1 'in.) howitzers came into action. They fired a shell weighing 485 lb. On the 12th, the Japanese took the trenches between the Water works Redoubt and the Erh-Lung, and from this time forward there was a desperate struggle at the sap-heads on the north front.' A lodgement on the counterscarp of Sung-Shu prepared the way for mining. On Nov. 17, seven mines were exploded.
On Nov. 26, another assault was made on the same lines as the earlier ones. By this time the besiegers were sapping under the es carps of the northern forts, and it would have been better to delay. But the situation was serious in the extreme. In Manchu ria Kuropatkin's army had reasserted itself. From Europe Roz hestvenski's squadron was just setting sail for the Far East. Marshal Oyama sent his principal staff officers to stimulate Nogi to fresh efforts, and some exhausted units of the besieging army were replaced by fresh troops from Japan. With ioo,000 men and this urgent need of immediate victory, Nogi and the marshal's staff officers felt bound to make a third general assault. The siege works had, indeed, made considerable progress. The ditches of grenades and extemporized trench mortars were used on both sides with very great effect. The Japanese hand grenades consisted of about I-lb. of high explosive in a tin case; the Russian cases were all sorts, including old Chinese shell. The Japanese em ployed wire-netting screens to stop the Russian grenades. Various means were tried for the destruction of entanglements. Eventually it was found that the best plan was to sap through them.