The demonstration that successful propaganda must express a definite policy and that policy must be framed in accordance with actual or prospective fact, remains as the chief lesson of Allied propagandist activities during the war. Yet the lesson was soon forgotten. While prep arations for the Paris Peace Conference were being made, some Allied Governments resumed propaganda of the older and less truthful type in the hope of promoting their interests during the negotiation of peace. This propaganda vitiated the whole atmos phere of the peace conference. In the presence of propagandist maps, drawn to substantiate the conflicting territorial claims of a dozen peoples, President Wilson exclaimed, indignantly: "Bring me maps that do not overlap." Drawn, written or spoken inaccu racies were accompanied by intrigue and pressure until the re sponsible statesmen of Europe found themselves so enmeshed that their expert advisers could not wholly disentangle them. Had not the framework of a peace settlement been created by the necessi ties of policy, as a basis for propaganda, during the war, the peace conference might have failed to reach even an approximately equitable settlement. As it was, the force of facts was too strong to be entirely overcome by interested misrepresentation.
For some years after the peace con ference, propaganda of the less laudable kind continued. It sur 'rounded every meeting of the Supreme Allied Council for the ad justment of post-war difficulties. Alongside of it ran persistent German propaganda of which the object was to disprove the charge that the Government of pre-war Germany had been espe cially responsible for the war. Among the German people this propaganda was highly successful, and it made some impression in Allied countries. A monumental collection of German diplo matic documents, covering the period between 1870 and 1914 was issued in more than 5o volumes. The British Government, in its turn, presently authorised a similar publication of its documents, and at length, the French Government decided to follow the Ger man and the British examples. Gradually the distinction between good propaganda and bad was again recognised, and a preference was shown for impressive presentations of truth. Realising that the public is entitled to information, and that declarations sus ceptible of being controverted on the morrow have little lasting value, many Governments established central offices to supply in formation, and attached special officials to their embassies, lega tions and consulates abroad in order to furnish it. Even if the line of demarcation between information and propaganda has not been everywhere scrupulously observed by these agencies, the gen eral tendency has undoubtedly been towards greater truthf ulness except in the case of propaganda emanating from Governments which have suppressed freedom of opinion in their own countries.
Russian Communist propaganda, in particular, has been wholly unscrupulous in its efforts to promote a world revolution; and Western Governments have been obliged repeatedly to insist, as a condition of normal relations with Russia, that it should cease. But, as often as this condition has been accepted, it has been violated, for revolutionary propaganda abroad is looked upon as essential to the maintenance of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Russia. In point of fact, the world has become, since the war,
the scene of a contest between incompatible views of social and political organisations just as it was during the war an arena for contending opinions upon the aims of the belligerents.
In substance, the principle at issue is whether or not force shall be recognised as the final arbiter in human affairs. Against the advocates of force, propaganda is being vigorously pursued for the promotion of international peace and for the elimination of violence from international relations. In many countries influential peace societies have been formed to urge peoples and Governments to abandon the very idea of resorting to force in their dealings with other Governments and peoples. This propaganda derived strength from the estab lishment of the League of Nations by the Peace Treaties; and the United States of America, though not a member of the League of Nations, promoted in 1928 the conclusion of a world-wide treaty to renounce war as an instrument of national policy.
Peace propagandists are agreed upon their main object—the prevention of war and the enthrone ment of law as the supreme arbiter between nations—but they differ upon the means of attaining it. Some hold it incompatible with the pacifist ideal to apply "sanctions," that is to say, coercive measures, against the warlike. Others believe that "sanctions" are as necessary in upholding international law as pains and pen alties are recognised to be in vindicating the laws of individual communities. The founders of the League of Nations were con vinced that some provision should be made to coerce Govern ments guilty of making war without submitting their claims in ad vance to mediation, arbitration or conciliation. For this reason "sanctions," economic and military, were contemplated in the League of Nations Covenant. On the other hand, the partisans of the "outlawry of war" urge that it would suffice to forbid war by international agreement. Only thus, they claim, can peoples and governments be brought to conceive international relations in terms of peace instead of in terms of war as the ultima ratio.
Between these two schools of thought, controversy has been lively and protracted. Propaganda for the definition of an even tual 'aggressor," on the one hand, and for the simple "outlawry of war" on the other, has been vigorously carried on ; but the prac tical efficacy of the arguments advanced on both sides may depend upon political and economic circumstances. The increasing rapid ity of communication between nations, and the inter-twining of their financial and commercial interests appear to operate in favour of peace. However strongly individual peoples may cling to their several rights and sovereignties, the leading nations feel that a violent clash between their aims and the aims of others might expose them to disaster if not to destruction. Circumstances are thus propitious to propaganda for peace, inasmuch as they tend to make it representative of sound policy; and, in the light of experience, this condition should suffice to ensure its success.
(H. W. S.) For "Propaganda by Deed" see ANARCHISM, BAKUNIN, INTER NATIONAL, THE, and COMMUNISM.