Sieges of Przemysl

During February and the first half of March the Austrian field armies made repeated efforts to advance to the relief of the for tress, but unsuccessfully (see CARPATHIANS, BATTLES OF THE). Meanwhile the Russians had gradually closed in and had com menced a systematic bombardment of the fortress. On March 13 they carried the advanced positions on its north front. Kus manek's situation was now desperate ; his supplies and munitions were almost exhausted, and the final effort of the field armies to come to his rescue had definitely been abandoned. He deter mined on an attempt to save a portion of the garrison by a break through to the east. The effort was made on the morning of the 19th, but was soon brought to a stand. The fate of the fortress was now sealed. On the morning of March 2 2 Kusmanek sur rendered, after destroying the works and military stores as far as possible. The numbers of the garrison then amounted to about 0,000.

Recapture of the Fortress.

The Russians did not hold the fortress for long. At the beginning of May Mackensen's offensive on the Dunajec broke through the Russian line and drove their armies back to the San (see DUNAJEC-SAN). On May 3o the Austrians attacked on the south-west and the Germans on the north of the fortress. The former made little progress, but the German heavy artillery, which included 42 cm. howitzers, made short work of the northern group of forts. On the night of June 2 the Russians abandoned the fortress.

Conclusions.

Przemysl was the only land fortress of the World War which stood a prolonged siege after complete invest ment, but the length of its resistance was seemingly due to the Russians' lack of efficient siege artillery, as is confirmed by the speed with which Mackensen's heavy guns reduced the forts at the time of its recapture. Nor can it be admitted that the fortress

served any strategical aim commensurate with the efforts expended on its defence and attempted relief. It is true that its resistance during the first siege was of value to the Austrians when their armies again advanced to the San, in assuring to them a bridge head over the river. But during the second siege Przemysl was an embarrassment rather than a source of strength and led to several ill-considered efforts at relief which cost the Austrian field armies dearly. The fortress did not control any line of supply vital to the Russian armies operating west of it towards Cracow, since there was a railway available through Jarostow. The Russians could therefore afford in the second siege to resort to a simple blockade by second-line troops, so that the fortress did not even weaken their field armies to any appreciable extent.

Hillge

r, Krieg and Sieg, Befreivng vor Przemysl (1915) ; E. Ludendorff, My War Memories (trans. 1919) ; E. von Falkenhayn, General Headquarters, 1914-1916, and its Critical Decisions (trans. 1919) ; J. Daniloff, Russland im Weltkriege, 1914-1915 (1925) ; A. W. F. Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914-17 (1921). See also