reaction in the field of social psychology was produced by the attitude of the behaviourists. With an excess of revolutionary zeal the behaviourists adopted the principle of reducing all mental life to the stimulus-response formula and were led to challenge the traditional views of instinct and emotion. Some rejected instincts entirely, accusing the instinct-psychologists of defending the old faculties under new names. Such lists as that which McDougall created have been specially attacked by adherents of this latest school. In the language of these reformers these are only action patterns, laid down in the organism as physiological structures, and the stimulus brings into play one or other of these patterns. As modes of action these are reflexes and the total action can be analysed into component parts which are reflex in character. Lan guage, for example, is acquired by the combination of an auditory stimulus with a vocal response (at first accidental) : when the con nection is once established the utterances of the parent or teacher operate as an extension of the original "circular reflex," that is, the process in which the child hears the sound which it makes and then imitates the sound which it hears. As a descriptive analysis of elementary behaviour explanations of this kind are valid. The difficulties begin at the later stages when the responses are more varied and their selection seems to depend on such factors as inter pretation of meaning. It is then necessary to introduce hypotheses and take refuge in the complexity of brain-structure with the possibility of innumerable cells carrying on activities which as yet cannot be observed.
The dynamic attitude predominates among psychologists who have entered the field since 1900. The majority find the biological approach most congenial: they link up animal and human psychology by this way of regarding them. include child-psychology as a genetic science, and treat the more difficult problems of the nature of intelligence by regarding it as a capacity for the variation of responses in varying situations. But these titles do not apply to all psychologists. Many would disclaim any particular designation and say that for the present psychology is simply concerned with methods and results, not with theories. Specific problems exist in bewildering numbers and it is enough for the worker to solve his chosen problem without attempting to build a system. This agnostic attitude is justifiable, but it is difficult for its exponent to escape from the pre-suppositions of his own technique. This has been shown by two movements which have earned important places in the recent history of the subject. These are the Gestalt psychology and the Freudian doctrine. The term Gestalt has come into general use for want of an equivalent in the
vo cabulary. It may be translated "configuration," though the German writers do not consider that this word is exactly ade quate. An early tendency in the same direction may be found in the work of Kiilpe and the Wurzburg School, but the specific origin is found in the writings of Ehrenfels (t7ber Gestalt qualitaten, Vierteljahrschr. f. wiss. Philosophie, xiv. 189o) and Wertheimer (articles in Zeitschrift fiir Psychologie, 1911-12, reprinted as Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalt-theorie, 1925). The essential feature of the Gestalt theory is that it employs "con figurations" instead of elements, or it may be said to take as its elements significant groups rather than abstract parts. For example, a tone in a musical sequence is not heard as a tone simply : it is merged in the configuration of the musical phrase in which it occurs. In vision a similar fact is demonstrable either in the grouping of the objects or in the form of movement from one position to another. Five dots arranged in a row have a different "form-quality" from the same dots arranged like the five of hearts. A line presented in the vertical position and then again in the horizontal position will, if the rate of motion is not too slow, produce the impression of one line rotating through an angle. There seems to be a process in these cases which is more than the reception of impressions (peripheral) and may be a reaction originated centrally. The most important work in the development of this theory has been done by W. Kohler. The full significance of the viewpoint can hardly be estimated yet. One of the implications seems to be that in the actual mental experience a relation may be as significant as the data between which the relation holds. Thus an animal may learn to respond to a change from one colour to another though the colours used may be quite different. If this is true, it would imply that the total character of the situation is more signif icant than the (supposed) elements; in fact the elements as such would exist only for the experimenter who arbitrarily analyzes the situation into those elements. Kurt Koffka has
shown how this new outlook would affect problems of education (The Growth of the Mind, Tr. 1924). Kohler's observations on apes suggested to him that the apes arrived at a solution of a problem when they saw all the factors in the situation as a whole: this he regarded as an intuition, a real comprehension, rather than the trial-and-error process usually attributed to ani mals. If this line of enquiry leads to more complete results and the Gestalt theory becomes an established doctrine, recent ideas about the learning process will require to be revised in accordance with the new discoveries.
The new psychology of 188o was the psychology of the laboratory and the experimental method of Wundt. The new psychology of 190o was the dynamic psychology of Freud. (See PSYCHO-ANALYSIS.) The most significant contribution which Freud has made to general psychology is to demonstrate the sense in which the affective or emotional life of the individual may control the entire psychic life. The keyword of the theory is repression. Though other writers had suggested that forget ting might be as great a problem as memory and that in fact there might be no such thing as complete forgetting, Freud first expounded the processes by which an experience may be thrust into oblivion and kept there as an active but unconscious psychic force. The term "unconscious" thus acquires a positive meaning and the unconscious is the underworld of the mind where the repressed memories live and act. This unconscious area cannot be reached by the normal memory : it is not equiva lent to a lapse of memory or a failure of attention, for in those cases the lost idea or impression might return to consciousness through later recollection. The unconscious of which Freud speaks is only to be reached through the technique of psycho analysis. The reality of the unconscious for the individual con sists in the conflict which it creates and in the unrecognized symptoms of that conflict, such as irrational dislikes and fears, inhibitions and peculiar physical disabilities. The particular theory has been generalized in such a way as to become a pos sible element in general psychology. This is due to the inter pretation of the individual's relation to society. It is held that natural instincts (especially those connected with sex) are never perfectly harmonized with the requirements of the social order. Conflict at some stage of life is inevitable and this conflict may lead to repression with consequent harm to the psychic develop ment of the person concerned. It is accordingly probable that every person has some degree of emotional disturbance, if only in the form of mild prejudices. The doctrines of Freud have penetrated into modern psychology and become one of the chief reasons why the emotions are now so much emphasized. The behaviourists, however, are disinclined to give any place to the unconscious and claim that the only distinction necessary is between verbalized and unverbalized behaviour. The Behaviour ist would accept most of the facts, particularly the presence of sex-interests in the early life of the child, and explain the subsequent development entirely in terms of conditioning. For the practical psychologist, concerned only with the normal mind, the process of conditioning and reconditioning may be a satis factory explanation of the personal characteristics which he is called upon to study. If mental pathology demands a different technique, the psychologist may claim that it does not fall within his province. But the psychology of the future will in any case be increasingly concerned with the problems of per sonality, with the early stages of development and with the growth of the mind, laying stress on the methods of training which will prevent abnormality and promote the development of well-balanced minds.
M. Baldwin, History of Psychology, 2 Vole. (1913) ; G. S. Brett, A History of Psychology, vol. i., Ancient and Patristic (1912) ; vols. ii. and iii., Mediaeval and Modern (1921) ; E. Chaignet, Histoire de la Psychologie des Grecs, 5 Vols. (1887-93) M. Dessoir, Abriss einer Geschichte der
(Eng. Tr.,
; G. S. Hall, Founders of Modern Psychology (1912) ; Janet and Seailles, History of the Problems of Philosophy (Vol. 1, Psychology, 19o2) ; 0. Klemm, Geschichte der Psychologie (191I) ; (Eng. Tr. 1914) ; H. Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie (1884) (Greek theories only) ; G. Villa, Contemporary Psychology (1903) ; H. C. Warren, A His tory of the Association Psychology (1921). (G. S. B.)