The Objective Approach

We are concerned, however, not so much with the constitution of an intelligent being, as with the specific intelligent act. The critical moment is that in which a fresh alternative is found. Once discovered, its conservation as a possible neural path is merely a function of retention.

The conditions under which the intelligent act occurs would seem invariably to involve the thwarting of some pre-established cycle. There is set in action some sequence of behaviour such as the quest for food. But a cycle which uneventfully works itself out in the usual way is not itself an exercise of intelligence. Some obstacle must arise with which the alternatives so far organized in the nervous system are inadequate to deal. The intelligent act consists in the completion of the cycle by a novel route. In this we have an objective definition of intelligence, or at least an objective criterion of its presence. The usual means of secur ing food constitutes such a cycle. An obstacle is provided, for example, by placing the food out of reach ; whilst the intelligent act may consist in the novel use of a tool.

How does the novel route arise? Attempts have been made to explain the process of discovery by reference to the conjoint action of two factors: (a) one that maintains persistent action until the consummatory act occurs, (b) a tendency to vary, and subsequently to avoid, all responses which fail to terminate the process. On this hypothesis, given time and the physical possi bility of giving the right response, every persistent tendency would, by a process of elimination, sooner or later be "successful." Perhaps success is sometimes so attained. But it would seem that the problem is sometimes solved more quickly than this hypothesis would explain—even if we assume that groups of responses are eliminated together. The facts, in short, suggest that the problem may be "thought out." What this phrase implies can no doubt be reinterpreted in purely neural terms, but the fact is, we have reached a stage of investigation at which—as a principle of method—objective psychology calls for supplementation from another point of view. In dealing with the higher functions we find it profitable to observe the process from within, and in the light of clues so gained to formulate hypotheses with regard to neural process. The study of simple reflex acts does not so obvi ously call for an introspective approach, but as we ascend to higher functions introspective evidence increasingly takes the lead. We may turn therefore to the study of mental process "from within," but before doing so may briefly summarise the merits and limitations of the objective method.

Value of the Objective Approach.

First, we may note that as a science in its own right, or as a sub-department of Biology, the study of behaviour needs no defence. Its limitations are only such as are self-imposed, or such as further research is likely to remove. It cannot be condemned for its failure to solve

the problem of mind, for with what is in strictness "mental" it is not directly concerned. If the principle of physicochemical explanation is to be rejected here, it has also to be rejected wherever we deal with life. There is little plausibility in the hypothesis that, whilst the behaviour of lower organisms is ex plicable in purely mechanical terms, teleology is required to ex plain the later phases of evolution.

Secondly, as a part of what we called general Psycho-physics the objective study of behaviour provides one-half of what is required. It may, however, in addition, provide subsidiary sources of information with regard to mental process. Just as the physi ology of the sense-organs has been advanced by the introspective observation of sensory experience, so are clues afforded to the nature of mental process by the correlative physical facts. In both cases, however, certain general hypotheses are required with regard to the relations of body and mind, and each presupposes a correlative but independent approach.

Limitations of the Method.

Considered as a substitute for Psychology, as some ardent exponents regard it, a purely objec tive study of behaviour suffers from more than a limitation. It fails to touch the essential facts. From a knowledge of bodily processes alone the existence of mental facts cannot even be presumed, much less explained. This is a limitation which is not paralleled in the distinctively psychological point of view; for, as we shall see, the analysis of experience reveals an awareness of the body. But the body as internally perceived is in strictness a different thing from the body as observed from an external point of view. Hence arises a danger of confusion, and hence, too, a need for a clearer demarcation of the alternative methods of approach.

But even in the more restricted purpose of extending our biological knowledge it is pedantic and inconvenient to restrict ourselves to the purely objective method. Any method is justi fied which succeeds in advancing knowledge. So far as the parallelism holds it avails us in both directions, and it is an in creasingly exemplified fact that the analysis of experience pro vides a valuable indirect means of securing knowledge of cerebral process. Which method has priority will depend on circumstances. To laud the objective approach in the study of lowly functions is to make a virtue of necessity, and to restrict the study of higher functions to this method is surely, when other means are avail able, to impose a gratuitous limitation upon the psychologist. What is required would seem to be a psycho-physical point of view which, whilst keeping the methods distinct, employs each to correct and supplement the other.