In 189o, Rhodes became prime minister of the Cape. Main tained in power very largely by the Dutch vote, which he spared no pains to conciliate, and having won the confidence of both sections of the colony, he was practically a despot in South Africa. He did much to elevate and to enlarge the field of local politics. He frankly declared and worked for the policy of uniting British and Dutch interests in South Africa ; he took a keen interest in local education. He restricted the franchise, introducing an educa tional test and limiting the vote to men with an income equal to a labourer's wage—thus abolishing, without making any distinction of colour, the abuses of the "blanket" vote.
His native policy was far from being one of simple restriction. He liked the natives ; he employed them by thousands in the min ing industry, and was successful in dealing with them. The first canon of his native policy was that liquor should be kept from them; the second, that they should be guaranteed the earnings of their labour; the third, that they should be educated in the practical arts of peace. He appreciated the full importance of raising their territorial condition from one of tribal to indi vidual tenure ; and while he protested against the uncivilized Kaffir voting on questions of highly civilized white policy, he believed in the principle of self-government in native affairs. Of these views some received practical embodiment in the much-disputed act known as the Glen Grey Act of 1894. In this connection it may also be noted that he was one of the warmest and most con vinced supporters of Lovedale, the very successful missionary in stitution for the education of natives in South Africa.
The position of benevolent despot has obvious drawbacks. In Rhodes's case the dependence which the populations of Cape Colony were led to place on him had its reaction on the public in a demoralizing loss of self-reliance, and for himself it must be admitted that the effect on the character of a man already much disposed to habits of absolutism in thought and action was the reverse of beneficial. Rhodes felt himself to be far stronger than any man in his own surroundings; he knew himself to be actuated by disinterested motives in the aims which he most earnestly desired to reach. He was profoundly impressed by a sense of the shortness of life, and he so far abused his power as to become intolerant of any sort of control or opposition. The inevitable result followed, that though Rhodes did much of great and good work during the six years of his supreme power, he entirely failed during that period to surround himself, as he might have done, with a circle of able men fit to comprehend and carry on the work to which his own best efforts were directed. To work with him was practically impossible for those who were not willing to accept without demur the yoke of dogmatic author ity. He had a few devoted personal friends, who appreciated his aims and were inspired by his example ; but he was lacking in regard for individuals, and a great part of his daily life was spent in the company of satellites and instruments, whom he used with cynical unconcern for the furtherance of his ends.
In 1896 the brilliant period of his premiership was brought to an end by the Jameson Raid. Rhodes, as a large mine-owner, was a member of the mining population, and was asked to give his countenance to the rising of the Johannesburgers, although he was also prime minister of the Cape. The subsequent finding of a Cape committee, which he accepted as accurate, was to the effect that "in his capacity as controller of the three great joint-stock companies, the British South Africa Company, the De Beers Con solidated Mines, and the Gold Fields of South Africa, he directed and controlled the combination which rendered such a proceeding as the Jameson Raid possible." He gave money, arms and influ
ence to the movement ; and he allowed Dr. Jameson, who was then administrator of the British South Africa Company in Rhodesia, to move an armed force of some 500 men upon the frontier. A cipher correspondence, seized and published by the Boers, left no doubt as to Rhodes's share in the preparation for the Raid. Sub sequent inquiries held by committees of the Cape parliament and of the British House of Commons acquitted him of responsibility for Dr. Jameson's final movement, but both committees found that he had acted in a manner which was inconsistent with his duty as prime minister of the Cape and managing director of the British South Africa Company.
He made no concealment of his own share in the catastrophe; he took full responsibility for what had been done by subordinates, and accepted the consequences which ensued. He resigned his premiership of the Cape (January 1896) , and turned his attention to the development of Rhodesia. His design was to live in the coun try, and to give all the stimulus of his own presence and encourage ment to the development of its resources. The Matabele rebellion of March 1896 intervened and in June Imperial troops were sent up and drove the natives to a practically impregnable position in the Matoppo Hills. The prospect before the British was one of continued war with a renewal of a costly campaign in the following spring. Rhodes conceived the idea that he might effect single handed the pacification which military skill had failed to compel. To succeed, it was essential that he should trust and be trusted. He moved his tent away from the troops to the base of the Matoppo Hills, and lay there quietly for six weeks, in the power of the enemy if they had chosen to attack. Word was circulated among the natives that he had come alone and undefended to hear their side of the case. A council was held by them in the very depths of the hills, where no armed force could touch them. He was invited to attend it. It was a case of staking his life on trust. He displayed no hesitation, but mounted and rode un armed with the messenger. Three friends rode with him. They met the assembled chiefs who laid the native grievances before them. At the end of a long discussion Rhodes, having exacted such concessions as he thought fit, asked the question, "Now, for the future is it peace or is it war?" And the chiefs, laying down their sticks as a symbol of surrendered arms, declared, "It is peace." Rhodes, riding away, characterized the scene as one of those "which make life worth living." His life was drawing towards its end. He had still a few years before him, however, and he devoted them with success to the development of the country which bore his name. The railroad was now brought to Bulawayo, and arrangements were made for carrying the line on in sections as far as the south end of Lake Tanganyika, a construction which was part of his pet scheme for connecting the Cape by a British line of communication with Cairo. He also concluded arrangements for carrying a telegraphic land line through to Egypt. The mineral development of the country also was fairly started. But the federal union of South Africa, the aim towards which he had always worked as the secure basis of the extension of British rule in the southern half of the continent, was not for him to see. The South African War broke out in 1899. Rhodes took his part at Kimberley in sustaining the hardships of a siege ; but his health was broken, and though he lived to see victory practically assured to British arms, peace had not been concluded when, on March 26, 1902, he died at Muizenberg, near Cape Town.