During the war Julius Rosenwald donated $1,000,000 to the Jewish War Relief Fund. After the war, he pledged $6,000,000 for the effort of the Joint Distribution Committee to settle the Jews of Russia in agricultural colonies in that country. He con tributed $1 oo,000 in 1920 for the relief of German children.
Rosenwald made gifts of more than $4,000,000 to the University of Chicago, and he gave approximately $6,600,000 for a Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago. He also founded dental in firmaries in the Chicago public schools. He was a large contribu tor to the work of the Y.M.C.A. in Chicago and elsewhere, and he contributed $25,000 towards the cost of erecting each Y.M.C.A.
building for Negroes in 21 cities of the United States. Rosen wald's gifts during his lifetime exceeded $22,000,000 exclusive of the Rosenwald Fund, which had assets worth $40,000,000 in 1928.
Rosenwald took an active interest in the civic affairs of Chicago for many years, and he was deeply interested in the improvement of municipal and national government. For many years he was chairman of the Bureau of Public Efficiency of Chicago.
In recognition of his work for the Negro, Julius Rosenwald re ceived the William E. Harmon award of a gold medal for distin guished achievement in race relations in 1928. In that same year he was awarded a medal by the Austrian Republic for his encour agement of science and art. In 1929 he received the Gottheil medal for the most distinguished service to Jewry during the year 1928. In 1930 President Paul von Hindenburg of Germany pre sented Rosenwald with a porcelain vase of German artisanship in recognition of his "many magnanimous gifts" to German war widows and orphans. He was a trustee of the University of Chi cago, of the Rockefeller Foundation, of the Baron de Hirsch Fund and of other organizations. Julius Rosenwald died in Chicago January 6, 1932. (M. R. W.) ROSES, WARS OF THE, a name given to a series of civil wars in England during the reigns of Henry Edward IV. and Richard III. Their importance in the general history of England is dealt with elsewhere, and their significance in the history of the art and practice of war is small. They were marked by a ferocity and brutality practically unknown in the history of English wars before and since. The honest yeoman of Edward
M.'s time had evolved into a professional soldier of fortune, and had been demoralized by the prolonged and dismal Hundred Years' War, at the close of which many thousands of ruffians, whose occupation had gone, had been let loose in England. At the same time the power of feudalism had become concentrated in the hands of a few great lords, who were wealthy enough and powerful enough to become king-makers. The disbanded mer cenaries enlisted indifferently on either side, corrupting the ordi nary feudal tenantry with the evil habits of the French wars, and pillaged the countryside, with accompaniments of murder and violence, wherever they went. It is true that the sympathies of the people at large were to some extent enlisted : London and, generally, the trading towns being Yorkist, the country people Lancastrian—a division of factions which roughly corresponded to that of the early part of the Great Rebellion, two centuries later, and similarly in a measure indicative of the opposition of hereditary loyalty and desire for sound and effective government. But there was this difference, that in the 15th century the feeling of loyalty was to a great extent focussed upon the great lords.
It is from the Wars of the Roses that there originated the deep rooted dislike of the professional soldier which was for nearly four centuries a conspicuous feature of the English social and govern mental system, and it is therefore in their results rather than their incidents that they have affected the evolution of war. They withdrew the English army system from European battlefields precisely at the moment of transition when the regimental and technical organization of armies was becoming a science and seeking models, and the all-powerful English longbow at the moment when the early, scarcely effective firearms were, so to speak, struggling for recognition as army weapons. On the other hand, they destroyed the British military organization, which remained for 15o years an aggregation of county levies armed with bills and bows.