The note of the Byzantine army was efficiency, and nowhere is the immeasurable superiority of the civilization of the Eastern empire to the contemporary States of Europe more apparent. The theory of military science was always studied and taught ; constant practice, interpreting and correcting theories, safeguarded it against pedantry; and a class of magnificent staff officers were trained, who in the loth century were the terror of the enemy. The particular tactics of the various foes whom they had to face were critically studied. We have a series of military text-books, from the time of Anastasius I. to that of Basil II., in which we can learn their principles and methods. In this army there was plenty of courage, and distinct professional pride, but no love of fighting for fighting's sake, nor the spirit which in western Europe developed into chivalry. The Byzantines despised such ideas as characteristic of barbarians who had physical strength and no brains. The object of a good general, as Leo VI. shows in his important treatise on Tactics, was in their opinion not to win a great battle, but to attain success without the risks and losses of a great battle. The same author criticizes the military character of the Franks. Paying a tribute to their fearlessness, he points out their want of discipline, the haphazard nature of their array and order of battle, their eagerness to attack before the word was given, their want of faculty for strategy or tactical combinations, their incapacity for operations on difficult ground, the ease with which they could be deceived by simple artifices, their careless ness in pitching camps, and their lack of a proper intelligence department. These criticisms, borne out by all we know of feudal warfare, illustrate the contrast between a Western host, with its three great "battles," rushing headlong at the foe, and the Byzan tine army, with its large number of small units, co-operating in perfect harmony, under a commander who had been trained in military science, had a definite plan in his head, and could rely on all his subordinates for strict and intelligent obedience.
work of Constans II., and we saw what it achieved. In this first. period (c. 650-720) the naval forces, designated as the Karabisi anoi, were placed under the command of an admiral, with title of strategos. They consisted of two geographical divisions, each under a drungarios : the province of the Cibyrrhaeots (probably named from the smaller Cibyra in Pamphylia) which included the southern coast districts of Asia Minor, and the Aegean province, which embraced the islands and part of the west coast of Asia Minor. The former was the more important ; the marines of this province were the hardy descendants of the pirates, whose subju gation had taxed the resources of the Roman Government in the last years of the republic. It was a new principle to impose the burden of naval defence on the coast and island districts. Distinct from these fleets, and probably organized on a different principle, was the naval contingent stationed at Constantinople. Leo III. changed the naval administration, abolishing the supreme com mand, and making the Cibyrrhaeot and Aegean provinces separate independent themes under strategoi. The change was due to two motives. There was a danger lest a commander of the whole navy should become over powerful (indicated by the political role Played by the navy before Leo's accession) ; but apart from this.
the general reform of Leo, which united civil and military powers in the same hands, naturally placed the commanders of the two branches of the navy on a new footing, by making them provincial governors. In this and the following reigns, the tendency was to neglect the fleet; the interest of the Government was concen trated on the army. For a time this policy was prosecuted with impunity, since the Omayyad dynasty was growing weak, and then under the Abbasids, who transferred the capital from Damascus to Baghdad, the sea-power of the caliphate declined. But the neglect of the fleet was avenged in the 9th century, when Crete and Sicily were wrested from the empire, the loss of south Italy was immi nent, and Muslim squadrons sailed in the Adriatic—losses and dangers which led to a reorganization of the navy under Basil I. and Leo VI. After this reform we find the navy consisting of two main contingents : the imperial fleet (stationed at Constantinople), and the provincial fleets, three in number, of (a) Cibyrrhaeot theme, (b) Aegean theme, (c) theme of Samos. A small distinct contingent was supplied by the Mardaites who, natives of Mt. Lebanon, had been transplanted (partly to Pamphylia, partly to Epirus, the Ionian islands and Peloponnesus). The imperial fleet seems to have consisted of about ioo warships manned by 23,000 marines (the same men fought and rowed) ; the provincial fleets of 77 warships manned by 17,00o. When the fleets acted together, the admiral in supreme command for the time was called the "drungary of the naval forces." The warships (Opoyczwes, "drom onds") were mainly biremes, but there were also uniremes, built for speed, called "galleys" (7aXcactc). Pyrotechnic was an impor tant department in the naval establishment ; the manufacture of the terrible explosive known as liquid or marine fire (see GREEK FIRE) was carefully guarded as a State secret.