parallel to the enemy or of retreating. As his army could move as a unit twice as fast as the enemy's, he intended to make a detour, screened by the Janus Hugel and the Polzen Hugel, and to fall upon them sud denly from the east. If at the moment of contact the Allies had already formed their line of battle facing north, the attack would strike their right flank; if they were still on the move in column eastwards or north-eastwards, the heads of their columns would be crushed before the rest could deploy in the new direction— deployment in those days being a lengthy affair. To this end General von Seydlitz, with every available squadron, hurried east ward from Rossbach, behind the Janus HUgel, to the Polzen HUgel; Colonel von Moller, with eighteen heavy guns, came into action on the Janus Hugel at 3.15 against the advancing columns of the Allied cavalry; and the infantry followed as fast as pos sible. When they came under the fire of Moller's guns, the Allied squadrons, which were now north of Reichardtswerben and well ahead of their own infantry, suffered somewhat heavily; but it was usual to employ heavy guns to protect a retreat, and they contented themselves with bringing some field-guns into action. They were, however, amazed when Seydlitz's thirty-eight squad rons suddenly rode down upon the head and right flank of their columns from the Polzen Hugel "avec une incroyable vitesse." Gallantly as the leading German regiments deployed to meet him, the result was scarcely in doubt for a moment. Seydlitz threw in his last squadron, and then himself fought like a trooper, receiving a severe wound. The mêlée drifted rapidly southward, past the Allied infantry, and Seydlitz finally rallied his horsemen in a hollow near Tagewerben, ready for fresh service. This first epi sode was over in half an hour, and by that time the Prussian infantry, in echelon from the left, was descending the Janus Hiigel to meet the already confused and disheartened infantry of the Allies. The latter, as their cavalry had done, managed to deploy
some regiments on the head of the column, and the French in par ticular formed one or two columns of attack—then peculiar to the French army—and rushed forward with the bayonet. But Moller's guns, which had advanced with the infantry, tore gaps in the close masses, and, when it arrived within effective musketry range, the attack died out before the rapid and methodical volleys of the Prussian line. Meanwhile the Allies were trying in vain to form a line of battle. The two main columns had got too close together in the advance from Pettstadt, part of the reserve which had be come entangled between the main columns was extricating itself by degrees and endeavouring to catch up with the rest of the reserve column away to the right, and the reserve artillery was useless in the middle of the infantry. The Prussian infantry was still in echelon from the left, and the leftmost battalions that had repulsed the French columns were quickly within musket-shot of this helpless mass. A few volleys directed against the head and left flank of the column sufficed to create disorder, and then from the Tagewerben hollow Seydlitz's rallied squadrons charged, wholly unexpectedly, upon its right flank. The Allied infantry thereupon broke and fled. Soubise and the duke, who was wounded, succeeded in keeping one or two regiments together, but the rest scattered over the countryside. The battle had lasted less than an hour and a half, and the last episode of the infantry fight no more than fifteen minutes. Seven Prussian battalions only were engaged, and these expended five to fifteen rounds per man. Seydlitz and Prince Henry of Prussia, the cavalry and the infan try leaders engaged, were both wounded, but the total loss of the king's army was under 55o officers and men as compared with 7,700 on the part of the Allies. (C. F. A.)