THE DEFEAT OF BULGARIA The military situation on the eve of the offensive was numeri cally little changed. The Bulgarians had a ration strength of some 700,000 and a rifle strength of 200,000—divided into the same three armies. The Allies had a ration strength of about 574,00o and a rifle strength of 157,00o, although against the in feriority of numbers they could put a slight preponderance in artillery and a heavy one in aircraft. But the real defect on the enemy's side was the first underlying war-weariness of the Bul garians and their dissatisfaction with their German directors; and secondly the divided command by which the so-called German XI. Army and the Bulgarian I. Army—from Doiran westwards— were under Von Scholtz, while the Bulgarian II. Army and the coastal detachments were under the Bulgarian commander-in chief, Gen. Gekoff.
For the new offensive Franchet d'Esperey's plan was first to strike a concentrated blow with a Franco-Serb group under Michich on a narrow front of seven miles along the Sokol-Dobro Polje range, aiming at a tactical break-through and a subsequent expansion of the breach to gain and clear the triangle formed by the Crna and the Vardar. This would menace the enemy's com munications on both flanks, and the offensive would then be taken up in turn by the other forces along the front. The initial ob jectives were relatively modest, for the possibility of a strategic break-through, ending in the overthrow of the enemy armies, was no more than an idea in the commander's mind.
The immense difficulties of the terrain and the scantiness of reserves made even this limited aim far from certain of success. But Franchet d'Esperey's plan, made possible by the whole hearted co-operation of the other Allied commanders, was an admirable fulfilment of the principle of concentration. On the vital sector six Serbian and two French divisions with 600 guns— more than a third of the total artillery strength in Macedonia— were concentrated against one Bulgarian division, and to do this the other sectors were almost stripped of their artillery.
The offensive began on Sept. 1, as the British 27th Div. made a feint attack in the Vardar valley to divert the enemy's attention, and on the night of Sept. 14 a heavy bombardment was begun on the real front of attack. Next morning at 5.30 A.M. the French divisions assaulted and after hard fighting gained the Dobro Polje ridge, the Sokol also falling by the evening—opening a path for the Serbian divisions of the I. Army, hitherto in reserve, to be pushed through. At the same time the Serbian II. Army advanced to the attack. By nightfall on Sept. 16 a penetration of 5m. had been made.
The Serbian troops now wonderfully inspired by success and the sight of their homeland, swept forward with such élan that by the night of Sept. 17 they were tom. forward, and the
breach had been expanded to 25m. by Greek and French divi sions on the flank. After the initial clash resistance was feeble, partly because the mountains hampered the lateral movement of reserves. By Sept. 19 the left wing of the attackers had reached across the Crna, while the right wing was rolling up the front eastwards towards the Vardar, and between the two wings the Serbian cavalry had penetrated to Kavadarci in the apex of the Crna-Vardar triangle. Meanwhile on Sept. 18 Milne's troops attacked on the whole front from the Vardar to Lake Doiran in order to prevent the Bulgarians withdrawing troops to dam the breach of the Vardar. Facing the British were the pick of the Bulgarian troops and also the strongest fortified positions, so that although they penetrated the enemy's lines along most of the front, it was little wonder that lack of reserves and artillery compelled them to yield up the larger part of their gains. But they had fulfilled their mission of pinning down the enemy in cluding the reserves dining these critical days, Sept. 18 and 19, and by Sept. 21 the whole of the enemy's front west of the Vardar had collapsed under the convergent pressure of the ex ploiting Serbs and of the French on their flanks.
By the afternoon of the same day the collapse had extended to the Doiran-Vardar front, and the British aeroplanes spread considerable havoc among the troops of the Bulgarian VI. Army falling back through the narrow Kosturino pass. Similarly, on the extreme west, facing Prilep, the Italians joined in the advance. From now on the advance became a strategic pursuit, now fast, now slow, in which successive rearguard resistances of the enemy were outflanked. On Sept. 23 the Serbian spearhead reached Gradsko, and Veles three days later. Seizing their op portunity, a French cavalry brigade under Gen. Jouinot-Gam betta made a dash for Skoplje (Uskilb), and seized this vital cen tre of communications, the key to the whole front, on Sept. 29. This definitely separated the XI. Army from the remainder of the Bulgarian forces, forcing them on divergent lines of retreat. To the south-east the British had already invaded Bulgaria itself, taking Strumica on Sept. 26. That night a Bulgarian staff officer arrived at British headquarters to ask for an armistice, and three days later the Bulgarians capitulated, accepting the Allied terms unreservedly. The first national prop of the Central Alliance had fallen. While the reoccupation of Serbia proceeded rapidly, a mixed striking force was rapidly organized under Milne's com mand to advance through Thrace on Constantinople, and had pressed as far as the Maritsa, seizing the bridgeheads, when Turkey—her force in Syria already annihilated by Allenby—sur rendered on Oct. 3o.