The expulsion of German officials and leading citizens and the disarmament of the people gave the Separatist movement new life. Though official cognizance was strongly denied, preparation as well as execution were favoured by the French (and Belgian) military authorities. In many cases the Separatists had been armed with their connivance, whilst the local police when fighting them was either disarmed or arrested or otherwise hampered by the military. Notwithstanding their support, the rising in Di.issel dorf (Sept. 3o, 1923) was quickly quelled by the local authorities. The Rhineland republic proclaimed in Aix-la-Chapelle (Oct. 21, 1923) lasted until Nov. 2, when under pressure of the British the Belgian government disavowed the movement. The "Putsch" in Coblenz, Wiesbaden and Mainz organized by Dorten and Matthes quickly collapsed in the first month of the new year.
It was only in the Bavarian Palatinate that the movement, which was almost officially fathered by General de Metz, lingered a little longer. He informed the Bavarian government on Oct. 25 that the Palatinate had ceased to be part of Bavaria. The Sepa ratists ejected nearly 20,000 people with French help. The popu lation strongly retaliated and there was a kind of civil war, in which the Separatists fared badly. Early in February the legiti mate officials returned. But it was only in March 1924 that com plete order was restored. The transfer of General de Metz in Nov. 1924 definitely marked the end of this episode.
The expenditure for the passive resistance in Rhine and Ruhr had completely drained Germany's financial resources. After stabilization it was doubtful whether she would be able to go on supporting the occupied provinces. The complete cessation of all relief was suggested. This being done, the responsibility for Rhine and Ruhr was to be thrown on the Allies. At no time since the armistice, was the French policy of wrenching the Rhineland from the Reich nearer its goal than during Nov. 1923.
The Locarno negotiations for a security pact enabled the Allies to concentrate on disarmament proper. By presenting Germany with a list of her shortcomings as to disarmament, most of which Germany was ready to amend, an agreement was reached. Cologne was evacuated on Nov. 3o, 1926, by the British, whilst the last
vestiges of the occupation of the northern zone disappeared at midnight Jan. 31, 2926. The occupation had lasted over a year longer than had been foreseen in the Treaty of Versailles. The Locarno treaty had separated the security problem from the occu pation problem, basing the former on quite different principles.
After the evacuation of the Ruhr, Germany suggested a pact between the powers interested in the Rhine which should give a mutual guarantee for the existing frontiers. The so-called Locarno Pact was signed on Oct. 16, 1925, and by it this mutual guarantee was given. The conclusion of the Locarno agreement was almost automatically followed, though not immediately, by Germany's entry into the League of Nations.
Immediately after the entry of Germany into the League the possibilities of an early complete evacuation were discussed be tween Stresemann and Briand. As a price the French suggested the marketing of German reparation bonds, which could not be done without further financial concessions from Germany. This might give France a capital sum, which would enable her to start the stabilization of the franc. The plan failed, being premature from a financial point of view. The German government insisted on a reduction of the strength of the occupying army. They main tained, moreover that, as Germany was a member of the League of Nations, the continuation of occupation was quite illogical. Germany had carried out all her obligations as set down in the Treaty—apart from the reparation payments, which had become subject to a separate regime, to which occupation guarantees were no longer applicable (Art. 43o).
At the meeting of the League in Geneva Sept. 1928 and again at the League Council's meeting at Lugano, they strongly pressed their legal point of view that, Germany having complied "with all the undertakings resulting from the (present) Treaty" (Art. 431) —apart from reparations which were rearranged by the Dawes Agreement—the occupying forces should be withdrawn immedi ately. The French and British Governments interpreted clauses 429 to 431 in a different way. But the British Government de clared their willingness to consider the questions involved not as legal, but as political issues, to be settled by negotiations in the spirit of Locarno. The way to such negotiations is opened by the following resolution passed at Geneva : (I) The opening of official negotiations relating to the re quest put forward by the German chancellor regarding the early evacuation of the Rhineland, (2) The necessity for a complete and definite settlement of the reparation problem and for the constitution for this purpose of a committee of financial experts to be nominated by the six Governments.
S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settle ment (New York, 1923) ; H. Oncken, Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napo leons III. von 1865-1870 and der Ursprung des Krieges von 1870-71 (Stuttgart, 1926) ; A. Tardieu, La Paix (Paris, 1921) ; A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs (London, 1925 and 1927), Supplement 1925 (London, 1928) ; K. Strupp, Das Werk von Locarno (Berlin, 1926) ; see also German official publications. (M. Bo.)