Schleswig Holstein Question

Attitude of Austria and Prussia.-With

this "folly"-as Bismarck roundly termed it-Austria and Prussia, in the teeth of violent public opinion, would have nothing to do, for neither wished to risk a European war. It was clear to Bismarck that the two powers, as parties to the protocol of 1852, must uphold the succession as fixed by it, and that any action they might take in consequence of the violation of that compact by Denmark must be so "correct" as to deprive Europe of all excuse for interfer ence. The publication of the new constitution by Christian IX. was in itself sufficient to justify a declaration of war by the two powers as parties to the signature of the protocol. As to the ultimate outcome of their effective intervention, that could be left to the future to decide. Austria had no clear views. King William wavered between his Prussian feeling and a sentimental sympathy with the duke of Augustenburg. Bismarck alone knew exactly what he wanted, and how to attain it. "From the begin ning," he said later (Reflections, ii. 1o), "I kept annexation steadily before my eyes." The protests of Great Britain and Russia against the action of the German diet helped Bismarck to persuade Austria that im mediate action must be taken. On Dec. 28 a motion was intro duced in the diet by Austria and Prussia, calling on the Confeder ation to occupy Schleswig as a pledge for the observance by Den mark of the compacts of 1852: This implied the recognition of the rights of Christian IX., and was indignantly rejected; where upon the diet was informed that Austria and Prussia would act in the matter as independent European Powers. The agreement between them was signed on Jan. 16, 1864. One article stated this and later correspondence see Part Papers, lxiv. (1864) P. 40 seq.

that the two Powers would decide only in concert on the relations of the duchies, and that they would in no case determine the question of the succession save by mutual consent.

At this stage, had the Danes yielded to the necessities of the situation and withdrawn from Schleswig under protest, the Euro pean Powers would probably have intervened, a congress would have restored Schleswig to the Danish Crown, and Austria and Prussia, as European Powers, would have had no choice but to prevent any attempt upon it by the duke of Holstein. To pre vent this possibility Bismarck made the Copenhagen Government believe that Great Britain had threatened Prussia with interven tion should hostilities be opened, "though, as a matter of fact, England did nothing of the kind." The cynical stratagem suc ceeded; Denmark remained defiant ; and on Feb. i, 1864, the Austrian and Prussian forces crossed the Eider.

The Danish War.

An invasion of Denmark itself had not been part of the original programme of the allies; but on Feb. 18 some Prussian hussars, in the excitement of a cavalry skir mish, crossed the frontier and occupied the village of Kolding.

Bismarck determined to use this circumstance to revise the whole situation. He urged upon Austria the necessity for a strong policy, so as to settle once for all not only the question of the duchies but the wider question of the German Confederation; and Austria reluctantly consented to press the war. On March 5 a fresh agreement was signed between the Powers, under which the com pacts of 1852 were declared to be no longer valid, and the posi tion of the duchies within the Danish monarchy as a whole was to be made the subject of a friendly understanding. Meanwhile, however, Lord John Russell on behalf of Great Britain, sup ported by Russia, France and Sweden, had intervened with a proposal that the whole question should once more be submitted to a European conference'. The German Powers agreed on condition that the compacts of 1852 should not be taken as a basis, and that the duchies should be bound to Denmark by a personal tie only. But the proceedings of the conference, which opened at London on April 25 only revealed the inextricable tangle of the issues involved. Beust, on behalf of the Confederation, demanded the recognition of the Augustenburg claimant; Austria leaned to a settlement on the lines of that of 1852; Prussia, it was increasingly clear, aimed at the acquisition of the duchies. The first step towards the realization of this latter ambition was to secure the recognition of the absolute independence of the duchies, and this Austria could only oppose at the risk of f or feiting her whole influence in Germany. The two Powers, then, agreed to demand the complete political independence of the duchies bound together by common institutions. The next move was uncertain. As to the question of annexation Prussia would leave that open, but made it clear that any settlement must in volve the complete military subordination of Schleswig-Holstein to herself. This alarmed Austria, which had no wish to see a further extension of Prussia's already overgrown power, and she began to champion the claims of the duke of Augustenburg. This contingency, however, Bismarck had foreseen and himself offered to support the claims of the duke at the conference if he would undertake to subordinate himself in all naval and military mat ters to Prussia, surrender Kiel for the purposes of a Prussian war harbour, give Prussia the control of the projected North Sea Canal, and enter the Prussian Customs Union. On this basis, with Austria's support, the whole matter might have been arranged without—as Beust pointed out (Mem. i. 272)—the increase of Prussia's power beyond the Elbe being any serious menace to Austrian influence in Germany. Fortunately, however, for Bis marck's plans, Austria's distrust of Prussia led her to oppose this settlement and at her instigation the duke of Augustenburg rejected it.