Under present day conditions the interdependence of nations in regard to their economic interests is such that no community of people, however rich or powerful, can afford to regard itself as "above the law." Such an attitude must, eventually, call down the overwhelming condemnation of the greater part of the civilised world, and this condemnation is always liable to be translated into concerted action. Britain and her allies in the World War had very great difficulty in securing recognition of their need to interfere with the free shipment to their enemies of so-called non-contraband goods in neutral vessels, At the outset of the War it had not been recognised that "business as usual" on the high seas for friends and neutrals alike would mean that vital supplies would reach the enemy by devious routes. There can be no denying the fact that at one time, British traders themselves were, probably in most cases unwittingly, assisting to supply the enemy. At any rate it was not until the United States came into the war that the strain on international relations was relieved and sea power was applied to encompass the economic extinction of Germany and her Allies with a thoroughness and intensity such as has never been achieved before in the history of the world.
There can be very little doubt now that had the British Gov ernment of the day not enmeshed itself by pronouncing its intention to adhere to the impractical terms of the Declaration of London and had it enforced rigidly on British traders the restrictions which, subsequently, it desired neutrals to observe, that the enemy would have been weakened by being starved of essential supplies much sooner than was actually the case.
The British fleet, with the assistance of the naval forces of France, Italy and Japan, could have effectually controlled the flow of supplies through every continental port, whether neutral or hostile; but lack of comprehension of the needs of a modern war and of a clear-cut policy on the part of the Governments of Britain and her allies hampered the work of their navies and complicated international relations with neutrals.
Since the war, the whole subject has been regarded as too delicate to be allowed to obtrude itself into diplomatic discus sions, especially at a time when there is a general demand for peaceful relations to be stabilised as much as possible. But it is very natural that nations should continue to study their interests on the seas and desire to feel that their sea-borne commerce and the ocean routes which link them with vital sources of supply are secure. It is this anxiety about security which produces a certain nervousness and an attitude savouring of suspicion when proposals are made for drastic reductions of navies. Every sea Power has its own maritime problems and until the millennium of universal trust arrives each will require a navy suitable both in composition and in size for its own particular needs. The British Empire, for instance, is a community of nations and peoples so scattered over the whole world that their mutual support and common interests demand the complete security of the long sea routes which knit them together. Sea power to safeguard these
routes is not only vital to their well being but, in the case of the people of Britain itself, means nothing less than their very existence. It is indispensable, physically, because unless sea-borne supplies to the home country are assured her people would rapidly starve and the whole commercial life of the nation would cease. It is indispensable, economically, because Britain pays for her huge imports by her exports overseas and by her mercan tile marine, which is the principal carrying agency on the oceans of the world. It is indispensable, politically, because sea com munications are a potent factor in the cohesion of the Empire. The Dominions owe their growing prosperity mainly to over seas trading. The consciousness of this fact is leading most of them to take an increasing part in bearing the burden of the cost of sea security. As yet, it is difficult for a community like the farmers in the Western Provinces of Canada, for example, to realize that sea power is anything more than a name to them. Certainly an appreciation of what it means and what it is worth will not be conveyed to them by rhetorical allusions to the glories of the past. Rather is it necessary to trace the course of the products of the land which they till from the time they leave the local wagon or lorry until they reach their final market on the opposite side of the Atlantic. Road and rail are safe because • a force of police exists to deter any ill-disposed persons from interfering with them. The sea-police force which safeguards the Canadian farmer's wheat on passage is the British navy and it is only by reason of the security which it gives that he can be sure of receiving the fruits of his labours.
For the policing of the seas which wash the coast of British and Dominion territory and of the long ocean routes used by the mercantile marine, a large number of warships are indispensable.
These vessels must be big enough to be able to withstand any thing except abnormally bad weather and they must be powerful enough to be able to hold their own, in the event of war, against enemy ships of a type which might be sent to attack trade. This sea-police force is represented for the most part by the cruiser (q.v.) and sloop types. The present (1928) numerical superiority in units of the British navy is mostly made up of cruisers and their substitutes ; but it is a mistake to think that such a superior ity constitutes an excess of sea power or a threat to the interests and security of other nations. These units are to a great extent widely scattered over the oceans of the world and could only be united into one large force at grave risk to the sea security of the Empire as a whole. It is no exaggeration to say that it would be more difficult and more dangerous for the British and Dominions naval forces to be concentrated into one vast fleet to be used for aggressive purposes than it would be in the case of those belong ing to any other naval power.