The position of Slivnitza, barring the high road between Nish and Sofia, had been extensively fortified, but when the Serbians opened their attack on Nov. 17, there were but few troops avail able to occupy the works. On the right of the Bulgarian line was the Meka Krud height ; here fighting went on through the short winter day, which ended with a gallant, and for the time success ful, counter-attack by six Bulgarian battalions led by Capt. Benderev. The prince, not yet ready for the offensive, withdrew these troops to their original position. In the centre, near the high road, a hot and, at one moment of the day, almost successful attack of the Serbs ended with their complete repulse. The latter had had 17,00o men against the Bulgarians' I,000; yet they had, owing mainly to faults in the superior leading, been unsuccessful. Next day their chances of victory would be even less, for the defenders were hourly reinforced from Sofia, and on the i8th were actually somewhat superior in numbers. On this day the Serbs made a very heavy attack on the Bulgarian left wing, which was eventually repulsed, though not without great difficulty, by the newly arrived troops from Sofia. Later a half-hearted attack was made on the centre, and from his position on Meka Krud Benderev again attacked the Serbian "Danube" division. On this day a Serbian division pushed the Bulgarians out of Breznik, but made no farther advance either on Sofia or on the left flank of the Bul garians at Slivnitza, in spite of orders to do so. On the 19th alarm and consternation at Sofia, caused by the presence of hos tile forces at Breznik, were so great that Alexander left the corn mand in the hands of his chief of staff, Major Guchev, and hurried back to the capital in order to organize the defence. The Serbian leader was, however, as inactive on the 19th as on the i8th, and when he at last moved forward towards Slivnitza it was only with a portion of his force ; this was driven back, by a de tachment from the left wing of the Bulgarian position, to Rakita. Meanwhile, the active Benderev had reopened his attack on the Danube division. Twice he was repulsed, but finally at about 3 P.M. his battalions carried the heights held by the Serbs. A little before this the Bulgarian centre likewise moved forward, and, though a final attack of the Serbs on the gap caused by the absence of the Bulgarian troops detached towards Breznik came near to success, the prince returned to the battlefield to find his troops everywhere victorious and driving the enemy before them. Two days later, reorganized and reinforced, the Bulgarians took the offensive and carried the Dragoman pass.
On the 25th Prince Alexander received at Tsaribrod proposals for an armistice from King Milan; these were not accepted, and the Bulgarian army, crossing the frontier, advanced in several columns upon Pirot, where the army of the Nishava took up a defensive position in the town and on the surrounding heights. A two-days' engagement followed (Nov. 26 and 27). On the 26th the Bulgarians were successful, but a heavy counter attack on the following day almost snatched the victory out of their hands, and it was only after a severe contest lasting I I hours that the Serbs finally gave way. The Bulgarians were not permitted to reap the fruits of their success. As they were preparing to pursue the defeated and now greatly demoralized enemy on the 28th, the Austrian minister at Belgrade arrived at headquarters and hostili ties ceased. The intervention of Austria saved the Serbian army, which was greatly demoralized, and was now threatened by the united Bulgarian force of nearly 55,000 men. On the same day the army of the Timok was repulsed with heavy loss in an attack on Vidin.
Serbia escaped almost unpunished from her war of aggression. The young Bulgarian army, with its improvised staff and newly appointed field officers, displayed admirable marching power and fighting qualities, and the Rumelian militiamen proved themselves to be good soldiers. The Serbs had, however, fought with great bravery also, and the victory must be ascribed in the main to the personal influence, the strenuous exertions and the sound military judgment of Prince Alexander ; and the brief but decisive campaign set the seal to Bulgarian unity.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.-Dragoni Edler von Rabenhorst, Strategische Betrachtungen fiber den serbisch-bulgarischen Krieg (Vienna, 1886) ; Hungerbilhler, Die schweizerische Militiirmission each dem S.-B. Kriegsschauplatze (Frauenfeld, 1886) ; Bilimek-Waissolm, Der ser bisch-bulgarische Krieg (Vienna, 1886) ; A. E. von Huhn, Der Kampf der Bulgaren um ihre Nationaleinheit (Leipzig, 1886; Eng. London, 1886) ; Moller, Der serbisch-bulgarische Krieg, 1885 (Hanover, 1888) ; Regenspursky, Die Kiimpfe bei Slivnitza (Vienna, 1895) ; Der serbisch-bulgarische Krieg bis zum Waffenstillstande (Berlin, 1886) ; Der serbisch-bulgarische Krieg; eine militiirische Studie (Berlin, 1887) ; Kunz, Taktische Beispiele aus den Kriegen der neuesten Zeit: I. Der serbisch-bulgarische Krieg (Berlin, 1901) ; Bujac, Précis de quelques campagnes contemporaines: I. Dans les Balkans (Limoges and Paris).