The Battle.—The numbers engaged were : Prussians 220,000 (including 24,000 cavalry) with 780 .guns, Austrians and Saxons 215,000 (including 24,00o cavalry) with 77o guns. Early in the morning (which was dull and rainy) Prince Frederick Charles advanced his force to the Bistritz, intending to hold the line of that river until the II. Army could appear on the field. But his hand was forced by the action of his left division (7th) under Fransecky, which was already across the Bistritz and advanced into the Swiep Wald, where it drew on itself the whole weight of the Austrian right wing, IV. and II. Corps, and caused these Corps to face west instead of north. It fought magnificently against heavy odds, but its danger led to the premature advance of the remainder of the I. Army across the Bistritz. Thus during the whole morning the I. Army was struggling against greatly superior Austrian forces and was hard pressed. Meanwhile the advanced guard of the Army of the Elbe was engaged on the right with the Saxon Army at Nechanitz. Shortly after noon the leading troops of the II. Army appeared on the field and soon decided the conflict. They caught the Austrian II. and IV. Corps in the act of retiring from the Swiep Wald to the positions they had originally been ordered to hold from Chlum and Nedelist to the Elbe, quickly routed them, and seized Chlum. The Austrian reserve corps then made two counter-attacks on Chlum. These failed, and by 4:30 P.M. the Austrians were in full retreat, gallantly covered by the self-sacrificing charges of their cavalry and by the steadiness of their artillery. There was great con fusion at the river crossings, but the pursuit was not pressed, the victors themselves being in almost as great confusion as the van quished owing to the lines of advance of the I. and II. Armies having converged. The Austrian losses were about 45,000, of whom 20,000 were prisoners, and 15o guns; the Prussian losses were under 1o,000. The features of the battle were, on the Prussian side, the extraordinary influence of the gallant fighting of Fransecky's division in the Swiep Wald, the deadliness of the breech-loader, and the spirit which animated the swift and resolute march of the II. Army to the rescue of the I. Army. On the Austrian side, the artillery was brilliantly handled throughout the battle, and the cavalry by their devotion at the end made some amends for their failures in reconnaissance.
Benedek withdrew his army unmolested to the fortress of Olmutz to recuperate, thus placing himself on the flank of the Prussian advance on Vienna. There is no virtue, however, in a
flank position unless the troops have the power to issue offensively from it, as these had not. The Archduke Albert, who had suc ceeded to the chief command, ordered the army from Olmiitz to Vienna, to join the two corps brought back from Italy in the direct defence of the capital. The Austrians eventually succeeded in as sembling at Vienna, though an engagement with the Prussian II. Army at Tobitschau on July 15 forced the three rear corps from Olmiitz to make a wide detour. Prussians and Austrians were facing each other outside Vienna when an armistice was agreed to on July 22, followed by peace on Prussia's terms.