Failures of Methuen and Gatacre.—In the meantime Methuen had begun his march to the relief of Kimberley. He encountered resistance at Belmont on the 23rd, but drove the Boers out of their strong positions. Two days later he won an other action at Enslin. Still persevering he moved on to the Modder, where he was seriously opposed by De la Rey and Cronje, the latter having posted down from Mafeking with 2,000 men and arrived on the previous night. The Boers, who held a river line, kept the British attack at bay all day, but eventually fell back, relinquishing the position after dark, as their right had been turned by Pole-Carew's brigade. It was a long and wearing fight, in which the British lost 485 killed and wounded, and what was more serious, Methuen (himself wounded) found that his force had exhausted its forward momentum, and that he would have to collect supplies and reinforcements on the Modder before fighting his next battle. The extent of the operations and the gravity of the situation now began to be felt in England; every available man was called up from the reserves, and the War Office made what at the time seemed adequate provision for the waste which it was seen would occur. On Nov. 3o the mobiliza tion of a sixth division was ordered, offers of colonial aid were accepted, and every facility was provided for local recruiting. On Dec. i o Gtacre essayed a night march and attack upon the enemy's position at Stormberg, and, misled by his guides in un known ground, was himself surprised and forced to return with a loss of 719. On the following day Methuen delivered an attack upon Cronje's position between the Upper Modder river and the Kimberley road, a line of kopjes called Spytfontein and Magers fontein. In a night attack on Magersfontein hill the Highland Brigade was caught under heavy fire while still in assembly for mation, and lost its general, Wauchope, and 75o men, and in the battle by day which followed, the total losses amounting to about 95o. Buller had collected at Chieveley in Natal a mounted brigade and four infantry brigades.
Buller's Failure. Lord Roberts Sent Out.—On Dec. 15 Bul ler made his effort and failed. Behind the Tugela at Colenso (q.v.) were Louis Botha's forces covering the siege of Ladysmith, and, imperfectly acquainted with the lie of the ground, Buller sent a force to turn Botha's left, in conjunction with a frontal attack. But the flank attack became entangled in mass in a loop of the river and suffered heavily, and two batteries that formed part of the frontal attack came into action within a few hundred yards of unsuspected Boer trenches, with the result that ten guns were lost, with some i,ioo men. Buller then suggested to White the surrender of Ladysmith, believing this to be inevitable and desiring to cover White's responsibility in that event with his own authority; but White replied that he did not propose to surrender, and the cabinet at home, aware of Buller's despondency, appointed Field Marshal Lord Roberts to the supreme command, with Maj.-Gen. Lord Kitchener as his chief of staff. As the formation of a seventh division practically drained the Mother-Country of trained men, a scheme for the employment of citizen soldiers was formulated, resulting in the despatch of Imperial Yeomanry and Volunteer contingents, which proved one of the most striking features of the South African campaign. Pending the arrival of Roberts and reinforcements, the situation in South Africa re mained at a deadlock : the three besieged towns—Mafeking, Kim berley and Ladysmith—merely held their own. In northern Cape Colony, French, with two cavalry brigades, kept at arm's length a superior force of the enemy in the vicinity of Colesberg. On Jan.
6 the Boers in Natal tried to storm Ladysmith. The garrison, though weakened by privation and sickness, made a stubborn resistance, and repulsed the attack at Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill with severe loss to the enemy, itself having soo casualties.
Roberts arrived in Cape Town on Jan. io, 190o. His first duty was to create a field army out of units in Cape Colony. Buller essayed a second attempt to cross the Tugela, by turning the Boer left. But the upshot of several days' fighting was the retreat of the British. They had penetrated the enemy's right centre by the seizure of Spion Kop (q.v.), but the force there became the tar get for the concentrated attacks of the Boers, and, after suffering heavily, was withdrawn (Jan. 24, 1900).
By Feb. I Roberts had matured his plans; on the 3rd he ordered a demonstration against the right of the Boer position at Spytfon tein-Magersfontein to cover the withdrawal of French's cavalry from before Colesberg, and the concentration of his army at Modder river, disregarding another set-back in Natal to Buller, who had against his advice made a third attempt to relieve Lady smith and failed to make good the purchase which he secured across the Tugela (Vaal Krantz).
Roberts's Advance.—Roberts's plan was first to concentrate to his left, taking every measure to induce the Boers to believe that the original scheme of invasion by the centre would now be resumed, and in this purpose he succeeded so well that his field army with the necessary transport for a cross-country march was assembled between the Orange and the Modder without serious mishap. Cronje at the new centre of gravity was not reinforced, all available Boers drawing down towards Colesberg. The con centration effected, Cronje still believed that the relief of Kimber ley was the object of the gathering behind Modder river, and therefore held on to his Magersfontein kopje. The relief of Kim berley was indeed urgent, for dissensions between Rhodes and the military authorities had become acute. But to this part of the task only the cavalry division assembled under French was as signed. The army itself was to force Cronje into the open and then advance on Bloemfontein from the west. Roberts began his operations on Feb. 11. French started from Ramdam (near Graspan) eastward on that day, intending to make a wide sweep round Cronje's immobile army. Skirmishing with De Wet in the first stages of their ride, the cavalry brigades crossed the Modder at Klip Drift on the i3th. Cronje sent only detachments to oppose them, but these detachments were broken through by a sword-in hand charge of the whole division, and Kimberley was relieved on the 15th. The infantry, meeting with great difficulties in its cross ing of the Riet at Waterval owing to the country and its own unwieldy transport, followed one and one-half to two days later. But Cronje had now realized his danger, and slipped away west ward behind French and in front of the leading infantry at Klip Drift. These were deflected by Kitchener westward to follow up the Boer rearguard, and after some delay the remainder of the infantry, at first fronting northwards, swerved westward like wise, while French from Kimberley, with such of his men as he could mount on serviceable horses, headed off Cronje in the north west. The result, after one premature and costly assault on Cronje's lines had been made by Kitchener, was the surrender of 4,000 Boers at Paardeberg (q.v.) with their leader on Feb. 27, the anniversary of Majuba. At the same moment came in news at last of the relief of Ladysmith.