Battle of Tannenberg

Germans Attack Samsonov.

The new German Command had galvanized the dispirited VIII. Army from the first and hope of success ran high. The attacks on Samsonov's two flanks were to be launched simultaneously on the 26th. On the right, the German I. Corps, strengthened by the Vistula garrisons, attacked only half-heartedly. Francois, the commander of the I. Corps, was short of some of his heavy artillery and he contented himself with driving in some of the Russian outposts. On the 27th, how ever, he launched his attack in earnest. At dawn a hurricane bombardment was opened on the Russian I. Corps' positions on either side of Uzdowo. The famished Russians did not wait for the infantry attack but broke and ran. By io P.M. that night there was nothing left of the Russian left wing except a small rear-guard just north of Dzialdowo and that too had disappeared before the next morning.

The rear of the Russian centre was now completely exposed and Francois directed his march on Neidenburg. Opposition there was none, and by the night of the 28th his leading troops had reached Muschaken, 8 m. E. of Neidenburg. By the night of the 29th the whole length of the road from Neidenburg to Willenberg was held by a line of entrenched pickets. The Russian retreat to the south was completely blocked. During the 3oth Francois was attacked at Neidenburg by fresh Russian troops coming up from Wawa and actually lost the town for a time. He held stoutly on to the line of his pickets, however, and on the 31st Neidenburg was reoccupied.

On the left, the German XVII. and I. Res. Corps, having turned their backs on Rennenkampf and marched due south, had ar rived within striking distance of the Russian right at Rothfliess on the night of the 25th. Their attack on the morning of the 26th came as a complete surprise. The Russian VI. Corps with drew in confusion, losing 6,000 men and 16 guns. By the night of the 27th the Russian right was 32 m. S. of Rothfliess and in a state of hopeless demoralization. The rear of the Russian centre was now exposed on its other flank. The German XVII. Corps continued its march to the south, whilst the I. Res. Corps moved in closer towards Allenstein. The story of the fighting in the Russian centre is not so inglorious as that on the two flanks. In accordance with Samsonov's plan the centre (XIII. and XV. Corps) continued their advance on the 26th towards the line Allenstein-Hohenstein. The XIII. Corps encountered no oppo sition, but the XV. had to fight its way steadily forward. For the 27th, the advance was to be continued.

Second German Blow.

Ludendorff, with his accurate inf or mation of the events on either flank, now decided that the Ger man centre had retired enough. The reinforced XX. Corps was therefore ordered to attack on the 27th. The battle which en sued between the Russian XV. Corps and the German XX. Corps was particularly fierce, the Russians holding their own and even advancing a little on their left. The Russian XIII. Corps ren

dered no help to its neighbour. On the 28th the Germans re newed their attacks and this time the hardly-tried Russian XV. Corps commenced to break. The XIII. Corps, moving down to assist, found itself assailed in rear by troops arriving from Allen stein and for the second time brought no help.

When night fell the two Russian Corps were on a line from Grieslienen to Waplitz and in close touch with the Germans. Hoping to escape from pursuit, they commenced to withdraw during the night. The withdrawal soon became a rout, and a mass of troops and transport, both unfed and unwatered, be came inextricably mixed in the depth of the Forest of Griinfliess. Determined attempts were made during the 29th to break through to the south of Muschaken and to the north at Kalten born, but the German ring held fast. Only some 2,000 men ef fected their escape. The greater portion of these two corps sur rendered to the German parties clearing the forest during the 30th and 31st.

Samsonov himself had moved up to Neidenburg on the 27th in order better to control the battle. He was greeted with the news of the disaster to both his flanks and met streams of stragglers coming into the town. He decided to go to the headquarters of the XV. Corps and take personal charge, and left Neidenburg on the morning of the 28th with a small staff, all mounted on horses.

At

once he became mixed in the mass of transport in the forest and could exercise no effective command. He then decided to ride to the south, but during the night of the 28th-29th he became exhausted after having walked for some distance. He drew aside in the darkness and his staff heard a single shot. A careful search brought no result and the staff continued their way, certain that their unfortunate commander had taken his own life in his despair at the turn which events had taken.

Results.

The practical result of the fighting from Aug. 26-30 was the total annihilation of two Russian corps and the reduc tion of three other corps to half their strength in numbers. The whole Russian II. Army was so demoralized and was so deficient in essential material, such as artillery and transport, that it was no longer of any fighting value. The Germans claimed 125,000 prisoners and Soo guns It is certain that their booty was very great, for 6o train loads of captured material left Puchallowen after the battle and the captured horses were driven in herds to improvised camps at Neidenburg. Although greatly inferior in the whole eastern theatre, the Germans had yet managed to concentrate a superiority on the field of battle. The Russians had 132 battalions, 96 squadrons and 62o guns, including 12 heavy, whilst the Germans had 155 battalions, 48 squadrons and 8i8 guns, including 128 heavy.