It is concerning tactical mechanization, however, that there is so much difference of opinion and discussion. Here the six wheeler is of little value. It is true that six-wheel armoured cars will be useful for long distance reconnaissance, but their fighting value may not be great. Their mobility is entirely dependent on the pneumatic tyre, which is at present very vulnerable though recent developments may give it greater immunity. These tyres can be replaced by semi-solid tyres of various types which are un affected by bullets, but this reduces the cross country capacity of the vehicle and the speed on roads to a considerable extent. The six-wheeler is therefore at present mainly limited to armoured reconnaissance and armoured mounts for officers and staff, and although these duties are important, they represent only a small part of the work of armoured fighting vehicles.
The present trend of thought is to divide the use of tactical mechanization into two branches—the employment of armoured fighting vehicles with normal formations such as an infantry division, and their employment in an independent mechanized force whose role would be to carry out turning movements and attack the enemy in flank or rear or to attack his communications.
Tanks are likely to be employed for many years to come in co-operation with infantry skirmishers in any carefully staged attack against a defensive position. The smaller tanks will in addition be used for scouting and reconnaissance work, while the larger tanks are kept for the decisive attack where trenches and obstacles may have to be surmounted which would be impassable to the lighter tanks. It is the employment of an independent mechanized force, however, that presents such difficulties and yet holds out great possibilities. This is in reality the modern form of independent cavalry, and just as the horseman was su preme on the battlefield in the early middle ages, so the advocates of an independent mechanized force consider that in this, their latest and most modern form, they will again reign supreme.
The British mechanized force was formed in July 1927, and consisted of one battalion of Vickers tanks (48 tanks), two com panies of armoured cars, a company of 16 light tanks, one mech anized brigade of field artillery and one light battery, one machine gun battalion carried in half-track vehicles, one mechanized com pany of Royal Engineers, and a specially equipped company of the Royal Corps of Signals. It was realized that there were too few light tanks and armoured cars. The vehicles with which this
force was equipped were by no means ideal, but it was thought better to carry out tactical 'trials and gain some information in this way with vehicles that were available at the time, rather than await the development of more perfect machines. If the trials developed successfully, it was intended that the force should travel entirely in armoured vehicles so that the whole force should be proof against small arm fire.
A series of trials were carried out on Salisbury plain. It may be argued that these rolling plains were unduly favourable for the mechanized force, and that much greater difficulties would have been encountered in almost any other part of England when the force moved across country. This is true, but on the other hand the enclosed country which is so common in England is not found to any great extent elsewhere, and Salisbury plain is much more typical of Europe. In these trials the plan was evolved of using a light group ahead, consisting of armoured cars, light tanks and light guns, and following up with a heavy group of Vickers tanks and mechanized artillery. It was the duty of the light group to carry out long distance reconnaissance with armoured cars, and close reconnaissance with light tanks; they were responsible for gaining and keeping touch with the enemy and holding important points. The heavy group followed close up, and when the enemy main body had been located, they were used to strike a decisive blow. At the end of 1927 the name of the force was changed to the Experimental Armoured Force.
These trials are, however, in an elementary stage; as the equip ment of the force improves, the anti-tank weapons of the oppos ing side will be developed. There are those who argue that the tanks will be developed with much heavier armour and a higher speed, and will be capable of resisting the smaller calibres of anti-tank weapons, and that development will be on naval lines up to huge battle tanks. There is, however, this fundamental difference between the army and navy, that whereas a battle ship on the open sea is all powerful and can destroy in a few moments any inferior surface craft that appears within range, a battle tank would be in no such position. A single gun concealed in a wood may be within a few hundred yards of a big powerful tank and yet quite unseen, and it could destroy the tank bef ore a shot could be fired in return. It is possible that development will be in the other direction, i.e., towards smaller and more numerous tanks which can avoid casualties by dispersion.
The present attitude of nearly all armies towards tactical mechanization is to watch developments. It is possible that the progress in design of anti-tank weapons may render the supremacy of fighting vehicles short-lived. On the other hand the development of these vehicles may surpass that of anti-tank weapons. Much will be learnt from the trials with the armoured force on Salis bury plain. The formation of this force was a most progressive step; just as the British were the first to conceive and use an armoured fighting vehicle—the tank—on the battlefield, so they have been the first to extend the idea to the use of a self-contained armoured force. The future progress will be watched with interest.