Statute

Besides the fourfold division above mentioned, statutes are often classed according to their subject-matter, as perpetual and temporary, penal and beneficial, imperative and directory, en abling and disabling. Temporary Acts expire at a date fixed in the Act itself. Thus the Army Act is passed annually and con tinues for a year, and the London Traffic Act 1924 was to expire at the end of 1928. By such provision experimental legislation is rendered possible where the success of a new departure in legis lation is doubtful. An annual Expiring Laws Continuance Act is passed for the purpose of continuing (generally for a year) vari ous temporary Acts; the list is periodically revised and those of proved value are then made permanent. Penal Acts are those which impose a new disability; beneficial, those which confer a new favour. An imperative statute (often negative or prohibitory in its terms) makes a certain Act or omission absolutely neces sary, and subjects a contravention of its provisions to a penalty. A directory statute (generally affirmative in its terms) recom mends a certain Act or omission, but imposes no penalty on non observance of its provisions. To determine whether an Act is imperative or directory the Act itself must be looked at, and many nice questions have arisen on the application of the rule of law to a particular case. Enabling statutes are those which enlarge the common law, while disabling statutes restrict it. Declaratory statutes, or those simply affirming the common law, once not uncommon, are at the present time practically unknown; the Treason Act is an example. Statutes are sometimes passed in order to overrule specific decisions of the courts. Examples are the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, the Married Women's Property Act 1893, the Trade Disputes Act 1906.

Interpretation of Statutes.

The construction or interpreta tion of statutes depends partly on the common law, partly on statute. The main rules of the common law, as gathered from the best authorities, are these: (I) Statutes are to be construed, not according to their mere letter, but according to the intent and object with which they were made. (2) The relation of the statute to the common law is to be considered. In the words of the resolution of the court of exchequer in Heydon's case, 3 Coke's Rep. 7, the points for consideration are: "(a) What was the common law before the making of the Act? (b) What was the mischief and defect against which the common law did not pro vide? (c) What remedy the parliament bath resolved and ap pointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth? (d) The true reason of the remedy." (3) Beneficial or remedial statutes are to be liberally, penal more strictly, construed. (4) Other statutes in pari materia are to be taken into consideration. (5) A statute which treats of persons of inferior rank cannot by general words be extended to those of superior rank. (6) A statute does not

bind the Crown, unless it be named therein. (7) Where the pro vision of a statute is general, everything necessary to make such provision effectual is implied. (8) A later statute repeals an earlier, as far as the two are repugnant, but if they may stand together repeal will not be presumed. (9) There is a presumption against creation of new or ousting of existing jurisdictions,. against impairing obligations, against retrospective effect, against viola tion of international law, against monopolies, and in general against what is inconvenient or unreasonable. (so) If a statute inflicts a penalty, the penalty implies a prohibition of the Act or omission to which the penalty is imposed. Whether the remedy given by statute is the only one depends on the words of the particular Act. In some cases an action or an indictment will lie; in others the statutory remedy, generally summary, takes the place of the common law remedy. In some instances the courts have construed the imposition of a penalty as operating not to invalidate a contract but to create a tax upon non-compliance with the terms of the statute. The Interpretation Act 1889 pro vides an authentic interpretation for numerous words and phrases of frequent occurrence in statutes.

The earlier Acts are generally simple in character and lan guage, and comparatively few in number. At present the number passed every session is substantial; for the session of 1925 there were 91 general Acts (occupying over 1,800 pages in the official volumes) and 132 local and personal Acts. Without going as far as to concede with an eminent legal authority that of such legis lation three-fourths is unnecessary and the other fourth mis chievous, it may be admitted that the immense library of the statutes would be but a trackless desert without trustworthy guides. Revision of the statutes was evidently regarded by the legislature as desirable as early as 1563 (see the preamble to 5 Eliz. c. 4.). It was demanded by a petition of the Commons in 161o. Both Coke and Bacon were employed for some time on a commission for revision. In 1861 was passed the first of a long series of Statute Law Revision Acts. The most important action, however, was the nomination of a Statute Law Committee by Lord Chancellor Cairns in 1868, a body of experts in drafting and public administration, which continues to supervise the official publication of revised statutes and indexes to statutes and to statutory rules. A Chronological Table and Index of the Statutes which are still law is annually published under the Committee's direction ; the Table shows how far any enactment has been repealed or amended. The first edition of Revised Statutes, begun in 187o, substituted 18 volumes for i18; a second edition, begun in 1886, contains the Acts from 1235 to 1900 in 20 volumes, extended further by the Statute Law Revision Act of 1927.