Reasons such as their distrusts of bureaucratic tyranny, the lack of trained lawyers, the limited need for criminal legislation, made for a reduction in the extent of summary jurisdiction. That a vigorous and extensive jurisdiction over minor offences was exer cised is, however, clear. (See Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harvard L. Rev. 917, 1926.) Some of the colonies gave general summary jurisdiction of all offences where the maximum punishment was a moderate fine and a moderate term of imprison ment. Special legislation conferred summary jurisdiction for petty offences such as swearing, gambling, illegal selling of liquor, profiteering, etc. The extent of this jurisdiction as being "a veritable social control in the daily lives of the people" is demon strated by the fact that prior to the American Revolution the number of offences punished in the first instance by a single mag istrate in Massachusetts amounted to 170, a figure equally illus trative of the extent to which summary jurisdiction prevailed in the other colonies.
Prior to the Revolution much antagonism was aroused by the Crown's denial of the right to trial by jury in a number of cases where traditionally such trial was had. This grievance of the colonists loomed large in the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and was responsible for the inclusion of provisions in the United States and State constitutions guaranteeing the right to trial by jury. The relationship of these constitutional pro visions to the recognized summary jurisdiction of the magistrates has proved a controversial issue in American law. It is quite clear, however, that their effect was not to introduce jury trial in all cases but that, whatever restrictions they placed upon the statutory extensions of summary jurisdiction, they left the exist ing ambit of that jurisdiction, in the main, untouched. The history of that jurisdiction has controlled the courts in deter mining the scope of the constitutional provisions for trial by jury. Thus, the constitutional provision has been interpreted by various courts as not to deny the power of the legislature to confer summary jurisdiction upon magistrates in a variety of petty offences such as assault and battery, disorderly conduct, petty larceny, violations of game, food inspection, liquor, vag rancy, Sabbath-breaking and highway laws. The test of what offences can be entrusted to the summary jurisdiction of single magistrates has been framed by the New Jersey court of errors and appeals in Katz v. Eldridge, 97 N.J.L. 123, 151. (1922), as follows : "The offence must be a petty and trivial violation of regulations established under the police power of the State in order that the offender may be summarily tried, convicted, and punished without indictment by a grand jury and without trial by a petit jury. It must, of course, be assumed that the punishment for such a petty and trivial offence will also be comparatively petty and trivial, otherwise it would violate another provision of the State constitution which prohibits cruel and unusual pun ishments." The constitutional problem arising from the guarantee of jury trials is present to a less degree in the grant of summary juris diction in civil cases. In some States the constitutional provision is expressly limited to criminal cases. In those where it includes
civil causes its interpretation has followed the historical manner given to the provision applicable to criminal jurisdiction. To in crease summary jurisdiction without infringing upon the constitu tional right to jury trial, statutes commonly provide that unless such trial is expressly demanded by the defendant at a certain stage of the proceedings the magistrate is empowered to proceed as if the case fell within his summary jurisdiction.
The extent to which magistrates exercise summary jurisdiction varies with the statutes of each State. In criminal matters it is exercised only in the broad class of petty offences. The furthest extent to which this classification has been enlarged concerned the breach of a State liquor law where the penalty prescribed amounted to a fine of $5oo and six months' imprisonment. No summary jurisdiction has as yet been conferred upon the judicial officials of the Federal Government. Federal crimes are limited in character and of such a grave nature as would traditionally call for the benefit of a jury trial. The recent prohibition amend ment to the United States Constitution and the legislation there under punishing the manufacture, sale and transportation of intoxicating liquor has, however, thrust upon Federal courts a large amount of trivial criminal business and brought to the forefront the desirability of establishing some system for Federal summary jurisdiction. In civil matters magistrates exercise a large summary jurisdiction. The abatement of nuisances, the col lection of taxes, the enforcement of liens, actions upon official bonds, quo warranto proceedings, the enforcement of awards, bastardy proceedings, are examples of classes of cases commonly entrusted to single magistrates. In ordinary civil actions upon contracts, promissory notes, torts and the like, summary juris diction is conferred provided that the claim does not exceed a certain pecuniary limit. Actions involving title to real property are generally excluded from grants of summary jurisdiction.
The procedure in summary jurisdiction matters is more in formal than otherwise. Matters of form are largely dispensed with and great liberality with respect to the proceedings is exer cised. Actions are commenced by summons which contains a short statement of the cause of action. No formal pleadings are necessary and in many cases the pleadings are oral, the magis trate's entry showing their substance. Defences are also pleaded orally. Many States, however, require the plaintiff to set out his cause of action in a bill of particulars and require the de fendant to file a formal answer. The admission of evidence is governed by general common law principles though less exact ness in their application is required. Judgments may be sued upon or executed in the same fashion as other judgments of superior courts. Dockets are required to be kept, upon which a record of the proceedings must be entered. Review of the proceedings is generally accorded by statute by appeal or writ of error within certain limitations as to the amount involved. The review is limited to those issues which were presented to the single magis trate and to the jurisdiction of that magistrate. Provisional remedies of arrest and attachment are also generally conceded to magistrates invested with summary jurisdiction.