Tanks

First Engagements on the Somme.—In the meantime the Somme (q.v.) offensive in France had come to a standstill. The right wing of the attack between the Somme and the Ancre which had met with some success at the start was definitely held up. The very heavy bombardments of the greatly increased artillery force had enabled the attackers to make some headway, but in the end the artillery fire had shelled away the barbed wire and replaced it by a worse obstacle, namely shell torn ground over which the infantry could only advance with difficulty, especially in wet weather. Moreover, this ground was quite impassable to transport. It was at this stage that it was decided to use the first two companies of tanks in an attempt to resuscitate the advance between the Somme and the Ancre. These two com panies were accordingly sent to France at the end of August.

On Sept. 15, 1916, the first tank attack took place. The IV. Army was to attack and advance on the line Morval, Les Boeufs, Guendecourt and Flers and the V. Army on the left of the IV. Army was to advance on Martinpuich and Courcelette. A total of 49 tanks were to be used, the majority with the IV. Army. They were to advance in small detachments of two or three machines against the enemy strong points. The general idea was that they should advance so as to reach the objectives just before the infantry. In some cases lanes were left in the artillery barrage up which the tanks were to advance ahead of the in fantry. The tanks advanced at dawn in a slight mist and came as a complete surprise to the enemy; the results were, however, disappointing. The tanks had been constructed to traverse wide trenches, banks and barbed wire obstacles, but not the shell torn ground which was the result of prolonged bombardment on a small area. Of Ole 49 tanks which were employed, 32 reached the front line. Of these nine went ahead of the infantry and rendered valuable assistance ; nine kept up or followed just behind and helped in reducing strong points where the enemy were still holding out. The remaining 14 broke down or sank and became ditched in the soft shell torn ground shortly after the battle had commenced. One tank in front of Flers gave remarkable assistance to the infantry and caused the surrender of 30o Germans. On Sept. 25 and 26, 13 tanks were employed on the same front and a few were employed later, on Nov. 13. In each case a large pro portion of the tanks were unable to negotiate the shell torn ground, but those that did rendered valuable assistance to the infantry, causing heavy casualties and the surrender of a large number of Germans.

The employment of the tanks in Sept. 1916 was contrary to the views of those who had originated the arm and were respon sible for its production. They considered that the tanks should be kept as a secret and used in large numbers as a surprise on a new portion of the front so as to give a chance of achieving decisive success. It did however prove that the tank was a definite reply to the machine-gun and barbed wire and that infantry ac companied by tanks could attack defended positions with every prospect of success.

Improved Types.

As a result of these trials it was decided that the arm should be expanded to a force of r,000 tanks. The tanks were not to be used again until the spring and the winter was to be spent in re-arming and training. The original six companies were expanded to nine battalions and the force in France was to become three brigades, of three battalions each, under the command of Lt.-Col. (afterwards Major-Gen.) H. J. Elles, R.E. Each battalion was organized in three companies and one mobile workshop, and each company was composed of four sections of four tanks each.

Although France had asked for i,000 tanks, the design of the tanks had not been settled. There was much discussion as to whether a completely new design should not be introduced ; sug gestions were made that a type with much wider tracks, or pos sibly equipped with more than one pair of tracks, should be tried.

In the meantime roo machines were ordered which were to be similar to the Mark I. machine, but with certain minor improve ments. These were known as the Mark II. and Mark III. ma chines. Other than the obvious fact that tanks had difficulty in crossing the pulverized ground on the Somme which was covered with craters and shell holes, the only military lesson that had been learnt as regards tank construction was the fact that it was not worth while fitting the tail to the tank; owing to its vulnerability and complications, it was constantly out of action and was of little value. The Mark II. and III. machines were therefore both very similar to the Mark I., the main differ ences being the provision of stronger rollers, and stronger armour to withstand the armour-piercing bullets which the Germans would be fairly certain to use in the next battle.