STRAITS QUESTION, THE. The Straits Question is composed of diverse elements—political, economic, sentimental. In its simplest form it consisted in the desire of Russia to control the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles—the doors to the Black Sea—and to obtain the sacred city of her religious dreams —Constantinople. Although forming a part of the greater East ern Question (q.v.), it was not co-extensive with that question; but throughout the i9th and early loth centuries was solely concerned with the narrower issue of the disposal of Constanti nople and the Straits in event of a break-up of the Ottoman power in Europe. Moreover, compared with other great political issues, the Straits Question is of very recent date.
known to the Ancient World as an economic and strategic problem in a very rudimentary form, it only emerged as an actual political problem in the 18th century, and then thanks to the initiative and imperialistic ambitions of a Russian tsar—Peter the Great. By his establishment of arsenals in the Crimea, and on the shores of the Sea of Azov, and by his foundation of a Russian navy, Peter the Great initiated that southward expansion of Russia so energetically furthered by his successors.
If not the first to perceive that nature had placed a severe handicap upon Russia in her struggle with the other nations by virtually excluding her from access to an ice-free sea, Peter was undoubtedly the first Russian tsar to understand the full complications of that handicap. Unless Russia were to secure access to an ice-free sea, she would start on an unequal footing with other nations in the race for world-power. Ever since Peter the Great's death Russia has unswervingly pursued the aim of obtaining a free outlet from the Black Sea to the Mediter ranean for her military and mercantile marine. Since the attain ment of that object presupposed the destruction of the Ottoman power in Europe, and the acquisition of Constantinople by Rus sia, the Mediterranean powers—France, England and Austria, as well as the Sultan, were concerned to frustrate the Russian design. Hence throughout the i9th century the Straits Question resolved itself into a contest between Russia and the Western Powers for the eventual possession of Constantinople and the Straits. Throughout the contest Turkey was little more than a tool in the hands of the rival protagonists, while Austria, whose interests were less directly threatened than those of France and England by a possible Russian acquisition of Constantinople, essayed intermittently to play the honest broker. Later, the emergence of a united Italy introduced a new factor.
diplomatic negotiations which centred from time to time round this problem were long and tortuous; but it is only possible to describe in brief outline the general trend of those negotiations, and of the policies pursued by the several powers. After the Treaty of Adrianople (Sept. 14,
1829) Russia seemed to be on the point of realizing her ambition. Under the Treaty of Paris (1856) she was forced temporarily to relinquish her project and to suffer the annihilation of her naval power in the Black Sea.
years (1856-7o) that inter vened between the conclusion of the Paris Treaty and the uni lateral denunciation in 187o of its Black Sea provisions by Russia, who seized the opportunity afforded by the Franco-Prussian war to free herself from the humiliating composition of 1856, were filled with protests from England against alleged infractions of the treaty by Russia. In the negotiations that preceded the assembling of the Conference of London (187o-71), and at the conference itself, England took the lead in insisting upon a formal withdrawal by Russia of her unilateral denunciation as the price for the actual removal of the neutralization of the Black Sea. At this conference England stood almost alone in opposition to Russia. France was too weak to render effective support ; Favre indeed hoped to purchase Russian mediation with Prussia by. a sympathetic attitude towards her in the Straits Question, while Bismarck had almost certainly secured Russian neutrality in the war by promising Gortchakov his co-operation towards revising the Paris Treaty in the sense desired by Russia. Austria alone supported England. But Austria was too fearful of the new might of Prussia, and her Foreign Minister, Beust, was too much of an opportunist (in 1867 he had attempted to gain Russia's friendship by promising his assistance in obtaining a revision of the Paris Treaty) for her support to be of real value. As the century advanced, various discussions were initiated (notably in i885 and 5894) over a possible alteration in the exist ing regime of the Straits; but always without result. England held tenaciously to her traditional belief that the presence of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean would be a menace to the Suez Canal. In 1894 Lord Rosebery, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and about to succeed to the premiership, actually declared to the Austrian Ambassador, Count Deym, that any attempt by Russia to change the existing situation in regard to the Straits would be looked upon by the British Government as affording a casus belli. Nor was Sir Edward Grey (later Vis count Grey of Fallodon) more sympathetic towards Isvolsky's suggestion in 1908 that the time had perhaps come for a revision of the Convention of 1841 in a sense favourable to Russia. It was doubtless urgent necessity that forced Sir Edward Grey in 1915 to reverse England's traditional policy by assenting to the conclusion of the Straits Agreements, by which Russia was prom ised the fulfilment of her long-cherished ambitions at the con clusion of peace.