Arguments for Theism

The Moral Argument.

Kant is the historical turning-point in the philosophy of religion. His criticism of the Theistic proofs was not made in the interest of Atheism, and he was an agnostic only in the technical sense that he denied the possibility of arriv ing at a knowledge of God by the pure or speculative reason. Religion belongs to the sphere of moral faith, of the "practical reason." There are three postulates of the moral reason, God, Freedom and Immortality; these cannot indeed be proved in any scientific manner, but the consideration of the limits of theoretical knowledge leads us to see that the pure reason cannot disprove their validity. It remains neutral. We are therefore free to affirm the three ideas without which our moral experience of the author ity of the moral law and the inexhaustible ideal of holiness could not be conceived as rational. This is Kant's fundamental position. The train of reasoning by which he seeks to establish the neces sity of the postulate of God is less important, being complicated by his peculiar views of the nature of the moral experience. The argument turns on the alleged moral demand that the highest holiness should ultimately coincide with the highest happiness.

The moral argument has been presented in various forms by important writers of the t9th and 2oth centuries. Theories of ethics naturally fall into two classes, (I) those which take the fundamental concept in morals to be duty and the moral law; (2) those which take the idea of the Good to be fundamental. From both of these standpoints Theistic conclusions have been defended. James Martineau in his Types of Ethical Theory and A Study of Religion adopts on the whole the first, T. H. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics and W. R. Sorley's Moral Values and the Idea of God are salient representatives of the second, while Dr. Hastings Rashdall's Theory of Good and Evil combines to some extent both points of view.

There are three elements in the moral consciousness on which stress is laid in Theistic arguments. (a) The authority which the conscience attributes to the moral ideal. This unique authority cannot, it is urged, be explained on any view which does not allow us to find the moral law in some way built into the structure of the world, grounded in Reality. Other possible accounts of the source of the sense of obligation really issue in an explaining away of the moral "ought," and hence in the consequence that the fully moral life is irrational. Further, it is urged, the Theistic view is the view which most clearly enables us to hold that the moral law is not simply imposed externally but is the expression of the deepest self and also that it is no mere individual product, but of universal validity. (b) The "objectivity" of the moral ideal. The conscience cannot be satisfied with the belief that the

moral ideal is dependent upon opinion, whether of the individual or of groups. In spite of the obvious fact that moral ideas change, the moral life depends upon the conviction that the moral ideal itself is absolute. Though men's apprehension of it may grow, their apprehension does not create it. It may be argued that Theism gives us the most rational account of this aspect of the moral consciousness, since it suggests that the moral ideal may exist in the thought of God. (c) The content of the moral ideal, particularly when viewed in its social aspect. Though we know what we mean by progress, we cannot conceive any temporal con dition which would be the final goal of social progress. Unless therefore we are prepared to allow that progress is towards an end which is inherently unattainable, we are led to the thought of an End which is beyond the temporal order. Here again the theistic hypothesis appears to offer the most reasonable view, since it would hold that perfect communion with God and herein with all rational beings, is the nature of the highest Good. The central thought of the moral argument in all its forms is this : given man's moral experience at its highest we have the choice of regarding it as rational and significant, or of explaining it away as partially founded on a mistake with the probable consequence of weakening its effectiveness. If we choose to regard it as rational and significant Theism is the view of the world which will most adequately fulfil our demands.

The Argument from Values in

General.—Strictly speak ing the moral argument is a special case of the line of reasoning which sets out from the existence of values. The world manifests the character of having value, or of being the occasion of our apprehension of value. Truth, goodness and beauty are real in our experience. In every case however, we are led to the con ception of an absolute value, a complete Truth, a perfect Good and Beauty. The very fact that we recognise degrees of truth, goodness and beauty, implies that we tacitly presuppose an abso lute standard towards which the partial values which we enjoy are approximations. Nor again, can we suppose that in the end these values are opposed to one another, though in finite experi ence they may sometimes seem to conflict. On the contrary, the Ultimate values must form a Unity, or rather perhaps, be aspects or attributes of one Supreme Value, which is what we mean by God. This is the line of thought which carries on the Platonist tradition in Christian philosophy and is impressively stated by Dr. W. R. Inge in his Philosophy of Plotinus and other writings.