The head of the column, however, which was naturally more prepared to offer effective resistance, to a number of some 6,000 men, rallied and advanced against the pass. They succeeded in piercing through the light troops on Hannibal's left in a south erly direction, and only when they had done so found that there were no other troops opposed to them. From the high ground they had reached, they were able, now that the mist had cleared, to see the full extent of the disaster, but as they were unable to offer any assistance they marched off to an unnamed Etruscan village, where they surrendered to Maharbal on the following day, in the vain hope of being set free if they laid down their arms; but with the rest of the prisoners (another 10,000 or so) they were all thrown into chains. The number of killed was about 15,00o; while the Carthaginian losses were only about 1,5oo.
It is the only instance in history of a general lying in ambush with the whole of a large army and accounting for practically the whole of the troops opposed to him, and it was, thanks to the favourable nature of the ground, the carelessness of Flaminius and the fortunate circumstance of the morning mist, a brilliant suc cess. Kromayer's account of the battle, which we have followed,
fits in with the account of Polybius and with the actual terrain better than any of the rival theories which have been advanced. Of these, the only one deserving of consideration is that which asserts that the battle took place a good deal farther to the west, in the valley of Montigeto, near the village of Tuoro. But here there is no long defile where an army on the march could be attacked—only a quite short one at Borghetto, close to the shore of the lake and too narrow for the passage of an army.
Immediately after this terrible defeat the Romans suffered a minor discomfiture. Servilius, who was hastening to his col league's assistance, had sent his cavalry, some 4,000 men, under C. Centenius, ahead of his main body. Hannibal sent Mahar bal with the light troops and part of his cavalry against him, and an engagement followed in which, according to Polybius, the Romans lost half their forces, while the rest sought shelter on a hill, but were surrounded and taken prisoners the next day.
(See CALLICULA.) See J. Kromayer, Antike Schlachtfelder, iii, 1, 148 sqq. (1914).
(T. A.)