Theology

In both spheres verification is pragmatic and is very different from logical certification, which would only be forthcoming if science were composed of deductions from axioms, instead of inductions from facts. Thus, in the entire realm of actuality, as distinguished from that of the pure or ideal sciences, what, of courtesy, we call knowledge is after all but probable belief. We can only be reasonable, not rational.

Such is the empirical account of the relation of faith to reason, theology to science and philosophy. It follows that no proof, in the most rigid sense, of the primary dogma of theism is possible. Such proof as may be had will consist in showing that theism is the most reasonable interpretation of the world and man, and in displaying the cumulative evidence for the assertion that the cosmos is due to the conspiration of innumerable causes and adaptations, by their united and reciprocal action, to issue in a general order of Nature, such as cannot reasonably be ascribed to fortuitousness but only to design by a supreme mind that must be intelligent and moral, the ground of the Good, the Beautiful and the True. Philosophical theology will thenceforward consist in the reinterpretation of the world and human history in terms of that metaphysical conclusion.

Theology Based on Other Grounds.

After rational theology received the classic criticism of Hume and Kant, attempts were made to establish theology on a new basis. The old proofs having been shown to be either fallacious or insufficient, the theoretical knowledge-methods by which they had been mediated were re nounced, as not the proper foundation of theology. But the empirical procedure, seeking for grounds of reasonable belief wherewith intellectually to justify faith, did not commend itself to the generations which succeeded Kant. In the 19th century the discovery of the deists that revealed religion presupposes natural religion was ignored; and Butler's suggestion, that what he vaguely called probability constituted our guide, was deemed in adequate. The latter line of thought was indeed pursued, without explicit awareness of the fact, by the numerous English writers who, from S. T. Coleridge onwards, developed the doctrine that religious truth can only be judged and accepted by "the whole man," and not by man as merely intelligent. Recoil from dis credited 18th century rationalism, however, did not direct itself to the empiricism represented by Locke, and perhaps more faith fully, in the theological sphere, by Butler. Confusing probability, as something pertaining to common or public beliefs and "knowl edge," with acceptance as merely probable on the part of the individual believer, objectors generally submitted that ardent faith is not a weighing of probabilities, nor can faith be content to stake its vital convictions on what it merely deems probable.

Of course the faithful man is certain, in the sense of being pri vately convinced; but what he is confident about may not have logical or scientific demonstrability from the point of view of objective or common knowledge. And it is the latter issue, not the mentality of this or that individual, with which theology is con cerned. But inasmuch as this confusion of standpoints was prev alent, it is not surprising that efforts were forthcoming to find a new basis for theology such as should constitute it a science, yet vindicate subjective certitude. Schleiermacher appealed to immediate experience. But it may perhaps be said that the immediacy of which he treated is but mediateness unrecognized .. when he proceeded to draw out what was implicit in his funda mental immediate truths, he reveals the presupposing of a whole system of philosophy and science. Another such attempt was that of Ritschl, who sought to make theology independent of the sciences of Nature and historical criticism, of metaphysics or theoretical (by which he seems to have meant rational) knowledge, grounding it on judgments of worth. That theology derives its arguments largely from considerations as to values is of course true. But these valuations must be appreciations of the actual, and so presuppose knowledge of the world and man, in order to yield any theistic argument. The existence of a real object, such as God or heaven, cannot be inferred from the worth of an ideal object or from doctrines about such objects. An existential science, then, cannot be extracted from considerations as to worth alone. There is room, moreover, for nothing but private faith or blind hope in the realization and conservation of the valuable, until the universe has been found, by theoretical knowledge, at least not to be of such a nature as to involve extinction of the valuable. That the good ought to be conserved is irrelevant to whether it will be conserved, until we have established a reason able belief in a good God. Thus it would again seem that the ology can only claim to be reasonable belief and that it can only provide itself with reasonable belief by interpreting the actual world. Once severed from the kind of "knowledge" on which it is dependent, it is unable to find any criterion whereby to distinguish reasoned and reasonable belief from superstition, theology from rules for pious behaviour or for pious feeling towards objects that may be but fond imaginations.