According to the fighting instructions of the day, it• was Mathews' duty first, if possible, to obtain the windward position. This he did. Then, before he bore down on the enemy to what distance he considered suitable, he was so to arrange his line that the ends would be conterminous with those of the enemy, so that, when parallel battle was finally joined, each ship would be opposed to the corresponding ship in the enemy's line. Clearly, however, Mathews' plan was hardly compatible with such instructions. If he was to wait until his whole line was covering the allies before attacking, he was the less likely to be back off Toulon in time to deal with the trans ports. Consequently, when Rowley's squadron was opposite the allied centre, and his own opposite the allied rear, Mathews signalled the attack. He was further influenced to this course by the fact that the British rear was far behind and to the east, owing, so its commander said, to variable breezes and adverse currents: in this connection, however, it must be noted that there was bad blood between Lestock and Mathews; the former was sullen, and the latter not without grave defects of temper—he was "Il Furibundo" to the Italians. Previously to the attack, Mathews had been flying the signal for the line—obviously ap plicable to Lestock—but when the commander-in-chief flew also the signal for battle, clearly meaning that Lestock should come up and take on the unengaged allied van before it should get about to assist the centre and rear, the second-in-command hove to and did nothing, on the grounds that Mathews was already filling his place opposite the enemy's rear and that consequently there was nothing for him to do. His action can scarcely be
justified except on technical grounds.
The remainder of the British fleet was also puzzled at being ordered to attack before the whole enemy line was covered, and in this connection it must be re membered that Mathews had at his disposal no signals other than those ordering the movements laid down in the fighting instruc tions, and no means of conveying to his subordinates his decision that, on this occasion, these instructions did not apply. The centre bore down on the enemy eventually, but in considerable confusion. Some of Rowley's squadron also attacked, but they were nervous of being doubled by the unoccupied allied van, and the leading ships correctly beat to windward to prevent this. Eventually M. de Court, realizing that the Spaniards who formed his rear were hard pressed, ordered his whole fleet about, and as the fresh ships came into action, Mathews broke off the battle. The only prize was the Poder, taken by Captain Hawke.
Verdicts of Courts-martial.—A record number of courts martial followed, and it is impossible to deal with them all here. Lestock was acquitted on the technical grounds indicated above, but Mathews was sentenced to dismissal from the service. He had, with such ships as supported him properly, fought energeti cally; he had dispersed the Spanish squadron of the allied fleet ; he had forced the enemy into Barcelona, and even resumed his work off Toulon. He was dismissed because, in trying to force a decision in difficult circumstances, he had trespassed against the fighting instructions of his day.