Nelson's Battle Orders.—Nelson had also drawn up orders for the guidance of his officers, and had explained to them how he intended to fight the battle. His instructions are embodied in the "Nelson Memorandum," which was drawn up at a time when he expected to have a larger force than 27. None the less the principles it contained are applicable with equal force to a smaller fleet. They were that the attack was to be made in two bodies; the larger, under Collingwood, was to obtain local superiority over the enemy's rear, while Nelson, with the smaller body, was to preserve him from the interference of the van and centre, should they attempt to go about to the assistance of the rear, as they normally would. On the day of battle Collingwood's squadron consisted of 15 ships and Nelson's of 12.
Villeneuve Puts to Sea.—It was on Saturday, Oct. 19, that the first of the Allies got to sea. Nelson knew of their move ments immediately, and made sail for the south-east so as to cut them off from passing through the Straits. Only part of the allied fleet got to sea on the Saturday, and on Sunday the loth the weather was so bad that they returned to the neighbourhood of Cadiz. Nelson, throughout, kept his main fleet out of sight, but followed them, move for move, receiving all the informa tion on which he based his decisions from his frigates. Monday the 21st was a fine day; the wind was light and blowing from the north-west, and at dawn the two fleets were in sight of one another. The Allies were sailing south, making for the Straits again, and the British were some 12 miles to the west of them. Nelson at once ordered his fleet to form two lines of sailing, in accordance with his plan outlined above. His own squadron was the more northerly of the two, and each admiral was leading his own squadron, Nelson in the Victory, and Collingwood in the Royal Sovereign. In this formation, they approached the allied fleet, and as they came more clearly into view, Villeneuve, for the first time, saw that he had underestimated their strength. He at once sacrificed the originality of his dispositions by order ing Gravina, with the reserve squadron, to come into the line; and, shortly afterwards, partly with a view to keeping Cadiz open as a refuge on his lee, and partly to counter what he thought was designed as an attack on his rear as he was sailing south, he ordered his whole fleet to wear and sail roughly north.
Collingwood's Attack.—Villeneuve's order to his fleet to wear was made about 8 o'clock, and it was not properly finished when Collingwood, who was to initiate the attack, ordered his squadron to change its formation from an irregular line ahead to an irregular line of bearing. This was about 8.5o, some two hours after Nelson had first ordered the advance. Collingwood's object was to bring his force into a line as nearly parallel as possible with the part of the enemy line that he was to engage, and the concavity in their line was such that this manoeuvre would virtually produce that result. Nelson had given his sec ond-in-command a free hand in deciding how to carry his line into battle, so that the credit for this movement, admirably suited as it was to the circumstances and designed to enable the British ships to use their broadsides as they got into action, must be given to Collingwood. For the rest, he carried out brilliantly the part assigned to him—namely to break through the enemy and engage the rear 12 ships. His own vessel, the Royal Sover eign, being a very fast sailer, was in close action just after 12 o'clock, and to her fell the duty of selecting the gap which would enable him to cut off 12 ships. Actually he cut off 15 and
became engaged with 16.
Nelson's Attack.—It now remains to consider the move ments of Nelson's line. The commander-in-chief it will be remembered had kept for himself the duty of preserving Coiling wood from any interference from the allied centre or van. For this purpose he continued his advance in the order he had first assumed, that is to say, irregular line ahead. With the object he had before him, he naturally wished to disguise the point at which his attack was finally to be directed, and line ahead was the most flexible and easily-managed formation he could adopt.
It had the drawback of exposing the head of the line, as it approached, to the concentrated fire of the enemy, but Nelson was prepared to regard this as a justifiable risk in view of the advantage of flexibility which the formation conferred, and which was peculiarly valuable in the particular circumstances. The event proved him right. He began by aiming at the van rather than the centre of the allies, whose leading ships, nervous of having their T crossed, crowded on sail to prevent this manoeuvre being executed, thus taking themselves further from that part of their line which was now being attacked by Colling wood, and which Nelson did not intend should be assisted by them. Indeed, the whole of the allied van and centre, mystified by Nelson's movements and uncertain of his aims, could do nothing but wait for him to declare his intentions, while they left the rear to look after itself. Nelson was himself leading his line, and as the Victory approached the allied van, he turned to starboard, followed in succession by the ships in his squadron and sailed down the allied line, looking for a suitable place at which to break through. This turn enabled him to open fire, but he preferred to hold it. Finally he found a gap astern of the Bucentaure, twelfth ship in the line and Villeneuve's flagship, and, passing through, he opened fire, raking the ships on either side with terrible effect. The majority of his line deployed to starboard and broke through the Allies at various places be tween the points pierced by Nelson and Collingwood; but two more ships ahead of the Bucentaure were engaged, the leading ten ships finally being left without attention. Six of these, under Dumanoir, at length made some attempt to go about to the help of those behind them, but their arrival was too late to be of any use, and they made off ; for, in the meantime, Nelson's 12 had been matched with 7, with the inevitable result. By this time, too, victory had declared itself for Collingwocd, who had been left without interference, as Nelson had designed, to com plete the destruction of the rear.
Completeness of the Victory.—In all, 20 prizes were taken —about 6o% of the allied fleet. A larger percentage was taken or destroyed at the Nile, but the comparison is not a sound one, for at the latter battle the enemy were caught in a confined space. At Trafalgar they had plenty of room to manoeuvre and a friendly port on their lee; yet they could not escape, such was the paralysing effect of Nelson's tactics—an inspired mixture of the traditional and original. Nelson had solved a problem that had puzzled British admirals for a century— namely, how to prevent the French making off while most of their fleet was still more or less intact. For this reason Trafalgar is regarded as the greatest of naval battles, and Nelson as the greatest of Admirals.