The new meaning given by Kant to the terms "transcendental" and "transcendentalism," is closely connected with his "revolu tion in the mode of thinking." In the preface to the second edi tion of the Critique of Pure Reason (p. 16) Kant compared this revolution with the change in cosmology effected by Coper nicus. "The condition is here the same as with the first idea of Copernicus who, having found that the explanation of the celes tial motions did not progress well when he supposed the whole host of stars to turn round the spectator, tried whether it might not succeed better if he made the spectator turn, and left the stars at rest." Thus, in metaphysics, we must not start from a dogmatic assumption about the constitution of objects and then determine the mode and character of cognition, but, on the con trary, the insight into cognition, into its regularity and structure, must precede, and supply the basis for putting and answering the question as to what kind of objects corresponds to that mode of cognition. "If intuition had to follow the constitution of objects, I do not see how one could know a priori anything about it but if the object (as object of the senses) follows the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I can quite well imagine that possibility." This start from the mode of cognition, with the intention of de termining the corresponding mode of objects, forms, according to Kant, the basic character of transcendentalism. He calls (Kritik der reinen V ernunft, 2nd ed., p.25) all cognition transcendental which is concerned not with objects but with our mode of know ing objects, insofar as the latter is to be possible a priori.
Transcendentalism, accordingly, does not start with some as sumption regarding the essence and constitution of "absolute space," in order to explain the peculiarity of geometrical cogni tion, but it begins with an analysis of geometry; it shows that all geometry comprises propositions of universal and necessary validity ; and it enquires into the "possibility" of these synthetical judgments a priori—it investigates "what the conception of space must be, if such a cognition of it is to be possible." (Transcenden tal Aesthetic, §3.) The answer to this question is that only if we think of space as an intuition a priori can the possibility of the apodictic cognitions of geometry become intelligible. Kant em phasises that neither space itself nor any geometrical determina tion thereof can be called "transcendental"—the term "transcen dental" applies rather only to the recognition of the fact that these notions have no empirical origin, and of the possibility by which they can nevertheless refer a priori to objects of experience (ibid. p. 8o seq.). This possibility follows, according to Kant, from
the fact that the objects in question are not "things-in-them selves"—not "transcendent" in the sense of dogmatic metaphys ics—but phenomena. The order and regularity of these phe nomena, which we call "nature," does not belong to them inde pendently of the form of our intuition and understanding; but the understanding itself produces this order by connecting the phe nomena according to its own laws.
Transcendental idealism, therefore, does not reach beyond the sphere of cognition by experience, beyond the realm of the em pirical objects; it rather tries to exhibit the foundation of empir ical cognition itself. In this respect, its use of the word "tran scendental" differs, as Kant emphasises, from its older scholastic significance, although even in the Critique of Pure Reason it is frequently used in a sense which corresponds to the older view attacked by Kant (A. Gideon, Der Begriff transcendental, i9o3). With particular clearness and pregnancy, the difference appears in Kant's Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. The word tran scendental—it is there declared—does not mean anything which goes beyond experience, but that which, although preceding it (a priori), is, nevertheless, only designed to make knowledge by experience possible. When these concepts supersede experience, their usage is called transcendent. The pure forms of intuition, space and time, as well as the categories, as basic concepts of pure understanding, are, therefore, of transcendental significance, but not of transcendental application; their validity is strictly uni versal and transcends merely empirical incidents; but they ex tend only to the totality of experience itself ; they determine its "form," but do not apply to non-empirical, absolute objects. In the same manner, Kant determines the concept of "transcendental truth." "In the whole of possible experience lie all our cogni tions, and in the general reference to this whole consists the transcendental truth precedes and makes possible all em pirical truth" (ibid. p. 185). (E. CR.)