Theory of Value

Logical or Theoretical Value

inclusion of logical or theoretical values in the general theory of value is undoubtedly the main reason for the outstanding place which axiology has in present day thought. Such an inclusion obviously involves a radical revision of our entire notion of values and of the relation of value to fact and truth. It is pointed out by the value philosophers that for an ultimate analysis, logic is also a science of values. The Pragmatists insist that theoretical values "presuppose purposes, selections, choices," and that "judgments are acts which do not differ in kind from those which are openly practical." The Neo-Kantian axiologists point out that the desire for truth and rationality, the demand for logical consistency or validity, is itself a craving for what ought to be and that here too we are moved by an ideal and directed by a norm, as surely as in the realms of ethical and aesthetic values. In either case validity becomes a form of value and logical rules instruments of the will to truth. The development of this notion involves diffi cult problems which cannot be gone into here. Whether the "value" of truth is relative or absolute, whether truth is the ulti mate value upon which all the others in some way depend, or merely subordinate and instrumental to the other values; or, finally, in some way co-ordinate with them—all these are debated questions which, as we have seen, in turn affect the problems both of classification and order of values. In any case, the notion of validity as a form of value has brought about in many quarters a radical revision of our notion of the relation of value to fact and truth. Against purely intellectualistic or "scientific" views it is contended, not only that every fact is ultimately an evaluation, but also that the logical impulse ought not to have the primacy over the other demands of our nature, and that no philosophical system can be adequate which fails to do justice to all our values. Philo sophic system tends to become, from this point of view, a system of values, or at least to presuppose such a system.

Value and Reality.

Whatever differences of opinion there may be among the various theories of value, there is substantial agreement that values are not subjective in the sense that they are merely matters of opinion and exist only for the persons who appreciate or feel them. Even for the psychological-biological theory, while they are dependent upon interest (desire and feel ing), they are independent of judgment and opinion. The "ob jectivity" thus universally accorded values is indeed given differ ent meanings, but in any case it is now generally agreed that values cannot be denied existence or reality in any world that can exist for man. They must, it would seem, exist in several senses.

Values "exist" ( s ) in the sense that they are operative and effec tive in and on human minds and in human action, and find embodi ment in the objective institutions of society. They are "real" in

the sense that they are valid, that is they claim to be true ideals as opposed to false ideals or fictions. They must, however, be real in a still more ultimate sense (metaphysical), in that they are part of the nature of things, and not something merely added to existences. For values to be real in either of the first two senses they must be real in the third. For both must be so related to real existence that they constitute the key to the nature of the real. Otherwise they become false ideals and futile fictions. The ques tion of just how values may be said to exist (to be part of the nature of things) is a difficult and debated question that cannot be gone into here. It is possible, however, to state a general proposition to which almost all theories of value would subscribe. Values are not mere subjective incidents, more or less gratuitously superadded to fact, but are inherent in the structure of reality. Reality in its fullness contains and exhibits values, and they can be extruded from it only by a process of abstraction that is rela tive to restricted purposes (of special sciences) and which is never quite successful. This reinstatement of the objective reality of values (in its essentials the Greek notion) is partly due to develop ments within value theory itself and partly to a larger movement in philosophy as a whole. In any case, it is now widely felt that in the answer to the problems of value is to be found the key to the philosophical interpretation of reality as a whole.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.—The lit. of the subject is extensive and scattered, some of the most important contrib. being found in art. and journ. and in general works in philosophy. The only works in English expressly devoted to the theory of values are W. M. Urban Valuation, Its Nature and Laws (1909) ; and R. B. Perry General Theory of Value (1926). Refs. to the more extensive liter. will be found in an art. by W. M. Urban, written in prep. for the Sixth Inter. Congress of Philosophy, entitled Value Theory and Aesthetics, and pub. in the Monist for Oct., 1926. Important works in general philosophy in which the value notion is central are Hugo Munsterberg Eternal Values (1909) ; B. Bosanquet The Principle of Individuality and Value (1912), and the Value and Destiny of the Individual (1913) (rep. the idealistic point of view) ; S. Alexander Space, Time and Deity (rep. the realistic and naturalistic point of view) ; and W. R. Sorley Moral Values and the Idea of God (1919). The Ger. and Fr. lit. is even more extensive. Only a few of hist. import. and of recent pub. can be noted. Among these are Ch. V. Ehrenfels System. der Werttheorie (1897) ; A. Meinong Zur Grundlegung der Allge meinen Werttheorie (1923) ; G. Simmel Philosophie des Geldes (1900) ; H. Rickert, System der Philosophic, 1921 ; W. Stern Wert philosophic (1924) ; C. Berguer La Notion de Valeur (1908) ; C. Bougie L'Evolution des Valeurs (1922). (W. M. U.)