Also in the epistemology of the i9th and the beginning of the loth century, the problem of truth is the central problem. It is especially the battle between pure "formalism" or "logicism" on the one hand, and "pragmatism" on the other, which gives to this epistemology its stamp. In the sense of "logicism," the concept of truth is determined especially by Bernhard Bolzano (1781-1848). Bolzano demands that the logical definition of truth must be set forth without any regard for the individual minds for whom the truth is valid, and without any intermingling of psy chological determinations. Truth is entirely independent of the thought of an individual mind. This view is expressed in Bol zano's concept of a "truth in itself." "I understand by a truth in itself any proposition which predicates something as it is, whereby I leave undetermined whether this proposition has really been thought and expressed by anybody or not. Be it the one or the other, the proposition shall always receive from me the name of a truth in itself if only . . . the object with which it deals, really possesses what it attributes to it. Thus, the quantity of flowers, for instance, which a certain tree standing in a definite place had last spring, is an indicable number even if nobody knows it; a proposition, therefore, which indicates this number, has for me the name of an objective truth even if nobody is cognizant of it." This formal determination of truth, which abstracts from any reference to actual thinking, is opposed by pragmatism (q.v.). For pragmatism, the concept of truth can be understood only if it is referred to the activity of thought, and if this activity is not considered merely in the abstract but is treated as a vital expression of a living individual. "True" is the term applied to those representations which hold good in the course of one's ex perience, i.e., which prove practically useful. This "power to work" is the real characteristic and criterion of truth. It is, ac cordingly, not so much an abstract-logical, but rather a biological conception : the truth of a judgment is decided not by the agree ment with a reality existing in itself, but by its practical effi ciency. As a consequence, there results that relativity of truth
which had already been urged by the Greek Sophists, especially by Protagoras. Truth is never absolute and universally valid : it is always true only for a definite biological species, inasmuch as the advantage of certain beliefs depends upon what is conducive to the species. (For a criticism of pragmatism, see CASSIRER : Sub stance and Function.) In an entirely different manner and with a different tendency Rickert tries to base the conception of truth not so much upon theoretical as upon "practical reason." Accord ing to Rickert's doctrine, we must start our quest for this concept not from the idea of what is, but from the idea of what ought to be, not from "ontology," but from the theory of values. The concept of reality finally presents itself as a concept of values; for we apply the name "real" to that which, in demanding recog nition from every thinking mind, is valid as a norm for all thought. Only by regression to a superindividual command, to a "transcendent ought," can the meaning of truth be clarified and understood. All cognition, inasmuch as it proceeds by judgments, i.e., by assent and dissent, implies an act of taking sides. Such an attitude, however, is possible only towards a value. Insight into this "primacy of the ought" is necessary for a satisfactory solution of the problem of truth. (Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 1904.) In general, the treatment of the problem of truth in the epistemology of the i9th and loth centuries, as compared with that of the 18th century, shows a change in point of view. The opposition of "experience" and "thought," of "empiricism" and "rationalism," has been replaced by the opposition of the "theo retical" and the "practical," "intellectualism" and "voluntarism." (E. CR.)