kg to some particular associations, the triangle on such occasions were not usu. ally the same, we should afterwards be unable to say what kind of a triangle had been in the view of our minds.
124. To state the fact respecting con ceptions more generally; if we attempt to form a conception of any object, it must, from the very nature of a concep tion, be individual, representative, per haps; of a numerous class, but still pos sessing those peculiar features which constitute individuality.—It may not be improper to suggest, that the want of attention to the difference between an idea and conception may have, in some measure, misled those philosophers who have denied the existence of general ideas. "The business of conception," says Mr. Stewart, " is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived;" and, admitting the truth of this, a conception is that transcript so presented.—We shall not enter into the inquiry, whether conception be a dis tinct faculty of the mind: we may, how ever, state, that it appears to us to be nothing different from memory, except as being a branch of that general faculty; and that a conception differs from an idea, only as species does from genus; that, in fact, without the aid of the asso ciative faculty, and with retention alone, every idea would be merely a concep tion. For the recollection of an indi vidual sensation, or group of sensations, whether seldom or frequently received, is a conception; but when a number of possessing some common fea tnres, hut in others differing, are received into the mind, the ideas they form there by the laws of association, coalesce with one another, thus Constituting these com plex ideas or states of mind, which never from their very nature can be concep tions, but which yet may be distinct, and when words are used to denote them, the subjects of rebsoning.
125. To apply these remarks : Almost an infinite variety of the sensations we receive, are presented to our view so constantly connected with others, that however much it may be in the power of the mind to attend to them in a separate state, it is impossible to form a concep tion of them separately; but, on the other band, there are a considerable number of qualities remote from mere sensation, belonging to an extensive range of indi vidual objects, which may be considered by the mind separate from those objects, and have internal feelings or complex ideas attached to the terms which denote them. Now, we apprehend, it is the grand difference between our general notions, when concerned about things merely sensible, and those which we might call more purely intellectual, that in the former case, the conceptions being usually clear, and frequently very vivid, are very easily brought up by the asso ciative power; and the circumstances of distinction being few, and merely sensi ble, are, from their very nature, calcu lated to produce a conception; and so little do we possess an abstractive power, that it is in most cases impossible to do this without introducing the conception of the whole object: on the other hand, the circumstances of distinction in the latter case, are less definite ; they are frequently extremely numerous, and are seldom capable of exciting conceptions, and consequently they do not readily call up any particular individual object to which the general term is applicable.—
We acknowledge, very much, in these latter respects, depends upon the peculiar circumstances of the case, or upon the habits of the individual. If a person had been remarkably struck with an act of justice, or of disinterested benevolence, or any other, it is probable, that while the vividness of the impression lasted, he would never be able to think of these qualities without the particular case being recalled into the mind ; and if he possessed a lively imagination, or had been present at the performance of the virtu ous action, would form an immediate conception of the whole scene. Or if a person be not much in habits of specula tion, he would universally think of sonic example of the action possessing those qualities. But these circumstances, though they tend to illustrate the operation of the associative power, do not appear to militate against the general truth of the above remarks.
126. The remarks we have made on the subject of abstraction or generaliza tion, have been, in a considerable de gree, separate from language, or at least supposing it not already formed. If every person was left to form his own classifications, language, in very many instances, would be of little utility ; be cause the same features of resemblance would not operate in the same way upon different individuals. But the proces8 of the mind, when language is formed, is somewhat different ; because in this case it is restrained, and has not the same un bounded liberty of forming its -associa• tions.—The mind of the child is not left to classify objects; but these objects are presented to it already classed, owing to the same word being used to express them ; and it is very interesting to ob serve the efibrts of the juvenile mind in finding out some features of resemblance between the objects which had previ ously been presented to him, and a new object presented to him with the same name.