Estinate of the Pleasures of S Path Y 61

benevolence, malevolence, life, affections, pure, compassion, benevolent, human, god and arguments

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65. It will confirm our belief that the cultivation of benevolence should be made a primary pursuit of life, if we recollect that its pleasures lie open to all kinds and degrees of men, since every man has it in his power to benefit others, and since we all stand in need of each other's good oflices.—Unlike the brute creation, We are dependent upon each other from the eras dle to the grave, for life, for health, for convenience, for pleasure, for intellectual accomplishments, and are unable to sub sist with comfort singly, or even in very small societies ; and this may be consi• tiered as a mark of the superior excellence of man's social pleasures. All the ten dencies of the events of life, ordinary and extraordinary, of the relations of life, of the various pleasures which have been enumerated, to connect us together, to connect accidental associations, and those forced upon us by the common situation of man, and his situation in society, into permanent affections, prove the same thing ; so great, indeed, is this tendency, that two men without claims to the title of benevolent, can scarcely become fami liarly known to each other, without con ceiving some good-will, complaisance, compassion, and tenderness, for each other.—Further, we love, esteem, and as sist the benevolent more than others : so that a benevolent action not only excites the receiver to a grateful return, but also the bystander to approve and reward and benevolence receives a hundred-fold, even in this world.—" But," says the ex cellent Hartley, " it would, be endless to pursue this. Benevolence is, indeed, the grand design and purport of human life, of this probationary state ; and every cir cumstance of human life, duly considered, must and does point to it directly or in directly." 66. As it is now established that bene volence is a primary pursuit, it follows, that all the pleasures of malevolence are excluded, as direct obstacles to our hap piness. The lower pleasures may all be made consistent with, and even subservi ent to, benevolence, by the limitations and power of it : but those of malevolence are quite incompatible with it. As far as malevolence is allowed, benevolence must be destroyed.—There is, however, this exception ; where wishing evil to some disposes us to be more benevolent on the whole, (as'in the case of what is called a just indignation against the vicious), it may somewhat aid the moral progress in the lower stages of benevolence. But it is exceedingly dangerous to encourage such a disposition of mind, by satire, in vective, or dispute, however unworthy the opponent may be; for, fostered, it will soon wear the features ofill-will, will soon totally become rank malevolence.

67. We most not only forego the plea sures of malevolence, but patiently and re solutely endure the pains of benevolence, particularly those of compassion. But we shall not be losers on either of these ac counts. The pleasures of the moral sense, which result from these virtues, will, in the first case, compensate for what we forego ; in the last, overbalance what we endure. Besides, mercy and forgiveness are in themselves pleasures, and in the event productive of many others ; and compassion generally leads us to such conduct as makes the afflicted to rejoice, and increases our disposition to rejoice with them.

68. As benevolence is thus supported by many direct arguments, there are many Similar and apposite arguments to prove that malevolence is the bane of human happiness ; that it occasions misery to the agent as well as the sufferer ; that it is in definitely inconsistent with itself, and with the course of nature ; and that, conse quently, it is impossible that it should subsist for ever. Now all these become so many indirect arguments for benevo• fence, and urge us to make the cultivation and exercise of it the supreme pleasure and end of our lives.—In order to make this appear more fully, we have only to take a survey of human life, the reverse of what we have already attended to. In

juries are increased by mutual injuries, till at last mutual sufferings oblige both parties to desist: the increase and consti tution of human nature give numberless admonitions to forbear ; and the hand of every man, and the power of every thing, is against the malevolent. So that, if we suppose a number of beings to be purely malevolent, and consequently to have an indefinite number of enemies, they would first cease from their enmity on account of their mutual sufferings, and become pure ly selfish, each being his own sole friend and protector ; and afterwards, by mutual good offices, endear themselves to each other ; so that at last each of them would have an indefinite number of friends, and thus would be indefinitely happy.—This is, in part, mere supposition ; but its ob vious correspondence with what we see and feel in real life, is a strong argument both of the infinite goodness of God, and consequently of the tendency of all beings to unlimited happiness through benevo lence. For the beings whom we have supposed to set out with pure malevo lence, could no more rest at pure selfish ness, or any other intermediate point, than they could at pure malevolence.—And thus the arguments, which exclude pure malevolence, necessarily infer that pure unlimited benevolence should be the ulti mate object of man.

Culture of Benevolence.

69. In order to augment the benevolent, and suppress the malevolent affections, we should diligently practise all such acts of friendship, generosity, and compassion as our abilities of any kind extend to ; and rigorously refrain from all sallies of anger, resentment, envy, jealousy, &c. For though our affections are not directly and immediately subject to the voluntary pow er, yet our actions are ; and, consequent ly, through them, our affections. He that at first practises acts of benevolence by constraint, and continues to practise them, will at last have associated with them such a variety of pleasures, as to transfer a great instantaneous pleasure upon them, and produce in himself the affections from which they naturally flow. In the like manner, if we abstain from malevolent ac tions and expressions, we shall dry up the ill passions which are the sources of them.

70. With the same objects in view, it will be of great use, frequently, to dwell upon the great pleasures and rewards at tending on benevolence ; and also upon the many evils, present and future, to which the contrary disposition exposes us. For thus we shall likewise transfer plea sure and pain by association upon these dispositions respectively; and rational self interest will be made to produce pure benevolence, and to extinguish all kinds and degrees of malevolence.

71. Frequent and fervent prayer for others, friends, benefactors, strangers, and enemies, has a very great and decided tendency to augment benevolence, and to extinguish malevolence. All exertions of our affections cherish them ; and those made under the more immediate sense of the divine attributes, have an extraordi nary efficacy, in this respect, by mixing the love, awe, and other exalted emotions of the mind attending our addresses to God, with our affections towards man, so as to improve and purify them. Petitions for the increase of our benevolence, and the suppression of our malevolence, have the same tendency.—Again, all medita tions upon the attributes of God, and par ticularly upon his, infinite benevolence to wards all his creatures, have a strong ten dency to refine and augment our benevo lent affections.—And, lastly, the frequent consideration of our own unworthiness, our entire dependence upon God, &c. raises in us compassion for others, as well as concern and earnest desires and pray. ers for ourselves. And compassion, in this imperfect probationary state, is an es sential and principal part of our benevo lent affections.

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