"In effect, after the same manner as the modern philosophers prove colours, taste, &c. to have no existence in matter, or without the mind, the same timing may be proved of all sensible qualities what. ever : thus they say, heat and cold are only the affections of the mind, not at all patterns of real beings existing in corpo real substances, for that the same body which seems cold to one hand seems warm to another. Now, why may we not as well argue, that figure and exten sion are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in matter, because, to the same eye, at different stations, or to eyes of different structure, at the same station, they appear various ? Again, sweetness, it is proved, does not exist in the thing sapid, because the thing re maining unaltered, the sweetness is changed to bitterness, as in a fever, or by any otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say, that motion does not exist out of the mind, since, if the succes sion of ideas in the mind become sinister, the motion, it is acknowledged, will ap pear slower, without any external altera tion ? Again, were it possible for solid figured bodies to exist out of the mind, yet it were impossible for us ever to know it : our senses, indeed, give us sen sations of ideas, but do not tell us that any thing exists without the mind, or un perceived, like those which are per ceived ; this the materialists allow. No
other way therefore remains, but that we know them by reasons inferring their existence from what is immediately per ceived by sense ; but how should reason do this, when it is confessed there is not any necessary connection between our sensations and these bodies ? It is evi dent, from the phenomena of dreams, phrensies, &c. that we may be affected with the ideas we now have, though there were no bodies existing without them ; nor does the supposition of ex ternal bodies at all forward us in conceiv ing how our ideas should come to be produced."