The Deity's acting and interposing in the universe show that he governs, as well as formed it ; and the depth of his counsels, even in conducting the material universe, of which a great part surpasses our knowledge, keep up an inward vener ation and awe of this great being, and dis pose us to receive what may be otherwise revealed to us concerning him. It has been justly observed, that some of the laws of nature, now known to us, must have escaped us, if we had wanted the sense of seeing. It may be in his power to bestow upon us other senses, of which we have at present no idea ; without which it may be impossible for us to know all his works, or to have more adequate ideas of himself. In our present state we know enough to be satisfied of our de pendency upon him, and of the duty we owe to him, the Lord and Disposer of all things, Ile is not the object of sense ; his essence, and, indeed, that of all other substances, is beyond the reach of all our discoveries ; but his attributes clearly ap pear in his 'admirable works. We know that the highest conceptions we are able to form of them are still beneath his real perfections ; but his power and dominion over us, and our duty towards him, are manifest.
" Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself," says Mr. Locke, " yet, having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he bath not left himself without a witness ; since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him as long as we carry ourselves about us. To show, therefore, that we are capable of know ing, that is, being certain, that there is a God, and how we may come by this cer tainty, I think we need go no farther than ourselves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence. I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear perception of his own being ; he knows certainly that he exists, and that he is something. In the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real be ing than it can be equal to two right an gles. If, therefore, we know there is some real being, it is an evident demon stration, that from eternity there has been something: since what was not from eter. nity had a beginning, and what had a be ginning must be produced by something else. Next, it is evident, that what has its being from another, must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from another too : all the powers it has must be owing to and received from the same source. This eternal source, then, of all beings must be also the source and original of all power ; and so this eternal being must he also the most powerful.
" Again, man finds in himself percep• tion and knowledge : we are certain then that there is not only some being, but some knowing intelligent being, in the world. There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being, or else there has been a knowing being from eternity. If it be said, there was a time when that eternal being had no knowledge ; 1 reply, that then it is impossible there should have ever been any knowledge ; it being as impossible that things wholly void of kr.owledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a •riangle should make itself three angles greater than two right ones. Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful, and knowing Being, which whether any one will dill God, it matters not. The thing is evi dent; and from this idea, duly consider ed, will easily be reduced all those other attributes we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being.
" From what has been said, it is plain to me, that we have a more certain know ledge of the existence of a God, than of any thing our senses have not immediate ly discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is any thing else without us. When I Say we know, I mean, there is such a knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that as we do to several other inquiries.
" It being then unavoidable for all ra tional creatures to conclude that some thing has existed from eternity, let us next see what kind of a thing that must be. There are hut two sorts of beings in the world, that man knows or conceives ; such as are purely material, without sense or perception ; and sensible perceiving beings, such as we find ourselves to be.
These two sorts we shall call cogitative and incogitative beings ; which, to our present purpose, are better than material and immaterial.
If then there most be something eter nal, it is very obvious to reason that it must necessarily be a cogitative being ; because it is as impossible to conceive that bare incogitative matter should ever pro duce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing of itself should produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eter nal, we shall find it in itself unable to pro duce any thing. Let us suppose its parts firmly at rest together ; if there were no Other being in the world, must it not eter nally remain so, a dead inactive lump ? is it possible to conceive that it can add mo tion to itself, or produce any thing ? Mat ter then, by its own strength, cannot pro duce in itself so much as motion: The motion it has must also be from eternity, or else added to matter by some other be ing more powerful than matter. But let Is suppose motion eternal too ; but yet matter, incogitative matter, and motion, could never produce thought. goolf4 ledge will still be as far beyond the pow er of nothing to produce. Divide matter into as minute parts as you will, vary its figure and motion as much as you please, it will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, than it did before this division. The minutest particles of matter repel and resist one another just as the greater do, and that is all they can do ; so that if we suppose nothing eternal, matter can never begin to be ; if we suppose bare matter without motion eternal, motion can never begin to be ; if we suppose only matter and motion eternal, thought can never begin to be ; for it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or without mo tion, could have, originally, in and from itself, sense, perception, and knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternally inseparable from matter, and every particle of it. Since, therefore, whatsoever is the first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative ; and whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist, it necessarily follows, that the first eternal being cannot be, matter. If, therefore, it be evident that something must necessarily exist from eternity, it is also as evident, that that something must be a cogitative being. For it is as impos sible that incogitative matter should pro duce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of all being, should pro duce a positive being or matter.
" This discovery of the necessary exist ence of an eternal mind sufficiently leads us to the knowledge of God ; for it will hence follow, that all other knowing be ings that have a beginning must depend on him, and have no other ways of know ledge or extent of power, than what he gives them ; and therefore, if he made those, he made also the less excellent pieces of this universe, all inanimate bo dies, whereby his omniscience, power, and providence, will be established ; and from thence all his other attributes ne cessarily follow." With respect to Christians, it need only be just mentioned, that they were very early divided in opinion as to the nature and essence of the Supreme Being ; a great part worshipping three persons in the unity of the godhead, whilst others ab4olutely rejected a trinity of persons, and asserted the unity of the divine na ture, both as to person and substance. With respect to the theology of the Pagans, it is thought by most learned men that they acknowledged but one God ; and that the many different divinities worshipped by them were but attributes and actions of one and the same God. This may probably be true of the wiser Heathens ; and, indeed, there are many strong and beautiful passages in Pagan authors, to prove that these acknowledg ed but one God. Thus Pythagoras taught the unity of God, and defined him to be a mind penetrating and diffusing itself through all the parts of the universe, from which all animals receive life ; and Plato called God the being which is ; and whenever he mentions the Deity, it is al ways in the singular number.