6. The true principle of classification seems to be, not essential differences in the origin or signification of words, but the mode in which they are employed. 'it should, however, be steadily kept in view, that all distinctions among the sorts of words have gradually arisen out of the circumstances in which language has been formed, and proceeded towards maturity ; and that such distinctions are by no means to be extended beyond the present em ployment of words. It is necessary, for convenience and dispatch, that we ar range ; but arrangement must not super sede further examination. The fact is, that originally there could have been but one sort of words, the names of the ob jects of our sensations and ideas. From these all others must have sprung; but, without words expressing affirmation, lan guage must have moved very slowly, and often have been very ambiguous ; and therefore we may reasonably suppose, that the ever active principle of associa. tion would soon transform nouns into verbs, by making them in certain situa tions expressive of affirmation. From these two classes all the rest have sprung, and though it is desirable, and even neces sary, for the grammarian to arrange, it should ever be carefully borne in mind, that his arrangements respect the present contrivances of language ; and that he, who would look into the causes of these contrivances, most retrace the steps which have been trodden, and see what were the procedures of those periods, when language was merely the child of necessity, not the organ of long-establish ed and intricate associations. The philo sophy of language is one branch of the philosophy of mind, and neither will be fully understood till both are.
7. The objects of sense and intellect are, in reality, nothing more than proper ties, or collections of properties. The mind, however, resorts to a support for those properties; something by which they are connected, in which • they ex ist; and this we call substance. As far, however, as this word has any meaning,.
it signifies nothing more than a collection of properties existing, or capable of existing, independently of other properties. These properties may be considered collectively ; or they may be thought and spoken of, though they cannot exist, separately. We can think of no material substance which does not possess, at least, two properties; no visible object, for instance, can be without colour and extension ; but we can think of extension and of colour sepa rately; that is, we can direct the attention a the mind to each of them, exclusively of the other properties with which it may be connected. This separate orexclusive attention of the mind is called abstraction. It is a very simple, though a very difficult, operation of the mind. It is often con founded with generalization but though exercised in every act of generalization, it may be exercised altogether indepen dently of it.
8. The names of substances are called substantives; the names of properti es, with out reference to the substances of which they form a part, are called abstract nouns. To every name comprehended under these two classes, the term NOUN is ap plied. A noun is said to be increased or diminished in wompreheasion, when the number ofideas denoted by it is increased or diminished ; and in extension, when the number of objects, to which it can be ap plied, is increased or diminished. Those single words, which are added to nouns to vary their comprehension, or to vary or determine their extension, are called AD. NOUNS. From these similar, yet generally distinct objects, of different adnounsarise two grand classes, adjectives and restric lives : the former varying the comprehen sion of the conjoined nouns ; the latter varying, sometimes determining, the ex tension of them. In one mode of the application of the term, adjectives are nouns ; for they are the names of proper ties; and, as will be seen in LANGUAGE, originally they were nouns; but since they are not employed alone, like substan tives and abstract nouns, to denote the objects of thought or discourse, it is pre ferable to class them with words whose use and employment is similar. Found ing our arrangement on the use and mode of employment of words, we include, un der the head of nouns, those words only which denote substances and properties, without being connected with other words. This, of course, includes substan tives and abstract nouns ; but excludes adjectives.
9. We constantly find it necessary to speak of ourselves, to address others, or to speak of others. If we wish to speak of ourselves, or to address others, we imme diately find, that we must either mention the names of the individuals concerned, or use some words not belonging to our selves or them, as individuals, but as the persons speaking, or spoken to. How
much to be preferred the latter method is, a slight attention to the subject will show : George might say to James, " George hopes that James is well, and that James will come and see George very soon :" but there is nothing in this which spews that George is the person speaking, or that James is the person spo ken to ; and besides, it often happens, that the names of the parties in conversa tion are mutually unknown. It is the mode adopted by children, and persons speaking to them ; and probably was so universally in the early periods of lan guage ; but we feel that we want more.. Suppose George to say, " The person speaking hopes the person spoken to is well, &c. ; it would be perfectly intelligi ble, and answer every purpose but that of dispatch. That would be effec'ed by us. ing some short words of equivalent signi fication ; such are / and thou. / has the same force as the person speaking, thou as the person spoken to ; except that I and thou are limited to the individuals actually speaking or addressed, or supposed to be so speaking or addressed. These words are then, strictly speaking, nouns ; but as they are used for names of persons, they are called PRONOUNS, that is, for-nouns. Again, suppose we wish to speak of some person or thing, which we have before mentioned, in such a manner as will de note, that we have before mentioned that person or thing, instead of merely re peating the word, as " James is gone, and James will come back ;" in which case it is left to an inference, which, in many cases, would be a doubtful one, that the latter referred tv the same person as the former,—we might say, " James is gone, and the said James (or the said person) will come hack," or, " and he will come back." Here it is obvious, that he not on ly supplies the place of the name, on which account it might be called a pro noun, but has a distinct reference to the person having been before mentioned. In a similar manner, she means the female person spoken of ; and it, the thing spo ken of. These words, with their plurals, are all called pronouns, and though they obviously either come under other sorts of words, or are abbreviations for one or more of them, yet they are at present so distinct and important in their use, that they require a separate class. Pnoxouxs, then, are words used for the names of persons or things, connected with the idea, that they are either speaking, spo ken to, or before spoken of 10. We cannot advance one step in lan guage, without leading our hearers or readers to the inference,that certain ideas are connected in our minds, or that we believe certain objects, properties, or events, to be connected. The connect ing link in language need not always be stated ; in the infancy of language it could not exist, and in the language of childhood it does not exist. Words are joined together, and it is easily under stood, that the corresponding ideas are connected in the mind. " Mamma, milk good," would surely be understood by any one ; and, in similar cases, depending upon the ease of inference, the ancient writers left it to the mind of the reader to form it for himself. But how slowly and how ambiguously communication would proceed, without some appropriated link of connection, any one may be convinced, by leaving out of a few sentences those words, which, in our language, serve that purpose, and which, in all languages, are necessary to render an affirmation com plete. The intelligent reader, to what ever other account of such words he may have been accustomed, will perceive that we refer to verbs. The essential quality t a vans is, to express affirmation, when 'bled with the subject ofthe affirmation.
henever a word expresses it, that word s a verb : if in any case it does not ex press it, it ceases to be a verb. That it does express affirmation is, doubtless, by a.; inference of the mind ; in itself consi dered, it can only be the name of some quality or circumstance of its subject ; but by being frequently employed with such inference, and,'in the later periods of language, being invested with peculi arities of it acquires a character different, in appearance at least, from that of the noun, and, in many instances, 19 appropriated to convey the inference, that something is affirmed of its subject.
11. From verbs, or rather from the noun state of verbs, in which they do not ex pykss affirmation, a new class of words is tamed, partaking of the ch aracteristics of the noun and adjective, and agreeing with verbs in the accidental circumstance of re quiring after them a peculiar form of pro nouns. These words are called PARTICI