The important distinction between li bels and words spoken, was fully esta blished in the case of Villers v. Mousley, (2 Wils. 403.) viz, that whatever renders a man ridiculous, or lowers him in the es teem and opinion of the world, amounts to a libel ; though the same expressions, if spoken, would not have been defama tion : as, to call a person, in writing, an itchy old toad, was held in that case to be a libel; although, as words spoken, they would not have. been actionable. And on this ground, a young lady of quality, in the year 1793, recoN ered 4,0001. damages for reflections upon her chastity, publish ed in a newspaper, although she could have brought no action for the grossest verbal aspersions that could have been uttered against her honour. An action for a libel also differs from an action for words in this particular ; that the former may be brought at any time within six years, and any damages will entitle the plaintiff to full costs. To print of any person that he is a swindler, is a libel, and actionable.
All libels are made against private men, or magistrates, and public persons ; and those against magistrates deserve the greatest punishment : if a libel be made against a private man, it may excite the person libelled, or his friends, to revenge and to break the peace ; and if against a magistrate, it is not only a breach of the peace, but a scandal to government, and stirs up sedition.
Where a writing inveighs against man kind in general, or against a particular order of men, this is no libel ; it must de scend to particulars and individuals, to make it a libel. But a general reflection on the government is a libel, though no particular person is reflected on: and the writing against a known law is held to be criminal.
Though a private person or magistrate be dead at the time of making the libel, yet it is punishable, as it tends to a breach of the peace. But an indictment for pub lishing libellous matter reflecting on the the memory of a dead person, not alleg ing that it was done with a design to bring contempt on the family of the deceased, and to stir up the hatred of the King's subjects against them, and to excite his relations to a breach of the peace, cannot be supported; and judgment was in this case accordingly arrested.
Scandalous matter, in legal proceed ings, by bill, petition, &c. in a court of justice, amounts not to a libel, if the court bath jurisdiction of the cause. But he who delivers a paper full of reflections on any person, in nature of a petition to a committee,to any other persons except the members of parliament who have to do with it, may be punished as the publisher of a libel. And by the better opinion, a person cannot justify the printing any papers which import a crime in another, to instruct counsel, &c. but it will be a
libel. 2. The communication of a libel to any one person, is a publication in the eye of the law ; therefore the sending an abusive private letter to a man, is as much a libel as if it were openly print ed ; for it equally tends to a breach of the peace.
In the making oflibels, if one man dic tates, and another writes a libel, both are guilty : for the writing after another shows his approbation of what is contain ed in the libel ; and the first reducing a libel into writing may be said to be the making it, but not the composing. If one repeats, another writes, and a third ap proves what is written, they are all mak ers of the libel; because all persons who concur to an unlawful act are guilty.
If one writes a copy of a libel and does not deliver it to others, the writing is no publication: but it has been adjudged that the copying of a libel, without au thority, is writing a libel, and he that thus writes it is a contriver ; and that he who bath a written copy of a known libel, if it is found upon him, this shall be evi dence of the publication ; but if such libel be not publicly known, then the mere having a copy is not a publication.
When any man finds a libel, if it be against a private person, lie ought to burn it, or deliver it to a magistrate ; and where it concerns a magistrate, he should deliver it presently to a magistrate.
The sale of the libel by a servant in a shop, is prima facie evidence of publica tion, in a prosecution against the master ; and is sufficient for conviction, unless contradicted by contrary evidence, spew ing that he was not privy, nor in any way assenting to it.
It is immaterial, on a criminal prose cution with respect to the essence of a libel, whether the matter of it be true or false ; because it equally tends to a breach of the peace ; and the provocation, not the falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally; though, doubtless, the false hood of it may aggravate its guilt and en hance its punishment. In a civil action, a libel must appear to be false as well as scandalous : for if the charge be true, the plaintiff has received no private injury, and has no ground to demand for a com pensation himself, whatever offence it may be against the public peace ; and, therefore, upon a civil action, the truth of the accusation may be pleaded in bar of the suit. But in a criminal prosecu tion, the tendency which all libels have to create animosities, and to disturb the public peace, is the whole that the law considers. And, therefore, in such pro secutions, the only points to be enquired into are, first, the making or publishing of a book or writing ; and, secondly, whether the matter be criminal ; and if both these points are against the defend ant, the offence against the public is com plete.