Every change, however minute or stu pendous, however connected with unin telligent or snoral nature, equally re quires and possesses some cause of its ex istence. The steady resolves and brilliant career of virtue as necessarily result from preceding circumstances, as the harmo nious movements of the solar system ; and the irregularities of vice demand the operation of preceding impulses, equally with the wanderings of a meteor. .Let any specific volition or determination be admitted at any time to exist in the mind: whence did it arise ? Most certainly not uncaused; unless we are prepared by this reply to destroy all the common receiv ed opinions and feelings of mankind, and to admit that, though there was a period in which the order and beauty of the uni verse did not exist, they suddenly broke into being, unconnected with any circum stances whatever tending to accomplish so glorious a result. If this volition be stated to originate in a selfdetermining power, acting independently of motive, this self-determining power must be con sidered as in fact only a preceding voli tion, and the question, therefore, instead of being correctly and finally answered, is by this reply merely trifled with and evaded. Indisputably, the only proper answer that can be given is, that the par.' ticular determination alluded to, neces sarily originated in the views and cir cumstances of the mind immediately pre vious to its adoption. These views and circumstances resulted from other situa tions which preceded them, and which were!the, consequences of others more remote. And thus in retrograde march we travel through a long series of men tal feelings and operations, finding each linked indissolubly to that by which it was preceded, and constituting part of an immense chain, which soon extends beyond the reach of mortal eye, as much u it defies the Controul of mortal power.
Another argument for the doctrine of philosophical necessity is drawn from the divine prescience. The foreknowledge of events must evidently preclude their contingency, for a contingent event is an event that either may or may not hap pen ; but that which may not happen most evidently cannot be foreseen. The distinctions which have been made on this subject by the advocates of liberty have served to exhibit the perplexity of their authors, instead of contributing the slightest support to their: cause. And with respect to the nature of the su preme mind, it is impossible to prove, or reasonably to believe, that the divine knowledge, infinitely superior as it un questionably is to that of man, can em brace those things which are not the ob jects of knowledge, and exist so as to in volve contradictions. To know that a contingent event will take place, would be to know that an event, which is de cidedly and characteristically uncertain, is nevertheless certain, or, in other words, to know a thing to be what it is not. It is only by the expedient of limiting the di vine prescience to events not dependent upon human choice, an expedient which some few have ventured to adopt, that the supporters of philosophical freedom can surmount this inconsistency ; and the grossness of contradiction is thus ex changed for the flagrance of indecorum.
To the believer in the absolute'foreknow ledge of God, the argument derived from it in support of the necessity of human actions may be considered as equally con vincing with perhaps any argument, upon any subject that can be presented to the human understanding. If events are foreseen, they cannot be contingent. If they are contingent, they cannot be fore seen.
In addition to the arguments above ad duced, may be added that arising from the consciousness which every man feels, of being influenced by some motive in the performance of every voluntary ac tion. If any person attempt to accom plish an act, of whatever nature, whether of importance or insignificance, without the influence of some motive to decide, he will find himself completely baffled in the enterprize, and in every Instance be will be able to assign the circumstances by which h. was actually influenced. He will likewise find the spirit of his exer tions uniformly proportioned to the ani mation of his motive. Where the motive is urgent, and arising from the union of inclination and conviction, his efforts will display all the activity of enthusiasm, and all the fortitude of heroism. And in correspondence with the lessening inter est of motives, his enterprises will decline in vigour, till, in the lowest instance, to adopt the language of our immortal poet, they are, " Sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought, And lose the name of action." The argument from consciousness, in deed, is applied by the asserters of philo sophical liberty with equal confidence in support of their system; and it is insisted that all men imagine themselves possess ed of liberty of choice, and must, there fore, if the opposite doctrine be true, la bour under a gross and constant delusion. The fact, however, unquestionably is, that the convictions of the meanest peasant, when he is enabled perfectly to compre hend the just statement of the subject, will oblige him to decide in favour of ne cessity. if interrogated, whether, instead of going to his daily labour on a particu lar occasion, he could have continued at home 1 he will reply, that most certainly he could, if he had so pleased, alluding merely to practical liberty or freedom from external controul. But when asked, whether he could have remainedat home with the same inducements of duty and inclination to go abroad ? as soon as he fully understands the question, he will answer, that he certainly could not with out changing his mind; in other words, that without some alteration in his feel ings of inclination and duty, some varia tion in mature cause or preceding cir cumstances, whatever term we choose to adopt, he must inevitably have proceed ed to his work.