The column of grand divisions cannot always proceed ; otherwise it would be by far the most eligible for the march of single battalions, in situations where the enemy's cavalry might 'make an'attack ; the grand divisions should all clOse up to half distance, so that when ordered to wheel up and form the square, they might leave no gap in either of the flank faces ; the two rear companies moving up to the spot on which the grand division immediately preceding them wheeled off, right and lett ; the firont companies halt ing during the wheel, and closing up to the centre as the reserve, with the co- ' lours, passes into their rear. When there are guns with a battalion, they move on such 'occasion to the angles most liable to be attacked; four pieces of cannon are needful to render a square perfectly safe; but, for their accommodation, it will be necessary for each face to move fOrward seven paces ; whereby the interior of the square will he greatly increased, and space given for the cannon to be served at the angles ; this evolution is'exhibited under fig. 17.
The column en potence, that is, in form of a gibbet, is peculiarly deceptive ; es pecially when that column is a close one, having no intervals between the compa nies ; in this the whole form one solid mass. If discovered, the enemy will cer tainly direct their artillery towards It; thereby doing great execution. The great object of this formation is, to push forward a strong force against some parti cular point, so as to bear down whatever opposes it, or suddenly to form a flank where a charge of cavalry is expected i iu the latter case, the rear division of the column halts until there is space enough for it to wheel, (to the right, if to secure the right flank) and, as each division does the same in succession, it is evident a line is formed, at right angles with the front line, which keeps moving on until all the divisions of the column have wheeled. We have shown, in fig. 18, how this is done on the right flank ; while on the left we have shown an eghellon flank, which moves with more ease than the close co lumn, and is not subject to so much mis chief from the enemy's artillery ; but this is not so deceptive ; however, it affords the advantage of being ready either to form a flank, by wheeling backwards an octave, or to move forward into line ; which cannot be done from a close co lumn without deploying.
When a column is advancing towards an enemy, it is proper that its cannon should precede it, to clear the way by their fire ; but when retreating, the can non should be in the rear, to check pur suit. The passage of rivers is generally conducted on the same principle ; advert ing to one point, where a choice can be made ; viz, always to cross at a re-enter ing bend of the stream, as shown in fig. 19, by reference to which it will be seen, that in crossing from A to B, the passage cannot be flanked by the enemy ; while it is defended by the troops which first -cross : change the position, and cross from B to A, and the enemy will flank the, passage, which you cannot defend ; because they will , enfilade whatever troops or cannon you post for that pur pose ; they having the command of a greater extent of front than yourself in the latter instance.
One of the most arduous situations in which an officer can be placed is the covering, or conducting, of a convoy ; especially when heavy carriages are in question. A numerous convoy can rarely
travel more than six or seven miles with in the day, however favourable the roads may be ; unless it may be practicable to draw two or three carriages abreast, which can be practicable on plains only ; for whenever a pinch or defile might present itself, so as to occasion only one carriage to 'proceed at a time, though only for a few feet, as in passing a nar row bridge, it would have the saxne ef fect as if the whole day's journey were performed in single trains: this is not the case in campaign situations, because one column of waggons may keep mov ing on while another is stopt ; and, if a carriage should break down, others may pass round it :, in this way the columns should not be far distant. When we con sider that a hundred waggons will cover a mile in length, we cannot but admire the frequent success of officers, perhaps with only four or five battalions under their command, in conducting convoys of many hundreds of heavy carriages, through an exposed country, from one place to another ; sometimes, indeed, for full an hundred miles. On such service it is highly necessary to have a body of cavalry ; else every little party of the enemy's horse would subject the convoy to perpetual danger and delay.
When a general expects a convoy, he must favour its approach and safety by every possible means : one of the best devices is, that of threatening an attack, so as to prevent the enemy horn detach ing his cavalry. When the convoy is near, and it is suspected that an attempt will be made to cut it off by a sudden movement, the general must, if circum stances admit, make one retrograde march with his whole force to meet it; or, if that be not practicable, he may send orders for it to follow such route as may be most under cover, or best remov ed from the danger of assault. We often see instances of a campaign being decid ed by the safe arrival, or vice versa, by the loss of a convoy. The utmost skill sometimes cannot oppose the overbear ing prowess of superior power ; but, as we always suppose an army to place itself between its expected supplies and the enemy, it is evident, that if of equal three, every advantage is on its side ; for the enemy, having a greater distance to march, when about to attack a convoy, than the defenders have to proceed to its rescue, and any detached party being liable to destruction while passing round the flank, it is evident, that, by retaining the intermediate situation, we may gene rally afford every necessary protection. When it happens otherwise, we com monly find that the enemy are superior in cavalry, which they detach to a great distance to intercept the convoy, while their infantry remains in some strong position. In such case a retreat is indis pensably necessary, and reliance must be placed in the commander of the convoy, (if he is warned of the enemy's approach) being able either to take refuge under the walls of some fortified place ; or on his taking possession of some village, or forming a barrier against the enemy, by drawing up his waggons, &c. to the best advantage : in such case he is virtually entrenched ; his cattle and troops being within an area impenetrable to cavalry, and furnishing an excellent cover for the keeping up a most destructive fire on the assailants. If he can command a sup ply of water, he may do wonders ; at all events, he may easily hold out until relieved.