BRUTE, or beast, a term generally ap plied to quadrupeds, and also to other animals, and implying inferiority of intel lect.
Among brutes, the monkey kind, both in the external shape, and internal struc ture, bear the nearest resemblance to man. In the monkey kind, the highest, and the most nearly approaching the like ness of man, is the ourang•outang, or ho mo sylvestris. Philosophers are much divided about the essential characters of brutes. Some define brute as an animal not risible, or a living creature incapable of laughter ; others, a mute animal, or a living thing destitute of speech ; the Pe ripatetics, an animal endowed with a sen sitive power, but without a rational one. The Platonists allow reason and under standing, as well as sense, to brutes, though in a degree less pure and refined than that of men. Indeed, the generality of the ancient philosophers thought that brutes reasoned : this, among the hea thens, was the opinion of Anaxagoras, Porphyry, Celsus, Galen, Plutarch, as well as Plato and others.
That brutes possess reflection and sen timent, and are susceptible of the kind, as well as the irascible passions, indepen dently of sexual attachment and natural affection, is evident from the numerous instances of affection and gratitude daily observable in different animals, particu larly the dog.
Of these, and other sentiments, such as pride, and even a sense of glory, the ele phant exhibits proofs equally surprising and unquestionable ; for which we refer to the article ELEPHAS.
The brute creation manifests also a wonderful spirit of sociality, independent of sexual attachment. It is well known that horses, which are perfectly quiet in company, cannot be kept by any fences in a field by themselves ; oxen and cows will not fatten by themselves, but neglect the finest pasture that is not recommend ed by society : sheep constantly flock to gether. Nor is a propensity to associate restricted to animals of the same kind and size. Instances to this purpose are enu merated in " White's Natural History of Selborne," to which we refer the reader.
Mr. Locke maintains that the souls of brutes are wholly material; that they do not possess the power of abstraction ; and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction between men and brutes. Accordingly he sup poses that they have no use of words, or any general signs, by which to express their ideas. It has, however, been a sub
ject of dispute, whether brute animals have any language intelligible to one an other. Some have pretended, that they have a kind of jargon, by which they can make a mutual communication of their sentiments. There is at least a similitude of speech in brutes ; for they know each other by their voices, and have their signs, whereby they express anger, joy, and other passions. Thus a dog assaults in one strain, fawns in another, howls in another, and cries when beaten in an other.
Dr. Hartley has investigated the intel lectual faculties of brutes, and applied his theory of vibrations and association in accounting for the inferiority of brutes to mankind, with regard to intellectual ca pacities. He ascribes the difference sub sisting between them to the following cir cumstances, which he has taken occasion to illustrate on the principles of this the ory. The first of these is the small pro portionate size of their brains, whence brutes have a far less variety of ideas and intellectual affections than men. The second cause of this difference is the im perfection of the matter of their brains, whereby it is less fitted for retaining a large number of miniatures, and combin ing them by association, than man's. The third cause is their want of words, and suck like symbols. Fourthly, the instinc tive powers which they bring into the world with them, or which rise up from internal causes, as they advance towards adult age, is another cause of this differ ence ; and, fifthly, it is partly owing to the difference between the external im pressions made on the brute creation, and on mankind. This ingenious writer sup poses, with Des Cartes, that all the mo tions of brutes are conducted by mere mechanism ; yet he does not suppose them to be destitute of perception ; but that they have this in a manner analogous to that which takes place in us ; and that it is subjected to the same mechanical laws as the motions. He adds, that it ought always to be remembered, in speak ing on this subject, that brutes have more reason than they can show, from their want of words, from our inattention, and from our ignorance of the import of those symbols, which they do use in giving in timations to one another, and to us.