The influence of the practical assent over the rational, arises from their being united in so many eases. And the vivid ness of the ideas arising from the suppos ed utility, importance, &c. produce a more ready and closer union of the terms of the proposition.
III. The evidences for past facts are a man's own memory, and the authority of others. These are, under proper restric tions, the usual associates of true past facts, and therefore produce the readiness to affirm a past fact to be true, that is, the rational assent. The integrity and compe tency of the witnesses being the principal restriction or requisite in the accounts of past facts, become principal associates to the assent to them ; and the contrary qualities to dissent.
If it be asked, how a narration of an event supposed to be certainly true, or to be doubtful, or to be entirely fictitious, differs in us effect upon the mind in these circumstances respectively, the words in which it is narrated being the same in case ? 'it may be replied, first, in having the terms true, doubtful, or fictitious, with a variety of ideas usually associated with them, and the corresponding internal feel. ings of respect, anxiety, dislike, &c. con meted with them respectively ; wheime the whole effects, exerted by each upon the mind, will differ considerably from one another. Secondly, if the events be of a very interesting nature, the related ideas will recur oftener, and thus agitate the mind the more, in proportion to the ' supposed truth of the event. And it con firms this, that the frequent recurrence to the mind of an interesting event, suppos ed to be doubtful, or even fictitious, by degrees makes it appear like a real one. The practical assent to past facts often produces the rational assent, as in the other cases beffire spoken of.
IV. The evidence for future facts is of the same kind with that for the proposi tions concerning natural bodies, being, like it, taken from induction and analogy. This is the foundation of the rational as sent. The practical depends upon the re currency of the ideas, and the degree of agitation produced by them in the mind. Hence reflection makes the practical as sent grow for a long time after the ratio nal is arisen to its height ; or, which is of - ten the case, if the practical assent arises, in any considerable degree, without the rational, it will generate the rational. Thus
the sanguine are apt to believe and assert what they hope to be true ; and the timo rdns what they fear.
V. There are many speculative abstract propositions in logic, metaphyscis,ethics, controversial divinity, Ike.. the evidence for which is the coincidence or analogy of the abstract terms, in certain particular applications of them, or as considered in their grammatical relations. This causes the rational assent. As to the practical assent or dissent, it arises from the ideas of importance, reverence, piety, duty, am jealousy, envy, self-interest, &c. • which intermix in these subjects, and thus in some cases, add great strength to the rational assent, in others destroy it, and convert it into its opposite.
On the whole it appears, that rational assent has different causes in propositions of different kinds, and practical assent in like manner : that the causes of rational are also different from those of practical; that there is, however, a great affinity and general resemblance in all the causes ; that rational and practical assent exert a perpetual reciprocal influence on each other ; and, consequently, that the ideas belonging to assent and dissent, and their equivalents and relatives, are highly complex, unless in the cases of very sim 1 pie propositions, such as mathematical ones. For, besides the coincidence or ideas and terms, they include in other ca ses, ideas of utility, importance, respect, disrespect, ridicule, religious affections, hope, fear, &c. and bear some gross ge neral proportion to the vividness of these ideas.
It tbllows from the preceding state ments, that vicious men, that is, all per sons who want practical faith, must be prejudiced against the historical and other foundations fir rational faith in`re vealed religion. Further, it is impossible any person should be so sceptical • as not to have the complex ideas denoted by the words assent and dissent associated with a great variety of propositions, •in the same manner as in other persons ; just as he must have the same ideas in general affixed to the words of his native language as other men have. An universal sceptic is therefore no more than a person who va ries from the common usage in his applica tion of a certain set of words, viz. truth, certainty, assent, dissent, &c.