Marriage being a contract it is necessary, as in all contracts, that the parties thereto should be capable of consenting—and in fact consent—to the rights and obligations created by the mutual agreement. This is the reason for the foregoing essential conditions, other than that relating to con sanguinity, of a valid marriage. It is also the reason for other conditions. Thus, there must be no duress or fraud. An instance of a marriage being annulled on the ground of duress is that in Clarke v. Clarke, where the wife went through the marriage ceremony under the impression that it was a ceremony of betrothal, she being influenced to do so, and in that belief, by her mother, who was conspiring to that end with the man to whom she was married. Another is found in the case of Bartlett v. Rice, where the woman went through the marriage ceremony in a fainting condition, because the man had previously produced a pistol and threatened to shoot her if she would not consent to marry him ; immediately after the ceremony she left him, the marriage was never consummated, and the man never insisted upon his marital rights. Generally speaking, it is not necessary, in order to avoid a marriage entered into through fear, that the fear should be such that a person of ordinary courage and resolution would yield to it ; it is sufficient if either party is mentally incompetent to resist pressure improperly brought to bear upon him or her (Scott v. Sebright). As an instance of a marriage
annulled on the ground of fraud may be quoted Lord Portsmouth's case, where the attendant circumstances were such as suggested fraud and circum vention between a person of weak mind and the daughter of his trustee and solicitor. But though duress and fraud may invalidate a marriage, yet the law will not annul one merely on the ground of misrepresentation of either of the parties as to his or her circumstances, position, or personality. The doctrine of CAVEAT EMPTOR (q.v.) would seem to enter as com pletely into the contract of marriage as the contract of sale. Neither party should consent to marriage without first using an independent judgment upon the circumstances of the particular case ; the law will no more relieve from the effects of a blind credulity in connection with the contract of marriage than in connection with any other wherein each party has the opportunity of using reasonable care and caution.
Although persons of the already n_entioned ages are capable of entering into the contract of marriage, yet any one who is less than twenty-one years