It was decided in Stevenson v. Blakelock that where a client gave his solicitor a specific sum for the purpose of satisfying a debt for which an execution had issued against his goods by a judgment creditor, to whom the solicitor duly paid the money, the solicitor had a lien for his general balance of costs upon a lease which he received from the creditor, and which had been deposited with the latter by the client as a security for the debt. It was also held in the same case that the lien was not extinguished merely because the solicitor had taken acceptances from his client before the lease was received from the creditor, in respect of the costs, some of which acceptances were subsequently dishonoured. But the lien only extends to a solicitor's taxable costs, charges, and expenses ; it does not extend to any advances or loans he may make to his client. Such advances and loans are clearly distinguishable from costs, charges, and expenses which are incurred with a solicitor in the strict relatior ship of client and solicitor. In respect of advances and loans which any one might have made to the client, a solicitor has no greater privilege than any other person would have (In re Taylor, Stileman, and Underwood). It often happens that a client gives security to his solicitor for the payment of the costs, and the question may then arise whether the solicitor by accepting the security waived his right of lien. The last
mentioned case is also an authority on this point. There Lord-Justice Lindley said : " Whether a lien is waived or not by taking a security depends upon the intention expressed or to be inferred from the position of the parties, and all the circumstances of the case. In this particular instance we are dealing with a solicitor and his client. It strikes me if a solicitor takes from his client such a security as this solicitor took [it was a promissory note for .e200 and interest at 5 per cent., payable on demand, secured by a charge on a policy of insurance], the prima .fade inference is that he waives his lien. That appears to me to be the right and proper conclusion to come to, bearing in mind that it is the solicitor's duty to explain to his client the effett of what he is about to do. In the case of a banker I should not draw the same inference, since a banker has not a similar duty towards his customer. Bearing in mind the position of the parties, and having regard to the decision of Sir John Leach in Robarts v. Jefferys, we are justified in saying that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the true inference from the circumstances is that the lien was waived."